

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

APRIL 1955

50¢





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(To learn how The Infantry School leads the way see page 20)

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ASSOCIATION'S JOURNAL

EACH of the more than 25,000 of you who were getting an individual copy of THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL at the end of last year is much more than a statistic to us, but we think you may find it interesting to know what you look like as a statistic.

If you're a general officer, you are one of 419 who were paid-up members at the end of 1954.

If you're a colonel, you are one of 1,678; a lieutenant colonel, one of 2,461; a major, one of 2,872; a captain, one of 3,812; a lieutenant (first or second), one of 5,136; a warrant officer, one of 765; and an enlisted man, one of 1,683.

We are quite proud of our general-officer figures. Those 419 who are members represent 93 per cent of all the general officers on active duty in the Army. If every other commissioned rank were as well represented, our circulation would really be booming.

Here are some more statistics about you: 820 of you are Marine Corps officers; 569 of you are officers in the Air Force; and only 90 of you are officers in the Navy.

Unfortunately, we can't give a breakdown of our numerous National Guard and Army Reserve members, because many of you don't tell us. We can count 2,401, but we know you are more than that.

In addition to your individual paid-up members, 6,455 units were buying copies for their dayrooms and headquarters. Libraries receive 644 copies each month and we peddle some 2,000 or more copies each month through post exchanges and military bookstores.

Here's a surprising statistic: Every branch and service of the Army is represented almost in direct proportion to its officer strength. For example, where you will find 495 Infantry lieutenant colonels on our membership list, you will also find 56 lieutenant colonels from the Transportation Corps.

One statistic we are unhappy about is the one that shows us that the percentage of members is larger among the general and field-grade officers than it is among company-grade officers. The reasons for this are understandable: You are less likely to be settled than the older officers, and less likely to be committed to the profession of arms. There is also the matter of pay, but the JOURNAL is such a good buy at \$5 a year that we don't think that many second lieutenants fail to become members because they can't afford it. This may be the case among noncommissioned officers, most of whom have families. We hope many noncoms will be able to spare \$5 of the new pay raise for a membership.

In closing, I ought to say that we didn't make this statistical study out of idle curiosity. It was to answer the questions of our advertisers, present and prospective.

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The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL strives to—

Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

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Cover by Gil Walker

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THE MONTH'S MAIL

February Issue

● Your February JOURNAL had so many articles of close and cogent importance for personnel of our "early ready" active reserve unit that I want to order twenty extra copies.

Our command has all the problems of the weekly warriors: men who are individually expert in their technical service MOS, but must be trained up to the "theater thinking" responsibilities of this unit, which would support a full field army; men who were keen, alert unit commanders in World War II and are staked out in T/O deadends not always commensurate with their abilities or past performance; young men of magnificent potential who wear out the years as Indians under many chiefs; and damned good line soldiers who have to learn how to work as staff officers. Our enlisted men are half returnees or previous service and half youngsters who are picked off one or two a month for active service.

My sergeant major has been with the unit less than a year. He was a Navy yeoman, and though almost sacrificially willing to work, he must learn about the Army. My message center chief joined even later, and broke in—due to his good humor and resourcefulness—successfully, in the hell's mess of summer camp when forty-odd attached units were dumped on us.

So, to these two men—my right and left hands—I will send copies marked with "To a Sergeant" as well as the splendid article by General Palmer; to our CG and his C/S go copies of the Palmer article; to some of my sweat-and-swear buddies of the long and dogged nights at summer camp go certain other articles which may help their morale and keep them with us.

You couldn't have drafted a better issue for my personal purposes. My father, who was an infantry major in World War I, wants to express his admiration and appreciation for your magazine, which I share with him. He and Mother keenly enjoyed your fifty-year issue, as I did.

MAJOR GEORGE A. PADDOCK, JR.
322d Log Com (C)
Chicago, Ill

How Do You Command?

● I was one of Colonel Harmeling's company commanders when he commanded an infantry battalion in post-truce Korea

["Troop Command in Korea," February]. In his article he states, "Sometimes I think that a battalion commander's primary duty is to shield his company commanders from as many frustrating distractions as possible, so that they will be free to run their companies according to their own personal methods of leadership." His line of thinking created a mutual respect between him and his company commanders.

I think Colonel Harmeling has hit upon two of the major causes of demoralized company commanders:

One is those "frustrating distractions" that include the endless certificates that "every member of this unit has personally . . ."; the inspectors from higher headquarters who come into the area to play squad leader; the numerous trivial reports that have to be submitted and are used for God only knows what; the constant picking away at a company commander's key personnel for the sole purpose of making higher headquarters a showplace; and so on.

The other is that in some battalions each company has two COs—a captain and a lieutenant colonel. Maybe it's a normal human weakness for battalion commanders to want to play company commander, but I've seen what it can do to a subordinate's initiative. In Colonel Harmeling's battalion each company had only one CO.

LT. ROBERT E. PRICE

Fort Ord, Calif

Thanks

● I would like to tell you that I like the Association of the United States Army and THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. It has been a tremendous help to my military study. I was recommended for special work and it was so wonderful because your JOURNAL furnished a good background for this work.

COL. ARCHIMINIO PEREIRA
Brazilian Army

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Solidarity and the Mass Army

● Congratulations on your February issue. It was beautifully put together and I'll bet it stirred up a hornets' nest of letters. Your articles by Bill Mauldin, Captain Little, and Major Boatner set each other off nicely. They also set me off, particularly "Solidarity is the Key to the Mass Army."

Captain Little's very first sentence belted me between the eyes. Down here at battery and battalion level, where we deal with this potential mass soldier daily, we find that soldiering *must* be a way of life. If it were not a way of life, almost a religion, we would not be able to retain our old soldiers who, contrary to Captain Little's ideas, are invaluable to the successful completion of our mission. The Captain evidently has never seen the anguish in a battery commander's eyes when he loses that crackerjack supply sergeant with eighteen years of service; the cries of woe of the battalion executive officer when he hears his wonderful sergeant major has decided to retire after doing his twenty. We at this level are hurting now because we have so little to offer a good man in an effort to retain him. Our most effective appeal is directed at his pride in his unit, trying to sell him on the idea of a long and honorable career in an honorable profession. And, thank God, this approach has shown encouraging results. All we can promise him is a "way of life." Take that away and what have we left?

Captain Little comments on the "psychological theory of emulation." Child psychologists also propound this theory, and it is a good one. A child learns by imitating the parent, and by constant repetition of this imitation. If the parent is good, barring accidents, the child develops in a satisfactory manner. . . . Is it not reasonable to assume that these children, grown into adults with sound moral backgrounds, can transfer this need of imitation to someone else who corresponds roughly to the parent? And it is reasonable, is it not, to assume that this imitation will be selective, based on reason and intelligence? If so based, how can this be wrong? The Captain may argue that the man at the top has no one to imitate and therefore may do anything and be anything he likes, thereby starting a chain reaction that could change our civilization. I say that the leader, intelligently chosen by a moral people, must and will have the image of a god to imitate as much as human frailty will show.

I refuse to clear away the old catchwords like *esprit*, *discipline*, and *morale*. It is the shame of the Army that these catchwords have been cleared away as of now, inadvertently in some cases, I must admit.

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

Again, down here at battery and battalion level, our men thrive on esprit, discipline and morale. Captain, come down here and tell Charlie Battery's first sergeant that his unit is no better than Baker Battery. Bring iodine! Catch the look of pride in a soldier's eye as he watches the Old Man cheering like hell for the battery's team at a basketball game. Go ask the soldier who was busted last week whether or not he deserved it and if he hates the Old Man for busting him. He'll probably tell you that "the Old Man is a whiz; you can't get a damned thing past him." The amazing thing about it is that these unit commanders have not been elected by these men, nor has anyone attempted to "reinforce" or "modify" the orders of their leaders. The discipline evolves from a set of reasonable principles, known by all, being enforced by a reasonable commander. For any man to take upon himself the radical modification of this set of principles, rules or laws, would result in immediate reprisal, not only by the commander, but by the men who resent seeing a good unit fouled up. This is "solidarity," but the type of solidarity that is a result of esprit, discipline, and morale, and not a negation of the three.

Captain Little writes of the "trade-union philosophy." Does he infer that the clerk-typist, in time of national desperation, would refuse to shoot when shoved into the infantry? I know a few clerk-typists who typed out a thousand rounds per minute in the Battle of the Bulge. They weren't overjoyed at being there, but they had a job to do and they were the johnnies to do it. And they did it. . . .

One sentence of Captain Little's is particularly interesting if you compare it with another article in the same issue: "He could not be exposed to the carefully organized and precisely scheduled program of the training center." I urge the Captain to read Major Boatner's article on page 32, the best I've seen on the training program in quite a while. Not only are these "carefully organized and precisely scheduled programs" failing to impart any knowledge to our soldiers, but they are ruining some of our younger officers by forcing them into unwieldy and unfamiliar roles. Initiative and responsibility must be developed right here, while the tree is still green and unbent, and there is no room for any sort of development except that of the narrowest kind in Captain Little's program.

Captain Little gets down to the meat of his problem when he says, "The problem of solidarity does not necessarily destroy the potential effectiveness of an army in combat." Up to this point he has been sailing along, making confident, concise, positive statements, and suddenly he shifts to the defensive. On this single paragraph alone, libraries could be filled, and I will not attempt to discuss it here. Rather, let me refer to the author's standard of "solidarity," the nebulous something that iden-

tifies one soldier with another. In combat, when this soldier's solidarity is destroyed, nothing is left, least of all an effective fighting unit. However, we "old Army" sticks-in-the-mud have three gimmicks to help us along: esprit, morale, and discipline. By destroying one, or, in some cases, even two, of these you may still have an effective fighting force.

* * *

I would like to presume for a moment to refer Generals Patton, Ridgway, and Van Fleet to the following: "Commanders at higher levels may continue to use the symbolic techniques of the historic commanders, but they will not be effective because the mass soldier does not understand them, nor do others who are members of the society from which he is recruited." Captain, you and I have never known three more "effective" gentlemen than those three officers.

Captain, can't you see what you are advocating? Can't you see the tragedy of the mediocrity you are trying to force upon us? Where is the fire, the spirit, the initiative, the individuality that has won all our wars and made us the strongest nation in the history of the world? Must we beat everything into the conform, the average? May you and I never serve in an army where the average leaders will lead the average army down the average road to a hotter-than-average hell!

Yours for any kind of an army that wins wars,

LT. BART V. MITCHELL

12th AAA Bn
Miller Field, NY

• I wish to compliment you for publishing "Solidarity is the Key to the Mass Army." I just finished reading it, and nothing has impressed me so much in a long time. It was a very poignant piece of writing that was obviously written by a first-class craftsman, but I almost wept when I had finished it. Not just for the loss of the fine traditions in our Army, but the obvious lessening of importance of the individual in our society for the cause of efficiency.

The sentences, "Under industrial management principles, all activity must yield to criteria of 'efficiency' and 'utility,' rather than 'good' or 'right.' Habits and customs must be made 'systematic,'" I think brought out the whole tenor of life and thought of our society and Army. We have been lamenting the passing of prestige of our noncoms and junior officers, but actually it is only a reflection of modern technology. It is no longer required to be a leader or know every aspect of one's trade, because the junior leader no longer makes decisions or possesses authority. His job is only to carry out directives from someone higher up. The company and battalion commanders are tied down to their desks running their units by paper directive from above. The clerks and administrators in some far-distant per-

sonnel office have more to say about their men than the noncoms and platoon leaders. Consequently there is a loss of respect for the junior leaders by the men and a loss of self-respect by the junior leaders who realize that they are flunkies and possess no real authority.

The Army used to be accused of treating men like numbers without regard for individuality. This may be so, but the Army is not to be blamed, as it has only reflected our modern society and its methods. The individual has been submerged in the interests of efficiency. The Army cannot revive prestige for the noncoms and junior officers so long as they are shop foremen and not unit leaders. One might as well try to return the King of England to a position of power and authority. It used to be that a soldier could be recognized by his lean, tanned visage from days in the field and on the drill ground. Now as a manager the CO, through hours at a desk, probably has a large spread both front and rear as his symbol.

I am not griping, but I do feel rather like the frontiersman who saw the great buffalo herds, and then one day realized that they were no more. I am sad because, like our frontier, which is no more, the old Army produced some great men. I only hope that in our quest for efficiency we do not lose sight of our heritage. I hope we are not selling our birthright for a mess of pottage.

LT. ROBERT CEDER

Box 116, Rogers Center
Bloomington, Ind.

• Although a brief review of the Army's history since the beginning of World War II would not inspire one to take issue with Captain Little's article on what has happened to the Army's pride, morale, and esprit, his appalling assertion that it is right and meet that the United States Army should properly be reduced to a mass of uninformed MOS'd nonentities is in itself a tragic contemporary reflection of the attitude of so many "scholars" who attempt with analytical precision to foster technological mass psychological dogma on a basically human—not industrial—organization. The Army fights—it does not produce. In the final analysis, the killing of an individual enemy with a rifle, grenade, bayonet—yes, even the bare hands—is the mission of the Army. People so organized to perform this mission are not a union of journeymen. This mission has no civilian counterpart.

Consequently, no material assets, real or imagined, no community relations techniques, will ever convince Private X that there is sufficient reward to justify his performing this necessary mission.

There is only one rationale which can convince Private X that the killing of a human being is justified and that is an unswerving devotion and loyalty to his country. The so-called frills that Captain Little so casually, even scornfully, casts

aside as superfluous to the "mass" Army are but symbols of that dedication to service. They are but a local transition of a basically idealistic inspiration. The regiment's colors—with the battle streamers representing the glories of that unit's participation in the defense of these United States—the ribbons, the pageantry, if you will—represent idealism, not mass material motivation.

We would venture to say that when these symbols of patriotic devotion to service of country disappear and IBM efficiency standards measure performance while technological controls replace personal leadership, the twilight of the fighting army is near at hand.

It is true that because of public apathy to military living conditions the colonel and the corporal have become fellow strap-hangers as they commute daily to their posts of duty. Yet each is still a *man*, whether or not he may have been transformed from a ruralite to an urbanite. In each is a heart and a soul, within which there remain a conscience and emotions.

Are we to believe that no longer shall one come a little closer to a clear comprehension of the greatness of America when he observes Old Glory fluttering in the evening breeze as she is lowered at Retreat to the air of the National Anthem played by bandsmen who share the meaning of the words with Francis Scott Key? Are we to believe that the human heart shall no longer experience a surge of strength as the human mind beholds the sacrifices of those who have gone before us when the simple notes of Taps invade the silence of the night? Are we no longer to find mutual respect and deep, abiding, and unswerving devotion to the cause we serve when the colonel and the corporal exchange salutes?

When the day dawns to find these human feelings beyond our sensitivity, then America shall not be worth defending—for the heart and soul of her manhood will be as common stone, and just as worthless.

COL. GEORGE I. FORSYTHE

Infantry

LT. COL. HAROLD H. DUNWOODY

Armor

Washington, D. C.

● Captain Little's article is a superior job of temporizing Clausewitz's awareness that social institutions are the primary elements in shaping the soldier. His general image of the urbanization of the Army by our fast, mobile, cosmopolitan society is superb. All his observations are precise. But one might question his assumptions and conclusions.

To say that "soldiering is no longer a way of life" may just as well mean that society, rather than destroying that way of life, is assimilating it: that society, rather than saying that soldiery is no longer a necessity, may be saying that it can no longer do without it. Society may realize it must completely integrate the military

function of man into its day-to-day life. When military experts warn that war can now reach Kansas City and all the world, perhaps man has reasoned, however feebly, to a conclusion that it is necessary for every individual to assume the soldierly stature in self-defense.

Captain Little's disturbing assumption seems to be expressed in his closing words: "to be done in a business-like way . . . and then go home." It is quite possible that society has realized there can be no such thing: that one cannot "go home" in an age in which war means a foxhole in your front yard.

One must heartily agree with Captain Little when he says "the mass soldier stands alone." Whether or not he stands alone spiritually is the question. The character, motivation and conduct of that individual may be entirely different from what Captain Little has intimated. Moreover, one might question whether or not the loss of symbols, discipline, and traditional pageantry is the portent of the mass army. It is possible, under a different assumption, that the cosmopolitan nature of an army may contain the seed of greater and greater interest in those symbolic aspects of the military life. Such losses may well be the portent of an army's failure to adjust to social changes. . . .

Captain Little's observations that "the size of the group with which the mass soldier can express solidarity becomes smaller" and that "mass soldiers become increasingly dependent on symbols" are outstanding. However, his distinction between "solidarity" and *esprit* is semantic. One may consider platoon "solidarity" or *esprit* the product of impersonal or imposed discipline, and mass "solidarity" as a product of self-discipline. But the distinction is a very fine one. Discipline of some kind is an essential of any social endeavor. In a society with a changing pattern of morality (apparently for the better, in Western countries) only a shift in the origin of authority or discipline is being observed. If the medieval knight could be a prototype of our cosmopolitan soldier, perhaps the Army's job is to encourage the natural tendencies of men to express their combative urges and to symbolize them.

Thank God "the mass Army is still in the process of development." It is unnecessary to conclude, as Captain Little does, however, that the process will be so sterile that man will not attempt to personalize his life with his limitless imagination. On the contrary, man will surely attempt to idealize or "egofy" his military affairs. American man may even go to the opposite extreme (as De Tocqueville observes) and so individualize his military activity that there will be a new boom of heraldry: more symbols, more crests, more flags than ever before. Certainly men will alter their dress more drastically when they search for identity with the transcendental greatness of "the group" as the Army increases its mass. The problem of identification of

groups in atomic war may well bring back the chevrons of cadets, campaign hats, and a host of distinctive apparel.

Who knows the future composure of an individualized and integrated soldiery?

CAPT. RICHARD J. BUCK

2807 Yale Station
New Haven, Conn.

History of 59th CA

● I am preparing a history of the 59th Coast Artillery Regiment, now the 59th AAA Battalion (SW) (SP). Most of the records of the regiment were lost with the fall of the Philippines. I want to get in touch with anyone who may have any authoritative information about the 59th or the names of any former members who can help write this history of a unit with a fine record.

CAPT. PETER A. ABRUZZESE

30th AAA Btry
Fort Bliss, Tex.

Warrant Officer Insignia

● The Air Force has already done it. Why can't the Army?

This question arose in a class on courtesy and discipline. The instructor used a training aid consisting of a chart which showed Army, Navy, and Air Force officers' cap, collar, lapel and shoulder insignia of rank and branch.

One of the men in the class asked, "Why can't the Army keep up with the times like the other services? The cap and lapel brass and the bars of the warrant officer are strictly WO. But the Army is assigning WOs now by branch and MOS, the same as commissioned officers. Why can't they wear the same brass as commissioned officers?"

This touched off a vigorous discussion which ended with the majority favoring the idea. Why can't WOs wear the same cap and lapel brass as commissioned officers, with no change in warrant bars?

SFC V. F. GIARRATANO

Hq 2d Trans Port Com C
APO 503, San Francisco, Calif.

Building the Reserves

● COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL has been an essential part of my military educational program for the past several years and has steadily improved in value.

In view of needed emphasis on developing a Reserve force adequate to meet future emergencies, those of us who labor to keep State Guard cadres on their toes would appreciate space and comment covering that important area of our military strength.

With some encouragement from the Army and a modest outlay for clothing and equipment, we could develop a substantial support force capable of handling most local and State security missions at a fraction of the cost involved if such missions were assigned to Army units.

MAJ. WALTER M. FERRIS
Cleveland, Ohio

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

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THE MONTH'S AUTHORS

If a casual visitor from outer space were to drop in on the United States for a couple of hours and read a few newspapers and magazines, and tune in on a few TV newscasts and forums, he might get a rather pessimistic, if inaccurate, picture of the present state of our defenses. Unification is eight years old, and there are few in the know who would say that it is either perfect or an organizational disaster. Interservice jealousies have not disappeared, and there still are officers who shortsightedly put their own service first every time. We think fewer of these are Army officers—which may be a boast or an indictment, depending upon your state of mind.

But all the services possess great numbers of officers who know that cooperation and compromise in modern warfare is a job for all and that weapons of all kinds are needed to defend America. Such an officer is COLONEL BERNARD THIELEN, author of "Guardian of Our Air Frontier" (page 14). As executive officer of the 52d AAA Brigade, which provides the antiaircraft defenses of New York City, Colonel Thielen does not belittle the value of the Air Force. If we are attacked, every enemy plane will have to be shot down. The H-bomb and even more frightful devices make attrition meaningless. It will take every available antiaircraft weapon, properly coordinated, to do the job. Colonel Thielen's plea is for effective cooperation and for changes in the command structure of our antiaircraft defenses in order to insure that cooperation.

Cooperation—interbranch, interservice, and international—has been a constant theme through Colonel Thielen's military career. A 1932 graduate of the Military Academy, he became a Field Artillery officer. In World War II he served overseas with Sixth Army Artillery. Since the war he has served with the Army General Staff, the JCS Secretariat, SHAPE, and the office of the Secretary of Defense. In 1948, while on duty with the State Department in Hungary, he was "kidnaped" by the Red Army but was soon released. After a tour as Professor of Military Science

and Tactics at Princeton, Colonel Thielen took up his present assignment late in 1954.

In the last ten years, countless military writers have speculated on the role of infantry in an atomic war. But while the pundits propose, The Infantry School disposes. The impact of nuclear warfare has already had some far-reaching effects on the training and instruction that are given at the august and eminently practical academy at Fort



COLONEL BERNARD THIELEN


Benning. In this issue, BRIGADIER GENERAL CARL F. FRITZSCHE, Assistant Commandant of TIS, shows how close we are to having "Tomorrow's Infantry Today" (page 20).

General Fritzsche has been an infantryman since he graduated from the Military Academy in 1928. After a tour of duty with the 10th Infantry at Fort Thomas, Ky., he attended The Infantry School's company officers' course, and later served with the 15th Infantry at the American Barracks, Tientsin, China.

In August 1941 he was appointed assistant chief of staff for intelligence of the 1st Armored Division, and in April 1942 he accompanied the Division to the European theater. He was soon

(continued on page 56)

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL



Salute to "The Angels"



FAIRCHILD congratulates the 11th Airborne Division on its 12th Birthday

Clearing the mountains in the Leyte Campaign, the hard-fought battles from Nasugbu to Manila, the Los Banos Raid, the campaigns in Southern Luzon and Malepuno and the more recent outstanding campaigns in Korea . . . these are but a few of the proud achievements of the 11th Airborne Division, celebrating its Twelfth Anniversary today.

Born on February 25, 1943, the 11th Airborne Division has earned presidential citations, scores of individual citations and medals and the world's esteem in a record of engagements that is second to none. This battle-scarred division will long be remembered by the 2100 grateful prisoners of war rescued at Los Banos who gave them their proud title . . . THE ANGELS.

Here is a salute to the courage and patriotism of the officers and men of this outstanding combat organization, from Fairchild Aircraft Division, home of another combat veteran, the world-famous and dependable C-119 Flying Boxcar.



"where the future is measured in light-years"

Preserve the Seed

IN 1939, when war clouds somewhat bigger than the shadow cast by a man's hand began to darken the world, President Roosevelt asked General George C. Marshall if it wasn't possible to strengthen the Army garrison in the Philippines. The Chief of Staff's answer was that it could be done only by sending out of the country the Army's all too "few grains of seed corn."

Less than two years later the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. In those intervening months the Army's seed had been planted and bountiful crops were in prospect (crops that materialized in the great victories of 1944-45), but too late to save the Philippines. Much suffering would have been alleviated and much wealth would have been saved had General Marshall had a couple of cribfuls of trained and equipped Army forces instead of the pitiful cadre of seed that he had to conserve and nourish during the long months it took to build and equip the Army that won World War II.

How wasteful this nation is in its conduct of its military affairs! It seems not to learn from experience, nor to heed the advice of its experts. In Korea in 1950 it almost threw away its best seed because it had not had the foresight to be prepared for such an emergency. In its penny-wise-pound-foolish policies this country would have long ago frittered away its military strength had it not been for the labors of professional soldiers, faithfully conserving the seed of military knowledge in the service schools, tirelessly working on new and better methods and equipment, always conscious that a second-best army is no better than no army at all.

KNOWING too that it takes time to build an army and that as wars increase in violence and velocity, less time is given in which to create them. So little time now that you may be able to count the time on the face of a clock rather than by turning the pages of a calendar.

So little time, indeed, that it is only realistic to acknowl-

edge that the primary need is for trained Army forces in being, equipped and ready to fight. We have them in Europe along with the forces of our NATO allies. We have them in the Far East, though we don't have enough in that ominously explosive part of the world. Though we can't be strong everywhere and we shouldn't try to be, we could and should be strong at home. Strong in trained Army forces ready and able to take off at the receipt of a coded telegraphic order.

THIS is not a new thought. Indeed, it has been advanced by high authorities. But instead of action following the expression of the desirability, there has been more than inaction, there has been a drift in the other direction. A dangerous drift that has weakened and will weaken the combat capability of the Army. A drift that history tells us will be followed by the utterly foolish policy of wasting some of our precious seeds of Army corn, leaving the Nation woefully unprotected and unable rapidly and purposefully to train and re-equip new armies that can move in as the committed forces are worn down with losses and combat fatigue.

This is not a plea for saving the professionals from combat. Not at all. It is a plea that this country face up to reality and make it possible for the Army to have trained professionals to throw into the battle lines when the balloon goes up and to have professionals man the cadres and to staff the all-important training commands and schools so that a new army of whatever size is necessary can be put together rapidly and efficiently—and in time to be used.

The great need today is for a corps or more of organized, trained, and equipped fighting men—a Strategic Army Command, if you will. A deterrent force as potent in brush fires as in global holocaust. A force that will give this nation's leaders the strategic flexibility they must have in a world of peril.



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FRONT AND CENTER

Unit rotation. Operation GYROSCOPE is given large credit for boosting the reenlistment rate of the Regular Army from 22 per cent last July to 54 per cent in December. Furthermore, there has been an avalanche of applications by married non-commissioned officers for transfer to units labeled for early transfer under the unit rotation plan. For example, Fort Carson, Colo., recently reported that 300 men had applied for transfer to GYROSCOPE units and more than 200 had reenlisted in GYROSCOPE outfits. So many married noncoms seek assignment to the 10th Infantry Division that the Department of the Army was forced to limit approval so as not to exceed the number of housing units available to it in Germany.

Regimental traditions. Senior officers discussing possible reorganization of the infantry division into combat commands carefully explain that these combat commands will be created from existing regiments and will carry regimental colors and perpetuate a regiment's history. And a study is progressing in the Pentagon designed to make it possible for Regulars—officers and noncommissioned officers—to be members of a regiment throughout their entire service. Based on the British regimental system, the plan would allow a soldier to retain ties to a "home" regiment even when at school or on staff duty. Prospects of approval depend largely upon the feasibility of the plan that is devised.

Tactical organization. It is clear from informed comment about the 3d Division's FOLLOW ME tests and the similar armored tests at Fort Hood (still incomplete) that the assumption of some commentators that smaller divisions mean a saving of manpower is not valid. One general has observed: "The choice is not between a division of 18,000 men a division of 12,000 men, because 12,000 men simply cannot do what 18,000 can do. The choice is between two divisions of 18,000 men each three divisions of 12, men each. The question narrows down to whether we can get more efficient service and at less cost in overhead from 36,000 men divided into two or three divisions."

Reserve Program Flops. It is regrettable that the ambitious reserve program of the Department of Defense appears to be a casualty of legislative inattention, because improvement of the reserves is a crying necessity. The Congress gave the DoD program a cold shoulder for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that Congressmen who have always looked at such programs with a fishy eye, while paying proper homage to the Minuteman folk story, can't reconcile repeated warnings that wars of the future will come with startling swiftness and be fought with unprecedented violence and speed, with a program designed to substitute reserve forces of questionable readiness for "in being" forces. But it was this very substitution that led DoD officials to promote the reserve program. They oversold themselves when they discovered that a big reserve program costs less than "in being" forces. As in the case of the New Look budget of a year ago, the attractions of the giant-sized economy package were irresistible.

No like Nike. Great Britain has turned down a suggestion that it be licensed to build the Nike anti-aircraft guided missile, *Aviation Week* reports. The magazine says the reason is that the British feel that Nike is too operationally limited, too complicated, and too expensive for them. In this regard there is a significant comment in the British "Statement on Defence 1955": "The nature of the potential threat from the air to the two countries differs in many significant aspects. As a result the weapons required by each country must often have different characteristics."

Airlift. Senator John Stennis, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has suggested an investigation of reductions in airlift available to Army combat forces. He was quoted as saying, "... there have been developments in Western Europe and the Orient affecting our defense program. I am concerned as to whether we could, should we be called upon, fill two commitments at the same time—in Europe and the Far East—if the reductions [in Army combat-ready forces and airlift] are made."


British defense problems. The printed transcript of the British Government's statement on defense plans for 1955 which touched off the debate in the House of Commons reveals that many of Britain's defense problems are almost exactly the same as ours.

More inducements to persuade regulars to reenlist for longer periods are one similar problem. The official statement speaks of the need for "building up and maintaining a 'hard core' of men of long service and experience."

A strategic reserve of Army forces is another similar need. The statement says: "The main burden of the cold war and of our other peacetime military commitments in the Colonial Empire is borne by the Army . . . [and] conventional forces and conventional arms are required. The Army is now able to rebuild a strategic reserve in the United Kingdom. This has for long been a primary aim of our defence policy; it is essential both in the cold war and in our preparedness for a major war."

The need for greater flexibility in Army tactical organizations so that units can "move from dispersion to concentrations as quickly, and with as little confusion, as possible," is one of the effects of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, the statement declares. It sees the need for "greater elasticity of outlook by commands at all levels." "Experimental organizations and revised scale of weapons and equipment, including transport, are being worked out" and will be tested in maneuvers during the coming year.

Home defense of the British Isles will require Army forces. "For this work the Services must themselves be trained, local organizations developed, and a link provided between the two. The Government have therefore decided to form a Mobile Defence Corps as part of the Army and RAF reserve forces," the statement says. Responsibility for this corps will be in the War Office and permanent instructional and administrative staffs will be from the Regular Army.



ENEMIES' MORTARS LOCATED BY RADAR

Army Used Device Against Reds in Korea, NY TIMES, DEC. 12, 1954

THE STORY BEHIND THE STORY:

■ "Hundreds of soldiers now returned safely from Korea literally owe their lives to the extreme accuracy and speed of the new counter-mortar system." This good news was revealed by the Signal Corps in December when the public first learned of the existence of the MPQ-10 Mortar Locator, one of the Army's best kept secrets.

■ How could a carefully concealed enemy mortar be located and destroyed

after just one or two shells had been fired? And how could such devastating accuracy be repeated over and over again—no matter how often the enemy relocated his mortars? These were important questions in Korea.

■ Actually, the uncanny efficiency of the MPQ-10 Mortar Locator was due to the joint efforts of the Army Signal Corps and Sperry engineers. Working together, they developed a new portable radar system for use at the front lines. How does it work? An automatic radar tracker detects and "locks on" the path

of enemy mortar shells. In effect, it traces each shell back through its trajectory and reveals the enemy position. This information is then relayed to an artillery fire direction center which directs a return barrage against the enemy mortar in a matter of minutes.

■ Delivering this Mortar Locator to the troops is another example of Sperry engineering and production solving a problem to meet a critical need. Today, in the air, at sea, as well as on land, Sperry is helping extend our nation's capabilities with instruments, controls and systems for all branches of the military as well as for important segments of industry.

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Nike crewmen manning Washington, D. C.'s defenses respond swiftly to a practice alert

The Growing Problems of the Lusty Outfit that is the

GUARDIAN OF OUR

NOW that we antiaircraft artillerymen have joined the Association family, the other brothers might want to know more about us. Most JOURNAL readers already know something about the AAA with an army in the field—which is essentially field artillery. But we have another role, which may have had less than its proper share of attention. American strategic centers are ringed with artillery—guns and guided missiles which, with the men who man them, make up the antiaircraft element of the Air Defense Command. This segment of the arm has inherited the tradition of the Coast Artillery Corps of living and working in fixed defenses. Rarely, however, have antiaircraft defenses inherited the comforts for which the CAC won lasting envy.

Unfortunately, an operationally independent mission leads to remoteness from the rest of the Army. Anything not concerned with field armies falls outside the concern of most of the Army. This is too bad, because if the AAA defense fails to do its job there won't be any field armies. Accordingly, the Army should be interested in our capabilities. It also seems that the Air Force regards us with something less than whole-souled enthusiasm. Thus our requirements are perpetually in danger of falling between two chairs in high military councils. And there is no overwhelming public appre-

COLONEL BERNARD THIELEN



THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

ciation of our role. To a great extent, of course, this is our own fault. Perhaps we have not told our story very effectively—or very loudly.

The first tenet in the creed of air-defense artillerymen is this: We believe that neither massive retaliation nor aircraft-to-aircraft interception can give a complete reply to all-out air attack on the United States. Our reservations with respect to those defense concepts could be developed at length but only highlights need be indicated.


As for retaliation, we think it might be mounted too late to preserve our country. We do not discredit it. We appreciate the deterrent effect of the Strategic Air Command in being. But in our business we have had to follow nuclear developments rather closely, and because we have enormous respect for what the weapons can do we find it hard to believe that either the military production of the United States or its will to fight could survive a successful attack on the scale that must in all reason be anticipated. The deterrent effect of an impregnable air defense is something we believe in very deeply. And we think that has been somewhat neglected.

As for air-to-air interception, we feel that it does not and cannot provide the nation with total security, regardless of what the public may believe. Our own Air Force apparently does not believe that fighter aircraft can stop

fleets of big bombers. Indeed, there are inherent tactical dangers in the concept of sallying forth from a prepared defense to seek out the attacking force. That is the tactic that cut backward to destroy the tank destroyer. All too easily our interceptors can be drawn off by feints and secondary attacks. Time and direction are controlled by the attacker. It is hard to see how aircraft can be brought to bear immediately at any point throughout the vast air space surrounding a defense, how saturation attacks can be met with sufficient force, how continuous operation can be maintained for long alert periods, how vulnerability to defensive weapons of the bomber fleet can be diminished, how heavy losses can be long sustained. Above all and in sum it appears that the battle in the sky, no matter how well fought by defending aircraft, will permit many attackers to survive. Attrition is not good enough now, as it was over Britain in 1940. Total destruction of the attacker must now be contemplated.

It seems to us in the AAA that the weapon characteristics essential for the final air defense are those inherent in artillery—and by *artillery* we mean all projectiles launched from ground bases under conditions of predetermined or continuous control. Artillery fires are almost instantly maneuverable throughout their range. Fires can be quickly massed or spread as the situation demands. Fires can be maintained so long as ammunition and parts are supplied. Properly sited, artillery is practically invulnerable to high-level bombardment. The only substantial attrition factors derive from wear on matériel and expenditure of projectiles. Finally, the object is theoretically attainable and practically approachable, of delivering artillery fires in such intensity that no airborne structure within range can survive them. Although this object may be somewhat beyond reach of existing weapons and control systems, most readers are aware that means exist which can guarantee destruction

AIR FRONTIER



of all aircraft within a tremendous radius of the point of burst.

Artillery bias might be misinterpreted as reflecting conviction that AAA can go it alone in the scheme of air defense. No such foolishness is intended. Air defense must always reach out beyond the range of artillery weapons. The full capabilities of the Air Defense Command are vital to early warning, identification, and generally to action analogous to what cavalry did in land warfare. We hope the Air Force can clobber an approaching formation far from the home defenses and destroy its potential for wholesale annihilation. But the job is not finished there. AAA must be able to drop the birds that get through. The whole job is too big for one arm or one service. If infusion of field artillery blood into the AAA has no other good effect, it should dissolve any idea that artillery exists in a vacuum. *Support* is what artillery lives for and dies without. When the Air Force and the AAA can get along like the infantry-artillery team, many problems will disappear.

Irrational motivation underlies some communication failures between Air Force and AAA elements of the Air Defense Command; attitudes carried over from the pre-atomic past. Airmen have an understandable distaste for flak in any form; AA gunners regard aircraft as natural enemies. Tragic errors in aircraft identification have been made—and friendly gun positions have occasionally been strafed. There have been times when guns were less than spectacularly effective; fighter pilots probably felt with reason that the full weight of air defense was on them. That is what many Americans believe today. Flyers who know what Nike and post-Nike weapons can do to an airplane undoubtedly hold them in respect. Many Air Force people don't seem to grant that any missile is proper possession of men in brown suits. Extremists on our side counter by saying that the piloted aircraft has had its day; that the future air battle will be an intercontinental artillery duel. All this is reminiscent of ancient quarrels about what color hatcords the infantry cannon company should wear.

NOT all mutual difficulties in communication are irrational, however. Our own faulty organization is partly to blame. The antiaircraft defense has a tortured command structure, hard to describe and harder to live with, which has little discernible correspondence with any element of the Air Force and no clearly stated relationship with the rest of the U.S. Army. Even in the trade, few feel entirely at home in the shadowy areas of liaison and "coordination." A defense commander may have a dozen widely deployed battalions and no intermediate links in the chain of command; on the other hand, he may have only two or three. ZI armies exercise command in some matters, Continental Army Command in others, and there is the fact that the Air Force now has a command role—not yet defined to the field—as a result of the recent creation of the joint Continental Air Defense Command. On no level except the top can an antiaircraft commander positively identify his opposite number or direct-support contact in the Air Force. There is no antiaircraft headquarters parallel to an air division, for



A soldier plots information received by radar and transmits it to the operations center of an antiaircraft unit

example, and an antiaircraft defense cannot establish liaison with more than one interceptor control station, no matter how many there may be in the area. The AA commander broods over his private operations board instead of sitting beside an Air Force counterpart in a center where the integrated defense can be controlled on the basis of coordinated information. All this is not to say that there is no interservice cooperation. There is a great deal; problems are worked out in reasonably good order.

THE faulty command structure of the AA defense is even more apparent in administration than in joint operations. The antiaircraft defense commander is quite limited in his command functions. He is dependent for his smallest administrative support requirements on agencies outside antiaircraft command channels which do not report with him to a common superior below Pentagon level. Personnel matters are deeply involved here: replacements, reenlistments, enlisted promotions and promotion vacancies, public relations, courts-martial, overseas levies, and the rest—all of which affect the morale of the command. The lack of means to handle these matters with some autonomy is probably not peculiar to the AAA situation, since there is a tendency throughout the Army to hamstring the commander's personnel jurisdiction, but the derivative problems are exacerbated in the AAA by twenty-four-hour-manning requirements, community relations of isolated units, the necessarily limited amenities on site, and other conditions peculiar to our situation which are not fully understood outside our circle.

Especially important is the maintenance support needed on a continuous basis for radar and other specialized electronic equipment peculiar to antiaircraft units. Radar is vital to warning and control; without it we are completely blind and partially paralyzed. The result of this requirement is that a substantial corps of technical-services personnel is maintained for the sole

purpose of serving the antiaircraft defense. But they exist entirely outside antiaircraft command channels. Some technicians are factory representatives and not even under military jurisdiction. This might not be too bad if all these technical people—mostly civilians—came under the same army commander. Some, however, are based on class II installations. In other cases, elements of the same AAA brigade may be located in different army areas. Because of gaps in proper command relationship, antiaircraft firing units are constantly visited by hordes of inspectors who swarm through the sites distributing instructions and memorializing their passage by monumental reports which eventually land in the battery commander's lap. The morale of junior officers on site probably suffers as much from uncoordinated inspections as from any other single cause.

It would be wrong to assume that antiaircraft artillery cannot and does not get along with the technical services, supply agencies, factory representatives, and army area functionaries on reasonably matey terms. It would be unfair and ungracious to competent and hard-working ordnance technicians, post engineers, quartermasters, and the like, to suggest that they are not doing a good job. But it is still a hell of a way to run a railroad.

THIS sad story would have no good purpose and little interest if it were anything but a prelude to proposals for improvement. The tremendous importance of the mission of the AAA, the leading place the arm has and must maintain in technical development—above all, these hard realities demand the attention of the Army and the Nation. The best brains we have are needed to solve the problem of providing full effectiveness. It will also take men and money—but less money, probably, than a single carrier of the *Forrestal* class. We must not fear expansion if expansion will secure the Republic against annihilation. Charges of empire-building should not deter us; such charges are no adequate rebuttal to a self-evident need. The only real question is: Exactly what is needed? A few basics can be indicated rather briefly.

On the matériel side, the problem is well on its way to theoretical solution. The new weapons in being and in advanced development are adequate tools for the job. What we want is enough of them—recognition of the priority they deserve in the overall military scheme. AAA, like its parent arm, has unusual technical competence at top levels; there is no lack of appreciation in the trade for the necessity of keeping up with scientific research and its military application.

On the other hand, the problem of bringing order to the organization of the AA defense would stagger the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. All that can be offered here is a soldier's solution—and that only in broad terms. Two major axioms are self-evident: first, that the organization must parallel that of the supported service so as to provide command liaison, team training, and mutual understanding at clearly defined levels; secondly, that internal organization must provide (1) a closely linked chain of command based on sound management theory and traditional military

practice and (2) control by the commander of all the means essential to the accomplishment of his mission.

NO student of management can examine the modern infantry division without admiring its attributes as a cohesive corporation, able to reflect the will of its commander both in independent action and as an element in large operations. It has the anatomy and physiology for cooperation. It is by no means static; it adapts itself to new weapons, new tactics, and new missions. And it is no monster—all arms, all eyes, or all nerves. It is a whole body with members to take care of its own needs. The division has evolved through centuries. With any faults it may have, it is more nearly perfect than what any one man could create or what many men at any one time could devise. It has grown like an oak and cannot be duplicated in structural steel—or magnesium.

Is it unreasonable to believe that divisional organization could profitably be adapted to any large military body having a combat mission? This thought may be



Antiaircraft gunners load a 75mm Skysweeper

foreign to the traditions of fixed artillery, but that should not make it unworthy of consideration. Prince Hohenlohe, in his classic, *Letters on Artillery*, tells how Von Hindersin "changed the whole spirit" of the garrison artillery in 1869 by integrating a command from isolated units "which had received but a step-motherly care from the brigades of artillery." Surely a modern Hindersin is needed to form artillery divisions for the essential task of defending American air space.

THE size of the artillery division is not the important thing; completeness is. The commander must, above all, be an executive in the business sense—a general manager. He must have a thorough understanding of what his immensely complex weapons will and will not do, but he need not be a technical specialist. It does not belittle technical specialists to say that they should not command divisions; they have other important work to do. The division commander must have a full-scale staff: a general staff having his own cast of mind—managers and planners—and a special staff including not

only a complement of technical men who can chase electrons through a maze of transistors but also the chief doctor, judge, priest, storekeeper, paymaster, policeman, and the other solid types who look after the many needs of men and machines in the divisions of field armies. It is most important that all essential functions be integrated in the command and under the commander. Similarly, service and technical supporting units must be incorporated in the artillery division. The command must be self-sufficient in routine operations. The present system of catch-as-catch-can support is not good enough. It must be realized that a mobile division has all these elements not primarily because it is mobile but because it is a division. And it is a division because it has a job that is not functional but tactical and administrative.

AS for the fighting edge, its exact organization within the division calls for intensive study. One would be inclined to favor a firm regimental formation; groups are too ephemeral, too limited in their fatherhood. The number of regiments in a division might vary (within narrow limits) to accommodate either one large vulnerable area or several smaller ones as the division's zone of responsibility.

Should each regiment include both the primary missile weapon and its own direct support, which is the gun or its successor? That question is moot. A possible answer lies in the traditional organization of divisional field artillery. Within the AAA, the support mission is to cover dead areas and lower altitudes; accordingly it would seem feasible to put separate weapons battalions in the direct-support role. All that lies within the scope of doctrine to be developed on the framework of a self-contained tactical and administrative corporation. The features that need underlining are broad tactical direction and information from the top, lateral communication within the division, and positive external coordination. None of these facilities is properly provided now.

Artillery division level should be the level of a single large defense or two to three smaller defenses not too widely separated. Unfortunately, the area flown by a defensive air division is much larger. Accordingly, the next higher echelon in the artillery command should be co-located with the air division and should have the same geographical limits. Continental armies can have little part in this business so long as their responsibilities are isolated from those of the Air Force. The ideal, perhaps, would be a truly joint command at air division level and above.

A FUNDAMENTAL problem not yet mentioned (and there is no point in beating it to death here, since it is not peculiar to our arm) is: Where do you get the right people for this important job? If you have them, in adequate force, your problems of organization, morale, operational effectiveness, and technical progress have a way of diminishing. But how do you attract them and how do you keep them? Unfortunately, the antiaircraft artillery has not yet solved that one. In fact, our conditions of service, which are not conducive to the uxorious life so highly regarded these days, seem to

spook promising youngsters and turn the eyes of experienced officers and men toward lush grass elsewhere. We share the problem of training and keeping good men with the military establishment as a whole, but we feel that it has particular force in the AAA because we have such complex technical requirements and because we alone in the Army are maintaining a wartime condition of readiness. Thus we have a peculiarly vicious circle. The need for AAA to maintain a condition of readiness demands highly trained people but the strain of this demand tends at the same time to drive them out. We face the real danger of having to substitute civilian technicians for soldiers. And the ability to handle the newest electronic equipment is in such demand that industry is outbidding us in the civilian technician field. Many of these men got their training from us as junior officers and enlisted specialists in the upper grades. Why can't we hold them in uniform? There are many obvious reasons with dollar signs on them, but the reason that strikes us hardest is the fact that on-site duty compares unfavorably even with other Army assignments. Not only technicians, but line officers and NCOs who intend to remain in the service prefer the amenities of post life or the perquisites of civilian-component duty to around-the-clock conditions of site alert. Accordingly, our immediate objective in the AAA should be (and we realize it is only a partial solution) to provide conditions comparable to normal Stateside garrison duty for our people. As the early-warning network develops, this becomes feasible. We can concentrate our troops at battalion or regimental strength on permanent posts where the basic amenities, including family quarters, can be made available. Only thus can true *esprit de corps* be developed.

AAA does have quite a lot to offer as a career field. Our weapons and their employment challenge the artilleryman's skill and imagination. Our unsolved command problems have more than passing interest for any military man priding himself on his management and leadership potential. The professional soldier who wants clear-cut responsibility for direct action in meeting the main military threat to the existence of the United States can find it in the Antiaircraft Command. Here is a job incredibly neglected in many respects. This nation ultimately stands or falls on its ability to survive attack by nuclear weapons. What job could a soldier have, short of combat, that is more in keeping with the ancient traditions of his calling than a part in building an essential line of defenses?

This is no aerial Maginot Line. The right arm must be cocked for the nuclear counterpunch and the sky cavalry must be mounted. Field armies that can seize and hold ground at the bayonet's point must be ready. But the good commander looks also to the security of his force and of his reserves for sustaining the attack. The antiaircraft artillery must be the ring of steel around production and population centers which are the ultimate force and ultimate reserve.

We have a mission that leaves no alternative to accomplishment. But we must have the means to accomplish it.

CIVILIAN SCHOOLING OPPORTUNITIES

CAREER Management Division has just completed the process of selecting officers to be enrolled in universities in June and September 1955. CMD has direct control only over selection of combat arms officers. Officers of the technical and administrative services are selected by the chiefs of their respective branches.

Officers are not sent to civilian schools to raise their level of education, but to receive specialized training not provided by service schools. In short, the objective of the civil schools program is to provide adequate training in appropriate fields of study to produce officers capable of coping with the political, economic, scientific, and social problems related to the military duties they perform. Approximately 100 combat-arms officers and 200 officers of the technical and administrative services are enrolled in civilian schools each year.

How does an officer apply for graduate civil schooling and when will he learn whether or not he will be selected? Officers of the combat arms apply under the provisions of SR 350-230-52, while officers of the technical and administrative services apply under the provisions of SR 350-230-1. A list of the various subjects is periodically published by the chief of each branch. When an application is received, the officer's military and academic records are reviewed and, if he is found to be qualified, his name is placed on a competitive order-of-merit list in the fields of his choice. Each year, normally in December, the order-of-merit lists are screened and officers are selected to enter schools in June, September, and the following January, in the fields of study for which civil-school-trained personnel are needed. A few officers are selected at other times.

Once an application has been made for civil schooling, it is not necessary for the officer to reapply each year. Applications are retained on file and the applicant is considered competitively each year for the subjects of his choice. His application will remain active un-

til he is selected for schooling, until he becomes ineligible because he has reached the age limit, or until he requests that his application be withdrawn.

GENERALLY speaking, an officer selected for graduate civil schooling must be able to fulfill the following requirements:

- He must apply in writing for the type of training desired and agree to remain on active duty for four years after completion of the course.
- He should be able to complete the course by the time he reaches the age of thirty-seven for work on the Master's degree level or forty-two for training on the Ph.D. level.
- He should have a minimum of five years' commissioned service (but an officer may apply at any time after he is commissioned).
- He should have completed, or have credit for, his branch advanced course.
- He must have an above-average undergraduate academic record. Applicants for engineering and physical science courses must have an excellent undergraduate record in mathematics, including calculus.
- He must have a well-rounded military record. The officer's military record plays a vital part in the selection of officers to attend civilian universities. For example, an officer lacking troop duty, or who is extremely vulnerable for an overseas assignment, will not be selected until he has fulfilled these qualifications. Care is taken to see that civil schooling comes at a time in the officer's career when it will not jeopardize his chances of selection for a service school.
- In exceptional cases, waivers of one or more of the above requirements may be granted.

AFTER completing civil schooling, an officer is assigned to serve a three-year utilization tour in a position which requires special knowledge in the field of his graduate training. He then reverts to the normal career pattern of his


branch. While he may not be required to serve another utilization tour, he remains available to fill positions requiring his special training. The utilization tour can be interrupted to permit an officer to attend a service school or for other career-broadening assignments.

A list of the fields of study can be found in SR 350-230-52. There is a definite shortage of applicants for the physical science and engineering courses, especially nuclear physics, guided missiles, aeronautical engineering, and meteorology.

Since 1948 Reserve officers have not been eligible to participate in civilian courses of longer than five months' duration. Provisions are now being made under which "career reservists" may participate. Details of the policy applicable to Reserve officers will be announced in the near future. They should not apply until formal announcement has been made in Army directives.

THE foregoing discussion deals with graduate training for officers possessing a Bachelor's degree. The Army also offers a great deal of assistance to active-duty officers who, on their off-duty time, pursue undergraduate courses leading to the Bachelor's degree. This program comes under the supervision of the Chief of Information and Education. Approximately three-fourths of the cost of tuition is made available through unit TI&E offices. Officers who do not possess a Bachelor's degree are encouraged to participate in this program. If a university or college is not located near the officer's present duty station, he may request on his next assignment preference form (DA Form 483) that he be considered for an assignment to an Army installation near a university. Needless to say, not all requests for such an assignment can be granted; but consideration will be given each request in so far as the needs of the service will permit.

Additional information may be obtained by writing to The Adjutant General, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C. (Attention: AGG-ES).



Tomorrow's

BRIGADIER GENERAL CARL F. FRITZSCHE

TOMORROW'S infantry is not yet here, but at The Infantry School we keep this thought in mind to accelerate our progress in examining new ideas, in formulating new doctrine, and in testing new weapons. Out of infantry's experiences in World War II and Korea, The Infantry School is turning to the task of mastering the intricacies of atomic warfare.

We know that future conflict cannot be won with archaic tools. The forging of new tools of warfare—weapons, doctrine and techniques—in our service schools in time of peace helped win the Second World War. So today, while looking toward the future, we are not overlooking the significant lessons from the past.

Evolution of Doctrine

The Korean war gave The Infantry School an opportunity to reexamine and reaffirm, and in some cases to modify, certain World War II conclusions. This re-examination cleared the way for further work on the tactics of atomic war.

The Infantry School had early assumed that as atomic

weapons become relatively plentiful, they would also become "conventional" weapons. It began by setting up requirements for atomic weapons for tactical employment by the infantry. Some early data and thought suggested that tactical atomic weapons would be too expensive for use by Army forces. The Infantry School, however, contended that in terms of money and lives, future warfare would be less costly if atomic weapons were integrated into our fire-support plans, just like any other weapon. Recent scientific developments, making more efficient use of fissionable material, reinforced the soundness of this contention. Consequently the infantry now can anticipate atomic battalion-support weapons.

Thus, many problems now taught at The Infantry School require solutions based on atomic as well as non-atomic conditions. Students must consider the effect of mass-destruction weapons on tactics when employed by their own forces as well as those of an aggressor.

Our doctrine was necessarily predicated upon the enemy's capability to use atomic weapons and so we had to seek and adopt measures that would give us an adequate

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MAJ. GEN. JOSEPH H. HARPER



BRIG. GEN. CARL F. FRITZSCHE

Commandant and Assistant Commandant, The Infantry School

S INFANTRY Today



defense if he should use atomic weapons. It was also necessary to develop an offensive using atomic weapons. All these requirements are leading us to new techniques, new training methods, and to establishing new requirements for equipment. The aim is to enable infantry to fight an atomic or nonatomic war effectively.

Changes in Doctrine

The resulting changes in tactical concepts fall generally into three categories: dispersion, mobility, and protection.

Dispersion decreases troop density and results in a poor atomic target being presented to the enemy. Basic units, probably a reinforced battalion, will be widely separated until called upon for a task that will require more than one of them. For maximum protection, concentration must be rapid and as near the enemy as possible.

All the above results obviously in greater stress on independent and semi-independent operations by single battalions. Consequently, increased emphasis is being placed on communications. It follows as an imperative

that infantrymen must know their communications equipment and how to make it work.

We must focus our attention on improving existing security means for surveillance of the increased intervals between units. The emphasis placed on massing in terms of time rather than space calls for greater mobility. All these factors as well as the very nature of dispersion call for skilled officers capable of taking independent action.

Mobility. The Army is earnestly engaged in developing and improving its air mobility through the use of assault transports, helicopters, and parachutists. To keep pace, The Infantry School's Airborne Department now trains students in all phases of basic parachute and jumpmaster techniques as well as air transport and aerial delivery. Officers and senior noncommissioned



officers are now being taught how to use helicopters, assault transports, and the more conventional transport aircraft in air movements.

In recent months the training of pathfinders has been brought back into the curriculum. This course is aimed primarily at training pathfinders in operations involving the use of Army aviation with ground units. Students learn the techniques required to operate aircraft navigation and personnel-assembly aids. These are designed to aid in the accurate delivery of troops, equipment, and supplies by helicopter (or fixed-wing aircraft) by day or night. The pathfinder course has been responsible for the development of new night-landing aids and techniques and also determines requirements for navigational aids and communications equipment.

The effort to attain air mobility has not been at the expense of ground mobility. The requirement for greater ground mobility has continually been stressed by The Infantry School, which believes that a most important requirement is the infantry's need for armored personnel carriers which may not be organic to a unit but available on call. The infantry also needs a utility-type tracked vehicle to replace our present fleet of vehicles.

Air and ground vehicles will be desirable and lucrative enemy targets. Therefore the infantryman must assume that the infantryman on foot may again be the fastest moving thing on the battlefield. This has led The Infantry School to continue its efforts to lighten the load of the individual soldier, while seeking to increase his sustained fire power.

Protection. To reduce the vulnerability of infantry units to atomic attack, we are placing increased emphasis on movement and maneuver at night. We teach that daylight and night operations are not separate and distinct types of operations but rather a single operation that requires continuous planning on the part of commanders and staff so that there is no halt at dawn or dusk.

Greater stress is being placed on digging in and camouflage. Instruction now includes the protective measures to be taken by the soldier against the effects of atomic explosions. The psychological conditioning that enables an individual soldier to cope with the awesome nature of atomic weapons is also stressed.

Mobile defense. The greatest change in our tactical instruction is the revamping of the infantry's doctrine of defense. Atomic weapons have outmoded our traditional concept of position defense: holding the enemy forward of a given line. Certainly at the beginning of a war, and for some time thereafter, we will not have sufficient troops to permit us to stretch units along one continuous line, even if this was tactically desirable.

The result is mobile defense—a new offensive-defense employed by separate units. Battalion-size units of combined arms are deployed in positions of depth as strong-points or grouped in islands of resistance. These positions are situated to force the enemy into known killing zones where he will become a conventional and thus a lucrative atomic target, or become more vulnerable to counterattack by our uncommitted battalions.



This type of defense renders the "close" or "desirable frontage" position defense virtually obsolete. In its place we have an open or "sponge-like" defense in which units operate independently beyond mutual fire-supporting distance and which are organic to the infantry. However, these units must be mobile enough to concentrate into a cohesive force should the enemy bring sufficient force against it.

The concept of mobile defense has led to increased emphasis on the importance of surveillance between units and the use of dummy positions and other deceptive measures. It has indicated a requirement for more efficient barrier systems if we are to compel the enemy to concentrate. It shows the need for better use of transportation to enable troops to concentrate rapidly for simultaneous attack. This emphasis on mobility has also pointed out our need to keep troops in top physical condition.

The Infantry School has found that tactics geared to atomic warfare require us to obtain accurate intelligence much faster than in the past. This is true since atomic targets will be more difficult to locate and more "fleeing" in nature. It has also found a greater need for deceptive measures, in addition to camouflage, in which the infantryman must be versed.

Staff functioning. These changes in doctrine will require greater effort by staffs at all levels. Greater dispersion of units will make planning, coordination, and supervision of logistical support operations, administrative functions and security measures far more difficult.

Massing in terms of time, rather than space, will require the utmost accuracy in troop movements plans. Frequently staffs will have to operate in two or more echelons. Solutions to these and many other problems in the area of staff functioning occupy a considerable portion of the advanced student's time.

Better Coordination and Assault Techniques

We have not overlooked the major lessons learned during World War II and in Korea, namely: The need for continuous fire-support coordination and for improving the conduct of the assault.

Fire-support coordination. During World War II, and initially in Korea, we failed to shift overwhelming concentrations of fire power as well as we were able to. To correct this, The Infantry School requires a solution for fire-support coordination and planning in problems of the battalion and regiment.

Conduct of the assault. The infantry is always concerned with the last 100-150 yards of an attack. Analyses show that improperly conducted assaults account for the greatest percentage of battle failures. A comprehensive study consisting of a review of historical examples, seminars, and numerous tests indicates three means of improving our assault technique. These are the following:

Leaning into our fires. This is directly related to fire-support coordination. When they become aware of the precision and reliability of their support weapons, infantrymen will "lean into" these fires in order to take



advantage of their devastating effect upon enemy ground troops. The Infantry School now teaches students to assault the enemy before he has an opportunity to recover from the shock effect of the fire delivered on him.

Delivery of assault fire. The School now emphasizes an intensified volume of accurate fire by flat-trajectory weapons directed against positions occupied (or suspected of being occupied) by the enemy as the fires of the indirect-support weapons are shifted. A new underarm position for firing the rifle in the assault has been developed and is currently taught at The Infantry School.

Use of tanks in the assault. The value of tanks in the assault should best be termed a *rediscovery*. Tests conclusively reveal that infantry should not assault alone unless it is impossible for tanks to accompany them. This idea, battle-tested in such unfavorable terrain as Korea, led to numerous other "discoveries" at The Infantry School. It reaffirms the need for tanks in fairly sizeable quantities in order to form infantry-tank teams. Infantry needs the mobility, fire power, and shock action of armor just as tankers need infantrymen for protection. This need led the School to teach that tanks, in addition to being massed for shock action, should habitually be attached to attacking rifle companies rather than be held in reserve. This is a premise no longer disputed within the infantry.

If infantry is to use tanks whenever possible for offensive maneuvers, it follows that infantrymen must know how to employ their new and powerful battalion antitank weapons.

Better Marksman

Changes in doctrine and weapons may require alterations to the present organization of the infantry battalion. Tests are being conducted and will determine what, if any, streamlining may be necessary. Current thought, however, indicates a trend toward a battalion with sufficient organic artillery, engineer, and tank support to fight independently. This team should be capable of entering combat on foot without an excessive "tail" of vehicles or by personnel carriers, helicopters, or assault aircraft. These considerations have dictated that its equipment be lightened to make it air-transportable.

Korea gave us tangible evidence that the ability to fire a rifle accurately was rapidly becoming a lost art. To revive the skill, The Infantry School has materially increased its marksmanship standards and has found more effective means of teaching the subject. Any student who fails to qualify receives additional instruction, and fires on weekends until he qualifies. To increase competition and interest, marksmanship badges are awarded. These are difficult to win and are with considerable pride.

THIS is The Infantry School's blueprint for success. Much has been done, more will be done to resolve the questions left unanswered and the problems that will arrive with the advent of new weapons. We will continue to initiate action that will lead to the development of doctrine, tactics, and techniques necessary to prepare for any eventuality—any type of war. We are confident that graduates of The Infantry School leave fully qualified to lead infantry battle teams in combat.



WHAT ABOUT ZHUKOV

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LIEUTENANT BENSON LEE GRAYSON

THE re-emergence from semi-obscurity of Marshal Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov is one of the most tantalizing facets in the recent shift of power in Moscow. Generally conceded to be the most capable military commander the Communists have produced, the sixty-year-old soldier has been appointed Minister of Defense, giving rise to speculation in the West that he is the strongest man in the present Soviet government. This is extremely speculative, but certainly the office he now holds and his undeniable skill as a military commander mark him as a man who can influence important decisions in the Kremlin. For that reason his career and character must be taken into account by the West.

At the end of World War II Zhukov was second only to Stalin as a military hero and architect of victory in the East. As Supreme Commander of the Soviet occupation zone in Germany, Zhukov was in frequent contact with the military leaders of the West and his photograph in company with General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery and other Western military leaders appeared in the world's press. A few months later he dropped out of sight and until his re-emergence in recent months it was popularly supposed in the West that Stalin had banished him from Moscow and high command. Two reasons were given. One was that Stalin was jealous of the adulation heaped on Zhukov (there is room for only one super-hero in a dictatorship). The other was that Zhukov was becoming contaminated by his contacts with Western leaders.

Whatever the reasons for his years of disappearance, Zhukov remained a loyal soldier and faithful Communist Party functionary. He continued to serve Stalin in the



role in which he had won his wartime reputation and for which he was best suited: as a military trouble-shooter. Evidence of Zhukov's ability in these lines can best be developed by tracing his career.

GEORGI ZHUKOV was born in 1895 in the village of Sterkovka, about a hundred miles southwest of Moscow. His family was of Great Russian origin, a distinct advantage, today, in the face of Soviet official discrimination against minority groups. His parents are officially described as "poor peasants," but that is the background the Soviet Government ascribes to most of its high-level officials. As a young man, Zhukov moved to Moscow, where he began working as a furrier.

In 1915 Zhukov was drafted into the Tsarist army, and served with a cavalry unit in combat. He displayed extreme heroism, and was twice awarded the Cross of Saint George. Following the Revolution, Zhukov joined the Red Army, where he served as an officer in Budyenny's famed cavalry corps. He joined the Communist Party in 1919, when the fate of the Soviet Government was still in doubt. This facilitated his rapid promotion; during the Civil War, the Red Army high command desperately needed skilled officers who could be trusted.

At the close of the Civil War, Zhukov decided to remain in the Red Army, although many of his associates exchanged their military posts for high positions in the government bureaucracy. In 1932, Zhukov studied at Frunze Academy, the highest Soviet staff college, where he specialized in studies of armored and parachute warfare. He later joined the faculty of Frunze Academy.

In 1936 Stalin chose Zhukov to be the Soviet senior military observer in the Spanish Civil War. Zhukov advised the Loyalists on the employment of their Soviet-supplied tanks, and he was able to observe the German weapons and tactics used by the Spanish Nationalists.

THE purge of Marshal Tukhachevsky and most of the Red Army high command in 1937 left Zhukov as one of the few surviving senior officers. The following year he was given command of the Soviet Red Banner Army, an élite force stationed in the Far East to prevent a Japanese attack. The border clashes between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1938-39 enabled Zhukov to show his ability. When the Japanese Sixth Army launched an attack upon the Soviet satellite state of Outer Mongolia, Zhukov's brilliant strategy resulted in the complete destruction of the invading force in a series of engagements along the Khalka River.

Zhukov was one of the few Soviet military leaders who opposed the German-Soviet nonaggression pact of August 1939, warning that Germany still intended to attack the Soviet Union. In November 1940, negotiations between Hitler and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov over the partition of Europe collapsed, and Hitler ordered preparations for the invasion of Russia to begin. Reports of the German mobilization reached Moscow, and Stalin conferred with his military advisers to decide whether Hitler was bluffing. Zhukov once more argued that a German invasion was imminent, and this time he was believed. On 12 February 1941, Zhukov was appointed Army Chief of Staff and Vice Commissar of Defense.

When Hitler began the invasion of Russia in June 1941, the reorganization of the Soviet Army had not yet been completed. Stupidity and confusion among Soviet officials and hatred of the Russian people for the Communist dictatorship contributed to early German successes. By October, German troops were near Moscow. As the Germans approached, rioting and looting spread through the city. The Soviet Government evacuated Moscow and a state of siege was declared. In this desperate hour, Zhukov was appointed commander of the Russian Central Armies.

The approach of winter and the arrival of fresh troops from Siberia enabled Zhukov to save Moscow. Zhukov was hailed throughout the Soviet Union as the defender of Moscow. In 1942, Zhukov represented Stalin at the fighting near Leningrad, and was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union for his performance there. In January 1943, he was sent to take overall supervision of the armies in the southwest, and he directed the operations which led to the encirclement and surrender of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, one of the most sensational Soviet victories of the war.

Throughout World War II, Zhukov was used as a trouble-shooter by the Soviet high command, employed wherever decisive results were desired. When Marshal Vatutin's illness deprived the First Ukrainian Front (Army Group) of its commander at the start of the Soviet 1944 spring offensive, Zhukov took over this com-

mand, which he retained for the duration of the war.

AFTER leading the first Soviet troops to enter Berlin, Marshal Zhukov was appointed Supreme Commander of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany in June 1945. In this position, he had frequent contact with Allied officials, and the most reliable descriptions of Zhukov's personality come from this period. President Eisenhower, then commander of Allied forces in Europe, described Zhukov as "a firm believer in the Communist concept," his support of Communism coming from "inner conviction and not from any outward compulsion."

This period of Zhukov's career was followed by the period of mystery and "disappearance." At the end of the war, Zhukov was elected to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a body in some respects similar to the U.S. Senate, although with little actual power. In March 1946, rumors circulated in Berlin that Zhukov would soon relinquish his post in Germany, owing to the difficulty of attending the sessions of the Presidium, which are held in Moscow. On 10 April 1946, Zhukov left Berlin and became commander of all Soviet ground forces.

Zhukov was seen on 1 May, reviewing the annual May Day parade, in the company of Stalin. In July, *Pravda* announced that he had been transferred to the command of the Odessa Military District. Then Zhukov dropped from sight and from mention in the Soviet press. Then followed the speculation in the West that Zhukov had been demoted, both because of his contacts with the West, and because Stalin distrusted his popularity with the Russian people. It is possible that these factors did enter into Zhukov's descent into obscurity. But there are certain clues which suggest that Zhukov, far from being in disgrace, had been returned to his wartime role of trouble-shooter for the Soviet high command. In 1946, some regions of the Ukraine had risen in revolt against the reimposition of prewar Communist controls. It is possible that the Soviet Government decided to send its best military leader to subdue a potentially dangerous rebellion, with no thought of removing him from a position of authority.

IN September 1946, there were reports that Zhukov was inspecting the satellite armies of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, with the view toward improving their efficiency and eliminating any elements opposing Soviet control. For two years, nothing further was heard of him until, in 1948, the Soviet press revealed that Zhukov was no longer in charge of the Odessa Military District. There followed frequent rumors, however, that he was advising the Chinese Communists in their conquest of China. This is not illogical. Zhukov had first won fame in the Far East, and in 1936 he had gained experience in advising foreign armies while helping the Spanish Loyalists.

Zhukov was seen publicly in June 1950, when he was identified as one of the deputies attending a meeting of the Supreme Soviet. This indicates that Zhukov had standing and position during the period of supposed disgrace. The start of the Korean War brought forth



N. S. KHRUSHCHEV
Party Secretary



MARSHAL BULGANIN
Prime Minister

reports that he was directing Communist operations in the Far East. The Chinese Communist winter offensive of 1950 was followed by information, from fairly reliable sources, that Marshal Zhukov was advising the Communist forces from a secret headquarters in Mukden.

Unrest in the Soviet satellite armies caused Zhukov to return from the Far East. In July 1951, he and Molotov went to Warsaw to address the seventh anniversary celebration of the establishment of the Polish Communist Government. In his speech, Zhukov praised the efficiency of the new Communist-controlled Polish Army. Zhukov's real mission in Poland became apparent nine days later, when the Polish Government announced that nine high Polish Army officers had been arrested and were being charged with spying for the United States.

After this incident, Zhukov was not mentioned in the Soviet press for a long period of time. It was not until the announcement of Stalin's death, and the installation of Malenkov as Soviet Premier, that Zhukov's whereabouts became known. On 6 March 1953, Marshal Zhukov was appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense.

Throughout 1954, Zhukov apparently gained in stature, as articles by him began to appear in the Soviet press. When Marshal Bulganin was named to replace the ousted Malenkov as Soviet Premier on 8 February 1955, it was Zhukov who succeeded Bulganin as Minister of Defense. In this position he is the supreme military authority in the Soviet Union, supervising the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

IT is vital to the interests of the United States to properly evaluate the significance of Zhukov's appointment. There has been some speculation that as Defense Minister, Zhukov is now the most powerful individual in the Soviet Government. This appears unlikely. Over seventy-seven per cent of all Soviet uniformed men are members of the Communist Party, or of its youth organization, and both the Communist Party and the MVD secret police have chains of command in the armed forces to prevent the growth of independent military power.

Zhukov, moreover, does not command the absolute loyalty of the Soviet officer corps. The Soviet generals are divided in their allegiance, some, for example, having been executed for supporting the purged police chief, Beria. For these reasons, it is doubtful whether Zhukov is as powerful as is sometimes claimed. I would

suggest that Marshal Zhukov now occupies a position roughly comparable to the combined positions of our Defense Secretary and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Certainly an important position, but at the same time controlled by civilian authorities.

It has been suggested by some hopeful persons that Marshal Zhukov's rise to power will result in a more cordial Soviet attitude toward the United States. This opinion stems from Zhukov's friendly relations with President Eisenhower in 1945, and from an article Zhukov published in *Pravda* in May 1954. In this article, which appeared during the celebration marking the ninth anniversary of the victory over Germany, Zhukov praised "the fighting valor of the troops of the United States and England" for their actions in World War II, as well as complimenting the Allied commanders, General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery.

When placed in context, however, these comments seem dwarfed by the rest of the article, which follows the usual Soviet line. Zhukov attacks "the American bankers [who] not for the first time, are profiting on war, on foreign blood, on the unhappiness of others." The article states that "the people of Europe and Asia do not want to be cannon fodder for the United States and will never accept such anti-popular ideas as are ceaselessly propagandized by Dulles, Adenauer and others." Significantly, Zhukov concludes by warning that the Soviet Union is "supplied with first-class military techniques and new weapons." Only the most complete optimist could find in Zhukov's article a suggestion of future Soviet cooperation with the United States.

A KNOWLEDGE of Zhukov's career and personality gives some indication of the policies he will follow as Soviet Minister of Defense. As a specialist on armored warfare, he will work for the rapid mechanization of the Soviet Army. In order to increase combat efficiency, he will urge the elimination of the triple chain of command which gives so much authority to the political officers and the MVD secret police. Zhukov's experience with the Soviet satellite armies may lead him to integrate them with Soviet forces to insure loyalty and efficiency. While Marshal Zhukov has often expressed his high regard for the fighting qualities of the U.S. armed forces, it now appears that he is devoting his energies to building up the Soviet armed forces to the point where they can successfully challenge those of the United States. It is important to note that one of the first acts of the new Soviet Government was to increase the budget for the armed forces by ten per cent.

Marshal Zhukov is both a Russian patriot and a loyal Communist. It is exceedingly unlikely that he will permit his once-stated friendship for President Eisenhower to impede current Soviet activities, any more than President Eisenhower determines U.S. policy in the light of his personal regard for Marshal Zhukov. A survey of Marshal Zhukov's career and personality indicates only one conclusion. The appointment of this man of proven ability to the leadership of the Soviet armed forces makes him one of America's most dangerous opponents.

Pull the attacker off balance, then . . .

Divide and Conquer


LIEUTENANT COLONEL RAYMOND W. MILLICAN

If war comes, the Army's first job will be defense. But unfortunately, we have had little experience in conducting prolonged defensive operations. In addition, we will be defending against an enemy who will outnumber us. We are likely to remain on the strategic defensive for a long period of time, and so we must become adept at tactics suitable for this situation.

The strategic defense uses both the tactical defense and offense. Covering forces and outposts delay and exhaust the enemy, a main line of resistance breaks his attack, and counterattacks destroy any elements that penetrate our MLR. We resort to the tactical defensive only as a necessary evil until we can attack from strength, hard and purposefully. Our defensive aim is to place the attacker in such an unfavorable position that the advantage passes to us. Then we hit him.

Our problem is essentially that of a lightweight boxer who is paired against a heavyweight. The lightweight must have superior skill, particularly in footwork. He must avoid the heavyweight's haymakers, exhaust him, punish him when he is exposed, and finally, he must bore in and land a series of decisive blows. Or we have a problem like that of a man beset by three cannibals on a desert island. If he fights all of them at once, he

As the enemy attacks, friendly forces withdraw to MLR



will become soup very quickly. If he runs away, they will eventually capture him and he will become soup. The solution is to run until the cannibals become separated, then turn and fight them one at a time.

A PLAN becomes visible. We will give ground, exhaust and harass the enemy, then attack and destroy elements of his force, and so reduce his margin of superiority. There is nothing original about this. Most of the successful defenses of history embodied the fundamentals of retreat and attack. Lee did it in Virginia. It was done in the First Battle of the Marne, the Battle of Tannenberg, and Rommel's defense of Cyrenaica in the summer and winter of 1941.

The MLR will absorb the impetus of the enemy attack and serve as a springboard for our counteroffensive. We must not engage the enemy's full force in a slugfest on the MLR.

Every mile the enemy moves toward us weakens him. The rate at which he loses strength depends on the terrain he crosses, the mobility of his force, his logistical system, his rate of advance, and the attrition effected by our air power and covering forces. The rate at which he weakens can be estimated, and the point at which the balance will swing in our favor can be predicted. Our MLR should be located at this depth, on the best ground in the area.

It must be anticipated that the commander will be under pressure to place his MLR where it will protect areas of political or economic importance. But if this pressure is allowed to supersede overriding military considerations, our force will be destroyed and the area will be lost anyhow. The only absolutely vital areas are those that are vital to the defense of our air bases and ports.

The covering force is used to gain time. It delays, exhausts, and punishes the enemy, and it obtains intelligence. It must be mobile, strong in armor and long-range fire power, and it must have excellent communications. Because of the increased mobility of armies, the enemy's manpower superiority, and our need for time, the covering force may have to operate through a zone of 100 to 300 miles.


LET'S see how this defense will actually work. After the enemy's advance has been under way for 24 to 72 hours, we should be able to determine the location, composition, and direction of advance of each of his primary and secondary efforts. The defending com-

mander must then select one enemy column as the first candidate for destruction. The remainder of the withdrawal is conducted with the aim of drawing this column into an exposed position.

The covering force, its artillery, partisan groups and air power will delay the enemy column and channel it into favorable routes of advance. Its strength, position, and rate of advance can be partially controlled by obstacles, interdiction, and opposition. As the column to be destroyed nears our proposed killing ground, full effort will be made to impede the advance of those other columns most likely to support or rescue our intended victim.

All possible units must be used. The MLR will be garrisoned only in the area where we expect it to be attacked. Elsewhere, the covering force must continue to delay the enemy's superior forces.

The bulk of our divisions will have been disposed in




One enemy column is picked for destruction

those general areas where principal routes of advance cut the MLR. The selection of the enemy force for destruction will determine the general location of the decisive battle. The divisions will move at night, both for secrecy and for protection against air attack. The disposition of forces in the critical area will conform to the plans for the block-attack maneuver.

We need not be too worried that the enemy will become cautious and refuse to enter the trap. It is more than likely that he will be eager to destroy our forces in a hurry, before our air power can wound him mortally.

AS the enemy advances, his capabilities will become clearer. If it appears that the column will bog down short of the MLR, the defending commander must be prepared to shift his mass forward and attack. On the other hand, if the enemy seems to have sufficient strength to breach the MLR once he reaches it, the commander must either move his MLR to the rear or use special weapons to cut the enemy down to beatable size. Unless vital areas are in immediate jeopardy, we should never offer decisive battle under conditions favoring the enemy.




Conventional and atomic weapons blast the enemy column

When the enemy attacks our MLR, he will be repulsed. Our attack must follow rapidly, for the enemy will grow stronger with every hour that passes, and we can't afford to delay our attack to make minute refinements.

The attack must be decisive. We must strike with every ounce of force at our disposal. At least temporary local air superiority is required to protect the concentration of forces before the attack is launched. Special weapons should be used to speed up the attack and so reduce the period during which our forces remain concentrated, and to liquidate enemy pockets. With local air superiority, we can launch an airborne attack on the rear of the enemy column. The mere appearance of airborne troops, coupled with the sudden reversal of conditions, will tend to panic the enemy.

Our attack, coming like a bolt from the blue, will create terrible confusion in the enemy command. Some columns will halt, paralyzed with uncertainty, while others will press frantically to the aid of the column under attack. When one enemy force has been destroyed, it may well be possible to turn and pounce on a second exposed column. With surprise, skill, and luck we can start a chain reaction of victory.

The next enemy column is now exposed to flank attack



Homburgs

CAPTAIN RICHARD P. TAFFE



The word from the Princeton Class of 1944 is that 3 per cent have ulcers, 25 per cent make more than \$10,000 a year, the 71 per cent that are married average 1.8 children; 1 is assistant coach of the Navy football team, and 1 admits that he keeps a mistress.

THE United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, and Princeton University at Princeton, New Jersey, are only an afternoon's automobile drive apart, but the differences in their programs and in their methods of preparing students for later life are greater than mere mileage would suggest. Two surveys were recently conducted which should be of more than passing interest to West Pointers who occasionally wonder what their lives would have been like had they gone to a liberal arts college instead of to the Academy on the Hudson, and to graduates of Old Nassau who have at times pondered the glories and pitfalls of a military career.

On the occasion of their tenth anniversaries, the class of 1944 of each of these eminent institutions published alumni books intended to revive old memories and to bring the members up to date on the doings of their sometime fellows.

The books make fascinating reading, especially when the facts they report are compared. Not all the facts, to be sure, are of earth-shaking importance, but it is a rare man who will not get a warm glow of satisfaction from finding that seven per cent of the West Pointers own cats and that one of the Princeton men keeps a mistress. And who cannot feel just a bit sorry for the 58 per cent of the West Pointers who have gained weight (an average of 15.5 pounds) or the three per cent of the Princetonians who have ulcers?

BENEATH the restrained language of the alumni books are many untold stories of happiness and woe, of ten turbulent years of American history. It is also possible to draw some interesting comparisons. For example, the West Point men, though a vast majority of them still roam around the world on active duty, are a considerably more domestic bunch than their civilian counterparts. Ninety-five per cent of them are married, as opposed to only 70.8 per cent of the Princetonians. The married military men have an average of 2.1 children, while the Princeton aver-

age is only 1.8. However, only 23 per cent of the West Pointers own homes, against 50 per cent for the Princeton men. But this must be attributed to the nomadic character of Army life.

WHERE money is concerned, the statistics hand out few surprises. Princeton graduates are wealthier than West Pointers. Approximately 75 per cent of the Princeton class of '44 were making over \$6,000, and over 25 per cent more than \$10,000—or so they reported when the statistics were being assembled. One man reported earnings of \$56,000 and another \$62,000.

Sixty-three per cent of the West Pointers were drawing about \$7,000 a year as majors. Two Air Force lieutenant colonels were nearing \$10,000. About 15 per cent of the class were pulling down approximately \$6,400. There is no record of the incomes of the 13 per cent who are in civilian life.

But money is the only category in which the Military Academy graduates clearly come out second best. Civilian critics who think military life is narrow in scope and opportunities can get an eye-opener from the two surveys. It just ain't so. The variety of pursuits of the West Pointers certainly matches that of the Princetonians.

Their careers began in much the same way. The West Point class of 1944 graduated on a symbolic date—6 June 1944—and immediately went off to war. So did 89 per cent of the Princeton men. Only a year of war remained, but 73.5 per cent of the West Pointers got overseas before it was over. Twenty-one per cent of the West Pointers and 10 per cent of the Princeton men participated in the Korean war.

The young men picked up their share of medals during these wars. The West Pointers have a total of 495 awards of medals and decorations, including: DSC 1, Silver Star 27, DFC 13, Bronze Star 164, Air Medal 82, Purple Heart 80, Combat Infantryman Badge 59, Commendation Ribbon 59, Soldier's Medal 1, and foreign decorations 9. The Princeton survey doesn't indicate the number

and Helmets

of decorations received, but acknowledges an impressive number of awards of the Silver Star and Purple Heart.

The medals were paid for. The Princeton class lost 22 men in World War II and the West Point class lost 9 men. The Military Academy class lost five men in Korea. Eighteen of them have died in aircraft accidents and seven from other causes.

WHILE the Princeton report doesn't tell how many of the class have earned advanced degrees, it does point with pride to the fact that it has produced several authors of books ranging from the physiology of behavior and a critical study of Wallace Stevens, the poet, to a do-it-yourself book that has sold half a million copies.

The Military Academy class doesn't report on the literary activities of its members, but some of them have contributed to *THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*. Twelve of the class have been to the Command and General Staff College at Leavenworth and 13 to the Guided Missiles course at Fort Bliss. Thirty-eight per cent have earned either an MS or MA degree at some civilian university or college and three have a Ph.D.

Since 1945 the West Pointers have handled a wide range of assignments. Originally, 171 of them were assigned to the Air Corps and 303 to the Army. Of these, 137 were on duty with the Air Force and 237 with the Army when the report was compiled.

Many of the West Pointers are combat leaders, staff officers, and pilots. Among the other jobs that have been held by the class of 1944 are: military observer for the United Nations on the cease-fire line between India and Pakistan; White House aide; Atomic Energy Commission military group; engineer adviser to Turkey; Big Inch Pipeline inspector for the Corps of Engineers; Inter-American Geodetic Survey officer in Ecuador; escort officer for VIPs touring the U.S.; attaché to the Embassy in Iran; POW of the Chinese Communist Forces; liaison duty with General Electric Company; and Russian language

student at the Army Language School.


Among the West Pointers who have left the service are a structural engineer with the Department of the Interior; a vice president of a shoe company; a management consultant engineer; a securities investment salesman; several Foreign Service men with the State Department; a doctor in Australia; a publisher; a reporter; a rancher; a logger; a few attorneys; and others in paper, pants, and petroleum.

The Princetonians too earn their bread in many different ways. The largest categories, in the order given, are: doctors, lawyers, engineers, salesmen, teachers, manufacturers, bankers, insurance brokers; stock brokers, advertising men, oil men, chemists, ministers, geologists, editors, writers, and publishers.

The West Point class has one distinction unmatched by the Princetonians: one of its members was far-sighted enough to select parents whose present address is the White House.

Despite the disparity in incomes of the two groups, their standards of living do not differ greatly. Ninety-two per cent of both groups own cars, while 46 per cent of the West Pointers and 53 per cent of the Princetonians have TV sets. Sixty-four per cent of the Princeton men say that it is a struggle to live within their incomes, while it would be surprising indeed if the 95 per cent of the West Point class that is married do not agree.

THE surveys show that the military men have lost more hair, gained less weight, and stayed in better health than the civilians. Beyond that, it is difficult to make any generalizations. Both groups, engaged in diverse pursuits, have already contributed much to American life. Men of these classes are now entering a period when their leadership will be significant. West Pointers will agree with the Princetonian who, when asked for a credo for his class, suggested: "Be strong, be determined, be calm, be willing to compromise, be receptive to new ideas, be generous, be stubborn, and, above all, be patient."



The word from the USMA Class of 1944 is that 58 per cent have gained weight, most of them earn about \$7,000 annually, the 95 per cent that are married average 2.1 children, 13 per cent are civilians, and not a single one admits to keeping a mistress.

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Commanding General, CONARC



MAJ. GEN. R. M. MONTAGUE
Deputy Commanding General



MAJ. GEN. W. M. MILEY
Chief of Staff



COL. J. F. GRECO
Deputy Chief of Staff



LT. COL. R. G. JONES
Secretary, GS



COL. C. Z. SHUGART
Adjutant General



COL. R. E. HOAG
Comptroller



CAPT. W. M. HEARN
Aide to the CG

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MAJ. GEN. R. M. MONTAGUE

DEVELOPMENTS GROUP

COL. M. M. IRVINE
Special Developments

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DR. F. C. BROOKS
Director

COL. W. L. HARDICK
Deputy Director



MAJ. GEN. W. P. ENNIS
Director, Special Weapons Developments
Fort Bliss, Texas

DEVELOPMENT & TEST



COL. H. S. SUNDT
Artillery, Atomic & Radiological Warfare

COL. R. H. BAYNE
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MAJ. GEN. J. H. HINDS

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Communications, Electronics, Air & Airborne

COL. R. N. SKAGGS
Infantry Weapons, Individual Equipment, Chemical Warfare & Biological Warfare

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COL. P. H. BROWN, JR.—Board No. 2, Fort Knox, Ky.
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COL. A. H. BENDER—Board No. 4, Fort Bliss, Tex.
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MAJ. W. C. EDLER—Wright Air Development Center, Ohio
CAPT. R. J. MANN—Whippany, N. J.
LT. COL. P. L. MCGIVEN—California Institute of Technology
LT. COL. C. M. FREUDENDORF—Army Chemical Center, Md.
COL. W. L. MCNAMEE—Lincoln Laboratories, MIT
MAJ. R. F. SHANNON—Redstone Arsenal, Ala.

G1



COL. R. STEINBACH

COL. N. W. BALTZER
Deputy

LT. COL. W. PEARSON
Manpower Control & Plans

LT. COL. K. G. RADTKE
Military Personnel

LT. COL. C. S. CURTIS
Procurement & Distribution

LT. COL. J. M. CARSON
Human Research Division

G2



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Deputy

LT. COL. H. N. HOLSTER
Operations Division

MAJ. J. J. WAGNER
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G3



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BRIG. GEN. S. G. CONLEY
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G4



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THE MONTH'S READING

Friendship Without Illusions

THEODORE H. WHITE
Collier's
4 February 1955

We Americans have gone through enormous cycles of naïve, almost adolescent, enthusiasm for foreign potentates and princes only to be betrayed and let down later. None of us should or can forget how our wartime honeymoon with Stalin was succeeded by the betrayal we invited by our naïveté.

Our most enduring and fruitful alliances have been with the French and the British, two powers whom we have constantly criticized, called to account, subjected to every form of debate and discussion—yet with whom we have always ended by making common cause.

We have for the past nine years enjoyed a honeymoon with the German people and with Adenauer even more complete than our honeymoon with the Russians and Chinese during the war and, in the individual case of Adenauer, with much better cause.

The last 20 years have proved such honeymoons dangerous. Our friendship with Germany will be solid only if it rests on the same base that sustains our friendship with France and Britain. That friendship rests on no illusion that sovereign nations make alliances and commit their destinies because of honeyed words alone. It rests rather on the belief that in even the strongest alliances each partner must examine each common goal first in the light of its own national self-interest. We are the allies of the Germans today because we need them. Yet they need us more, and it would be best for both peoples to keep this hard, cold fact always in mind.

The Soldier in Politics

THE HONORABLE MIKE MANSFIELD
Extension of Remarks in the Senate
21 February 1955

... What is the danger to our security inherent in the exposure of military leaders—whether sought or unsought—to the political conflicts of the day? It is this: Military leaders who are so exposed will find themselves in agreement with one side of a political issue and at odds with the other. They will be applauded by political leaders whose position they uphold and looked upon with suspicion by their opponents. When military officers become subjects of partisan politics they are no longer viewed as unbiased, objective career servants, nor will their military judgments be accepted as those of politically disinterested professional experts. From that, it is only one step to the loss of confi-

dence in the military judgment of our military leaders.

This central problem was clearly illustrated prior to the last presidential election when a Senator publicly called for a change in the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had, he said, lost confidence in their judgment. The new administration, moreover, subsequently did appoint new Joint Chiefs of Staff to take a new look at the military program. Surely we cannot have Republican generals and admirals for one administration and Democratic generals and admirals for the next without danger to the national security.

Now, possibly as never before, we cannot afford to play politics with our security. No political party, and no faction of a party, stands in the long run to benefit from military insecurity in this country. Certainly, the armed services as a whole do not.

In mentioning this tendency of some military officers to slip into or to be drawn into the political orbit of our system of government, I do not wish to imply that the military experts should have no contact with Congress. Certainly Congress has a right to know what our military experts think about military matters under consideration in Congress. The danger lies, not in this, but in military officers being employed as experts outside the area of their special competence in support of or in opposition to policy matters concerning which political and not military decision must be made.

There is no easy solution to this problem. Part of the answer lies in the restraint which civilian leaders must exercise to avoid placing military officials on the spot in political issues. Part of the answer must also lie in the fortitude with which military leaders resist the temptation to project themselves into nonmilitary questions. . . .

Idealism is Good Sense

FRANK TANNENBAUM
The American Tradition in Foreign Policy
University of Oklahoma Press, 1955

There is a peculiar consistency in this notion of ours that the little nation has the same rights as the big one. Our quarrel with Russia is founded on it. The Truman doctrine is a modern version of the basic propositions of President Monroe; and our defense of Korea is explainable on the conviction that the only kind of world the American people can comfortably live in is one in which Korea has no more right to attack and dismember Russia than Russia has to attack and dismember Korea or Finland. . . . And it is this conviction that underlies President Eisenhower's statement that "We will never acquiesce in the enslavement of any people in order to purchase fancied gains for ourselves."

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

To some, these American notions seem impractical and foolish. Influential scholars and counselors would have us abandon them. They suggest that we cease being childish and idealistic and recognize that the "national interest" and "national security" require us to become disciples of Machiavelli, take our lessons from Richelieu, Bismarck, or Clemenceau. The fact that Germany and Japan have committed national suicide by consistent adherence to these doctrines, and that other nations, who in their own way followed the same teachings, have been greatly weakened, seems not to dampen the eloquence of those who would persuade us to surrender the beliefs and practices by which we have lived and prospered from the beginning.

But the American people cannot accept this counsel. It runs against the grain of their experience. Our history is so unlike that of most of the other nations of the earth that we see things in a special light. In ways not readily describable, our conception of the relations between states is different from that which has governed the international behavior of most other great powers. American attitudes toward foreign policy derive from a unique historical experience. While the United States is culturally a child of Western Europe, and its religious and political ideas stem from the Hebraic-Christian and Greco-Roman tradition, it has been deeply influenced by the pervasive impact of the New World. The discovery, conquest, and gradual occupation of the American continent have shaped the European heritage into something markedly unlike its original form. Our view of the world is not European, and the difference explains the grounds upon which we would build our relations with the rest of the world.

Dear Armchair Strategist

Speech attributed by Livy to Lucius Aemilius Paulus to the people of Rome before the Pydna campaign

In every circle, and, truly, at every table, there are people who lead armies into Macedonia; who know where the camp ought to be placed; what posts ought to be occupied by troops; when and through what pass that territory should be entered; where magazines should be formed; how provisions should be conveyed by land and sea; and when it is proper to engage the enemy, when to lie quiet.

And they not only determine what is best to be done, but if any thing is done in any other manner than what they have pointed out, they arraign the consul, as if he were on trial before them.

These are great impediments to those who have the management of affairs; for every one cannot encounter injurious reports with the same constancy and firmness of mind as Fabius did, who chose to let his own ability be questioned through the folly of the people, rather than to mismanage the public business with a high reputation.

I am not one of those who think that commanders ought at no time to receive advice; on the contrary, I should deem that man more proud than wise, who regulated every proceeding by the standard of his own single judgment.

What then is my opinion?

That commanders should be counselled, chiefly, by per-

sons of known talent; by those who have made the art of war their particular study, and whose knowledge is derived from experience; from those who are present at the scene of action, who see the country, who see the enemy; who see the advantages that occasions offer, and who, like people embarked in the same ship, are sharers of the danger.

If, therefore, any one thinks himself qualified to give advice respecting the war which I am to conduct, which may prove advantageous to the public, let him not refuse his assistance to the state, but let him come with me into Macedonia.

He shall be furnished with a ship, a horse, a tent; even his travelling charges shall be defrayed.

But if he thinks this too much trouble, and prefers the repose of a city life to the toils of war, let him not, on land, assume the office of a pilot.

The city, in itself, furnishes abundance of topics for conversation; let it confine its passion for talking within its own precincts, and rest assured that we shall pay no attention to any councils but such as shall be framed within our camp.

The Danger Lies Within

LOUIS J. HALLE
Civilization and Foreign Policy
Harper & Brothers, 1955

In its innermost significance the ideological opposition of our traditional civilization and Soviet communism . . . is the opposition between two concepts of man. To our concept of individual human dignity based on that potentiality which resides in each of us the Communists oppose a materialistic conception of man as a soulless animal moved only by economic considerations. This animal exists in herds and is subject to herding. It is mass man, having no existence as a self-contained individual but only as a statistical component. By the devices of socialistic science this mass man can be trained ("conditioned") to react automatically in whatever direction his masters choose to the stimuli they provide. . . .

While this is the Communist attitude toward man, it is not exclusive to communism. In our own society as belief in human dignity has weakened a "science" of mass communication and manipulation of the mass mind has been developing. Propagandists, public-relations experts, sociologists, and advertisers have been learning how to condition (or train, or indoctrinate) "the public" so that it will support a certain policy and oppose another, so that it will demonstrate for one man and against another, so that it will feel a desire for a certain kind of beer and spend its resources accordingly. . . .

If our own civilization remained in full possession of the vision on which it depends the ideological challenge of communism would be quixotic. It could not endanger us any more than termites can endanger living wood. The danger to our civilization today comes from within, from the weakening of its vision, and the challenge of world communism, although so conspicuous, is an incident that has significance in proportion to the weakness that it confronts.

Another Look at the Y Formation

... TOWARD A MORE

CAPTAIN FRANK M. TATUM

LIEUTENANT Colonel George Juskalian's "Night Ambush Patrol" [December 1954] deserves comment. I am familiar with this type of formation and feel qualified to comment on its effectiveness.

My first criticism of the Y formation as described by Colonel Juskalian is the size of the patrol. FM 21-75 states: "A patrol consists of as few men as are needed to accomplish its mission. Large patrols are hard to control. They do not move rapidly and they make noise in moving. The smaller the patrol, the easier it is to control and the more rapidly it can move." Thirty-two men and their supporting weapons can certainly take care of a small enemy patrol no matter what formation they are in if it is reasonably well planned and executed. Were all those men actually needed? Or was it an attempt to outnumber the enemy—an enemy whose primary strength lay in numbers rather than in aggressiveness and resourcefulness?

Contrary to what was stated in the article, the Y formation patrol is not very flexible. Initiative is lost when a




Figure 1

unit is deployed in a formation or along a line. Control is fair so long as the patrol fights from its Y formation, but any movement of the patrol automatically destroys the advantages of fighting from this pre-planned position. The arrangement of the men of the squad in a single line makes control by the squad leaders somewhat difficult. This is particularly true if the original formation is broken by shifting one or more of the groups of the patrol. True flexibility cannot be gained unless the patrol leader can quickly shift his fires or his men to meet any situation.

We cannot overlook the difficulty of extracting the Y patrol from a fire fight with a superior force. The difficulty of moving a large patrol into position undetected must be considered, and we must also consider that the enemy has the capability of moving an equally large force out to intercept our patrol. This leads to the need of a plan for extracting elements of our patrol and reorganizing them before moving back to friendly lines. This maneuver is quite difficult at night, and the Y formation is not nearly so maneuverable as a platoon in a simple perimeter or a more conventional platoon formation.

A two- or three-man screening force cannot hope to operate in the area where the enemy was met unless the enemy has been completely neutralized. A single enemy soldier armed with an automatic weapon could almost wipe out such a small force. If the enemy were in sufficient strength to require the fires of two reinforced rifle squads to neutralize them, would it not seem logical to send out at least a well-supported squad as the screening force?

THE Y formation looks good on paper, and the theory behind the formation is sound, but it is difficult to actually

place on the ground. Figure 1 shows how the average platoon leader would place his squads while employing the Y formation. The squads are shown on a small hill. Although a more desirable location would probably be on terrain




Figure 2

that is more level than the one shown, the teams should be at least high enough to sweep the areas between groups with fire. The point is this: Would an enemy be stupid enough to blunder between two dangerous ridges without first checking to see if they were occupied? Even on level ground an intelligent enemy would avoid open areas.

To say that fifty per cent of the time the enemy would run into the spokes of the Y instead of into the spaces, seems entirely within reason. (Actually our own unit had an even poorer average than fifty per cent. Invariably the Chinese hit the spokes.) To be hit on the end of one of the spokes is serious. The enemy is usually so close to the man on the end of the spoke that to move him or the man behind him would alert the enemy and allow him to open fire first. To leave him there is very dangerous because once the fire fight has started, it is very difficult to maneuver from the Y formation. The teams

FLEXIBLE PATROL . . .

not in contact with the enemy are unable to help because they do not know exactly how the team in contact is maneuvering. To support by fire would jeopardize the team in contact. The team in contact must maneuver as much as possible, hoping to outfight an unknown number of enemy without any help from the remainder of the 32-man patrol.

Figures 2 and 3 show how an enemy force could endanger the Y patrol by launching a powerful attack against either one or two spokes of the Y. This seems a bit more realistic than blindly launching attacks into several of the trap areas at one time. Once the enemy's lead elements have been fired on, would not the average enemy then seek to find the flanks of the spokes firing upon him? Then he could assault the flank of a known enemy rather than blindly blundering into a trap by attempting a double envelopment in the middle of the night. The only time a prudent enemy would blunder into two of the trap areas simultaneously would be when he was either feeling out the dispositions of the friendly patrol or when he was closing in with a superior force to destroy the patrol. In either case the friendly patrol leader would be better off in a formation from which he could maneuver more rapidly. In the Y formation his only recourse is either to quickly disengage when hit from more than one direction, or to dig in and fight a do-or-die defense.

IF the platoon leader is expected to fight in more than one direction, would he not be better off in a platoon V formation or in just a plain perimeter defense? He would then have his squad leaders where they could better control their squads and he would have a reserve to use as needed, either to hit the

enemy, screen the area, or cover the remainder of the patrol while they disengage from a dangerous situation.

The Y formation seemed to fare pretty well against small Chinese patrols that were obviously instructed to fan out and circle the UN patrols. But the Y was certainly not the only formation that checked this enemy maneuver. The very size of the Y patrol gives it an advantage over small patrols, but this advantage is not retained as the enemy patrols increase to an equally large size.

Increasing the size of our patrols that are operating in enemy territory is not a guarantee of success. Nor does giving




Figure 3

a patrol leader a complete SOP to follow and a formation to adopt assure success on the battlefield. If the primary mission of a patrol is to fight from a piece of terrain, why not establish an outpost or patrol base and give the patrol the benefits of local security and all-around defense? But if a normal patrol is needed, why not dispatch a small, mobile, aggressive patrol that can move quickly and silently and function as a patrol and not as a combat outpost?

Each month in this space Captain Jack F. McAhon, who is in charge of motion picture distribution for the Pictorial Branch, Department of Defense OPI, reports on the new films available to the services.

Mortars are an invaluable ally of the infantryman. **Observation of Mortar Fire by the Combat Soldier, TF 7-1729** (40 minutes), tells what information the mortars must have to complete their mission. It explains the bracketing and creeping methods of fire adjustment, the WORM rule for zeroing the target, and the use of marking rounds and reference points to determine the location of the target in relation to the mortars.

In **Armies of the World, Part II, the Russian Soldier, TF 30-1966** (29 minutes), a Russian training film is shown, while a narrator describes the rigorous training that soldiers of the Soviet Union receive. The film outlines the Russian soldier's background, political indoctrination, and weapons, pointing out his weaknesses as well as his strengths.

Combat Formations—Rifle Squad and Rifle Platoon, Parts I and II, TF 9-1919 (36 minutes), is a useful film for basic unit training instructors. It uses diagrams and live demonstrations to explain the basic combat formations and tell under what circumstances each should be used. It also describes the hand signals that are employed to control the formations.

Recoil Mechanisms, Principles of Operation—Hydrospring Types, TF 9-1869 (15 minutes), shows, by means of cutaway models and diagrams, the recoil mechanism used on tank guns and some self-propelled pieces. The film also explains the use of oil with the piston system, the use of the counter-recoil spring and buffer, and the concentric recoil mechanism.

Dismounted Drill: Part I, Squad Drill; and Part II, Platoon Drill, TF 7-1947 (32 minutes), can be used either for the training of recruits or for review by seasoned troops. Part I covers falling in, dressing right at close and normal intervals, inspection of arms, flank and column movements, oblique marching, and forming single column and column of twos. Part II covers the corresponding movements for platoon drill.

MONTHS ago your JOURNAL began to plan a series of articles that would give the most thorough possible picture of the new German Army. It was our intention to publish them when the high diplomatic negotiations had been concluded and the West German government was fairly embarked on its military program. However, press reports indicate that it may be some months before final approval can be expected, and since the articles we have do not reflect on those negotiations, we are publishing them now.

Major Hargreaves's article, which begins on this page, is not an apologia for the German. On the contrary, through showing the record of the relationship between the German and those who fought *with* him rather than against him, it reaffirms the old truth that the standard set by the leader governs the conduct of the led. Our own army hardly needs to be reminded that the German-American (many of them immigrants or first-generation Americans) have been among the best soldiers we have produced, high-minded and loyal comrades and excellent fighting men.

The second article, by Lieutenant Colonel DeWitt Armstrong III, gives an excellent picture of the tactical and technical capabilities and deficiencies of the Federal Border Police, which many persons consider a cadre for the German Army to come.

In the final article, Captain Boyd T. Bashore reports on the plans of the Blank Office in Bonn. In preparing this article Captain Bashore visited that office, and interviewed its officials and obtained their unofficial assistance.

THE GERMAN AS AN ALLY

MAJOR REGINALD HARGREAVES



IT would be disingenuous to disregard the fact that a German Army in NATO is contemplated with an irrepressible feeling of dubiety and unease in some quarters. It is comprehensible enough that many of the members of those Western nations, who twice within a single life-span have been forced to take up arms against trampling Teutonic aggression, should experience an instinctive mental reservation as to the wisdom not only of acquiescing in German rearmament, but of deliberately furthering its consummation.

The gravity of the problem is not to be belittled; but in weighing the pros and cons in the balance it is impossible to arrive at an impartial judgment if attention is concentrated exclusively on the immediate past. To achieve a true perspective the German war record back over the centuries must be compared with that of other nations, and carefully related to the particular leader under whom the Teutonic armies took the field.

It has been written that "When the sword is drawn, all lusts warm the mind"; and in the dawn of world history war was conducted on lines of unalleviated savagery. But with the emergence of Western man from the Dark Ages, a change came over the manner of waging war, a metamorphosis which tended progressively to brutalize

it. Conflict became hedged about by all manner of chivalric prohibitions and taboos.

There were, of course, many infractions of this lofty standard of behavior, and in most instances they were punished with exemplary speed and severity. For they were enormities committed, in the main, by a negligible minority of the rank and file rather than by the leaders. And almost invariably *it is the standard set by the leader which governs the conduct of the led.*

In more recent times, the cold-blooded murder of ten thousand Polish officer captives at Katyn, and the saturnalia of pillage, rape and irresponsible destruction that marked the Red Army's advance into Germany, faithfully reproduced the spirit of barbarous, compassionless atavism by which Stalin's whole policy was unflinchingly actuated. The old proverb, "Scratch a Russian and you get a Tartar," has never applied with greater cogency than to the Soviet forces that took their inspiration from the wolfish, pitiless autocrat of the Kremlin.

NOW of all peoples the Germans most faithfully mirror the characteristics—good or ill—of those who become their leaders. With a man of the unblemished probity of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, the brilliant com-

mander of the Anglo-German forces throughout the Seven Years' War, the Teutonic fighting man proved himself capable of a standard of behavior—in battle, in billets, and on the line of march—as exemplary as any of which record survives. If he lapsed into senseless, wanton brutality under the shifty, unscrupulous Frederick the Great, he was perfectly restrained and circumspect under the eagle eye of King William I of Prussia, throughout the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.

But with a head of state of the satanic character of Adolf Hitler—a raving paranoiac, without ruth or conscience—the average German, having surrendered his will to the *Führerprinzip* his current demigod embodied, promptly proceeded to reproduce all those damnable traits of which Hitler was the unabashed exemplar.

Over and over again history has demonstrated that as the chameleon changes hue to harmonize with the fabric on which he finds himself, so will the German orient himself to match up with the leader to whom he has surrendered his destiny—as surrender it he must, for such is the nature of his particular psychology.

"Yesterday's rice is neither eaten nor paid for twice." The changing scene calls for a fresh approach, a new assessment. The choice today is not between German rearmament and no German rearmament. It lies between controlled and uncontrolled German rearmament; between a German armed force restrained by wise and temperate leadership and a German horde which, under Soviet inspiration, would be capable of a perfidy and barbarous excess without parallel since the days of Attila.

There is another aspect of the problem, however, and one whose consideration has been singularly neglected—the character and quality of the German as an ally.

GERMAN fighting men made their first appearance in relatively recent military history when Swabian *Landsknechts* superseded the Swiss mercenaries in the pay of the warring *cinquecento* princes affluent enough to supplement their own raw levies with a contingent of tough, battle-hardened experts. They were employed on an extensive scale by Emperor Maximilian I (1493-1519) in the eternal quarrel between the royal houses of Hapsburg and Valois. Sternly disciplined, dutiful, forbidden to loot save under certain specific conditions, their fidelity to their current patron was unexceptionable.

English men-at-arms first made acquaintance with the military quality of the *Landsknechts* in the campaign against Louis XII of France, inaugurated by Henry VIII in 1513. In an expeditionary force of some 15,000 men, 800 German mercenaries marched "all in a plump"—that is, in close order—in the place of honor immediately before the English King. That they were entirely worthy of the trust reposed in them was sufficiently witnessed by their skilled activities at the battle of the Spurs and the siege of Théroutanne.

In the unhappy kinsmen's quarrel which led to the War of American Independence, France was a menace

so near her shores that Britain was forced to retain many of the best of her own and the Hanoverian troops within the homeland. Lord North's egregious administration conceived the idea of hiring mercenaries from the complacent rulers of Brunswick, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse and Waldeck. It was a move which proved as politically inept as it was militarily unfruitful. Apart from a handful of skilled artillerymen, the raw rustics who were hustled, willy-nilly, into the contingents destined for service in North America, were uncouth peasants, bankrupt tradesmen and fugitive apprentices.

Half-trained, and even then on the wrong lines, they were never more than a horde of bewildered yokels.

Wellington made the fullest use of the services of the King's German Legion throughout the campaign waged against Napoleon's marshals in the Iberian Peninsula; the Legion Cavalry proving invaluable, both in action and as preceptors to the British Horse.

If the operations of the international force at the time of the Boxer Rebellion be left out of account, Waterloo was the last occasion on which British and German troops served in the same cause.

On this momentous occasion both Wellington and Napoleon confronted each other with somewhat scratch forces; the former, indeed, had frankly stigmatized his own as "an infamous army." And with many of his tried and trusty Peninsular regiments either on Foreign station or the high seas, there was reason enough for his perturbation. But among his units, in addition to some doubtful Dutch and Belgian contingents, were eight battalions of Germans, made up of Hanoverian Electoral troops and the King's German Legion. All of them were woefully understrength, but in the 3,994 officers and men at his disposal the Iron Duke reposed such confidence that he entrusted one weak battalion with the defense of the vital strongpoint, a little in advance of the left of his line, into which the farm of La Haye Sainte had been turned. Moreover, he maintained absolute faith in the Prussian Marshal Blücher's promise that, despite the setback he had suffered a couple of days earlier, he would reorganize and return to attack Napoleon's right flank with all possible speed. History records that the Iron Duke's confidence in the Germans was not misplaced.

GERMANS always respond to leadership; but the devil of it is that their reaction is just as fervent with evil leadership as with good. None the less, it is always to be borne in mind that the range of a man's capabilities is revealed as much by the depths to which he can descend as by the heights he can scale.

Whenever the German has found himself integrated with the troops of other nations his emotional instability has yielded to the steadying influence of his associates and the inspiration of sound leadership. As part of an international force under international direction, there is every reason to believe he will play a part worthy of all the best in an industrious, virile race.

The Federal Border Police

CADRE FOR A NEW ARMY?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DEWITT ARMSTRONG III

THE *Bundesgrenzschutz*, or Federal Border Police Force, is a professionally led 15,000-man internal security organization which was established in 1951 and has been slowly but steadily expanding ever since. Although it is definitely a police force, it is the closest thing to an army that the Germans have had since 1945, and it is as sharp an outfit as you ever saw. Its main mission is to provide mobile strength to back up the various German border security agencies. It functions under control of the Federal Minister of the Interior and works closely with the various police, customs, and security officials on and near the zonal border.

Actually, it is not a crystal-clear mission which has been given to the BGS (*BundesGrenzSchutz*). The

British and Americans still retain considerable responsibility for border security. Stationed close to the Iron Curtain are various Allied mobile troops, three U.S. cavalry regiments included, and these operate regularly on security duty near the frontier. Germans from various and numerous federal, provincial, and local agencies actually man the crossing points and enforce the civil laws relating to border crossing and smuggling, using various combinations of fixed posts, check points, and patrols. BGS duties and responsibilities must be dovetailed with these. In general, you might say that the BGS task is to maintain the territorial integrity of the Bonn republic and to keep order in border areas by reinforcing the less powerful civil agencies operating there. The BGS does its job in three ways: it garrisons the border region; it conducts mounted and dismounted patrols in certain border areas; and it trains toward combat readiness as a mobile light infantry force.

Stationed usually by battalion in old Wehrmacht *kasernes* near the border, resembling the old German Army in physical appearance, and doing its training and operating in a most military fashion, the BGS does look very much like an embryonic army.



The Rearming of Germany

ing such things as the extent of authority of noncommissioned officers and the off-duty relationships among the ranks. In these respects the BGS has pioneered, and the lessons it has learned will surely not be ignored. It is to be expected that other innovations introduced by the BGS without the stimulus of ministerial decree may also find their reflection in the *Streitkräfte*. So a look at Germany's BGS of 1954 may perhaps be a preview of the German Army of years to come.

IT is not a modern combat force and could not stand up to an organized attack. It lacks aircraft, tanks, anti-tank guns, and artillery, and is without heavy weapons of all kinds. It doesn't have mortars, bazookas, recoilless rifles, heavy machine guns, or even rifle grenades. It is restricted to small arms and the MG42, the rapid-firing bipod-mounted light machine gun so famous in World War II. Each battalion has three armored cars, but they are the practically roadbound U.S. M8s from which the 37mm gun has been removed. So the BGS is severely limited in what it can do, and of course this limitation is reflected in tactical doctrine and training.

These restrictions do give the BGS a clean, straightforward organization. Starting with a rifle squad that

Border policemen race down a country lane during recent maneuvers at Kassel, Germany



West German border police held large-scale exercises which included a river crossing last year

It is natural to see the BGS as a cadre for the new German Army. Speculation to this effect has been continuous since the inception of the BGS in 1951. That speculation is now more intense than ever. It does seem very natural to merge the BGS right into the new army or at least to draw very heavily upon it for cadres. But until some army units are trained up to combat readiness, there will still be a border security task to perform.

Regardless of its future status, the BGS's four years of experience will profoundly influence the shape of things in the new German Army. Adenauer's government has long since declared its intent to change many traditional features of the military establishment, includ-



has 10 men and an MG42, they put three squads together and have a platoon. Three such platoons and a very small overhead make a company. Three companies plus a headquarters company containing reconnaissance, pioneer, and communications platoons, make a battalion. Three battalions and a headquarters make a regiment. Simple, when you don't have to fit in all the supporting weapons, isn't it?

Above regiment there is an area organization fitted to the political territories of the Republic. At that level are found the various administrative establishments such as schools and depots. These, by the way, are few in number and small in strength, for the manpower is concentrated at the business end of the outfit, as was the Wehrmacht custom.

Since it is a police force, a para-military organization, it does not use the normal military terms for these units. Instead, there are such synonyms as "hundred-man group" for company. The grades and ranks, for that matter, also have sanitized names, like "senior patrol leader." But the units and the rank structure fit precisely into the military pattern; you have only to convert the words and there you have an infantry regiment—less supporting weapons—with captains commanding companies and lieutenants leading platoons, and so on. After all, what would be a more sensible way to organize a lightly armed constabulary force?

THE most impressive feature of the BGS is the high quality of its leadership. Its officers are an exceedingly able group, and so are its noncommissioned officers. When the BGS was first organized, in 1951, practically all the NCOs were former officers or noncoms of the World War II Wehrmacht. Now, however, the natural evolutionary processes of an expanding organization have thinned the proportion of experienced ones.

These BGS noncoms are alert and capable men. There are no deadheads among them who are merely drawing the extra pay and marking time. They are very much in earnest about their responsibilities and duties. In the field they actively and most energetically command their several elements; they never sit and wait for orders when initiative will help get the mission done. They expect quick obedience from their men, and they get it.

Of all the ways in which the BGS has pioneered, perhaps none has greater significance than the question of relationships among officers, NCOs, and men. The Adenauer government has stated that the new *Streitkräfte* must break sharply away from Wehrmacht tradition in this respect, and the BGS has broken trail for them. To understand, we must glance at the background.

German military men have long thought themselves enlightened in the matter of discipline. They have smiled indulgently at the Prussian militarism of Frederick the Great, considering it an anachronism from which progress has freed them. After World War I, they say, there was deliberate development in the 100,000-man army of a "comradeship" among all ranks, and

the spirit carried on through the expansion in the '30s and through World War II. Yet the Germans had in their modern army an authoritarianism which we would regard as almost tyrannical. Meeting a superior in a corridor or upon a city street, a soldier was required to stand at rigid attention and ask permission to pass. Should an officer chance to enter a restaurant where a soldier was eating, the soldier was obliged to get up, go over, and ask the officer for permission to remain. It made no difference if the man were on leave, nor did it matter whether he were with his wife or his father or whom.

Seldom were officers involved in enforcing such rules as these, for the habits of the NCOs made that unnecessary. The question of disobedience by a German private was almost academic, for his noncoms had seen to it that his obedience was total. They did so through a high degree of personal control and a wide latitude in punishment. It was not unusual for a corporal to have one of his men crawl on his belly from one end of the camp to another for making a mistake. The corporal had the authority to do this, and he used it. If the corporal figured that digging a hole in the ground would help the private see the error of his ways, the private did just that.

For several years there have been press releases coming out of Bonn saying how different will be the ways of the new army. The idea has been planted that the relationships among officers, noncommissioned officers, and men will be no longer authoritarian but instead more like those of a benevolent employer, his benevolent foremen, and their happy workmen. They have said, for instance, that the soldier will have a free hand in decorating his barracks room, that the power of noncoms will be reduced, and that the soldier no longer will have to ask an officer's permission to ride on the same streetcar.

Now, all of this may very well come to pass. Conceivably, they might go farther, perhaps to the extremes of the Doolittle Board, but I don't think so. Judging from the 1954 BGS, discipline in their new army will still look hard to us.

This is true in spite of definite effort, continuous since the birth of the BGS, to break away from the Wehrmacht pattern of discipline. The Germans feel that they have been successful in this. And it is undeniable that they have toned down the Wehrmacht practices. Brutality is absent. Company officers no longer have authority to confine men (on bread and water three days out of four) for periods up to ten days. Men wear civilian clothing when off duty. The endless close-order drill has been greatly reduced. Officers are closer to their men both physically and spiritually. Nevertheless, by American standards, discipline in the BGS is quite stern. Men still salute all superiors. Juniors still spring instantly to a very rigid attention when an officer enters a room, even if it is a class in session.

WHILE Allied restrictions on its armament keep the BGS from being up to date in its weapons, its motorization is modern. Gone are the many horses which were

found in Wehrmacht divisions; every operational BGS unit is completely motorized. No one has to shuttle, either. Two units of the same type will not necessarily have the same type of equipment. There is quite a variety in their transport, in fact; one company may be mounted entirely in trucks while the next company may have a number of small Mercedes roadsters. A little of their authoritative equipment is American, some is British, but most is German. The basic type of vehicle is a converted four-wheel commercial truck, with very limited off-road mobility. A new type of vehicle just being tested is the German equivalent of our quarter-ton, built to carry four men, operate across country, and be paddled across rivers.

By American standards, the BGS has very little equipment. Much less gear is issued to an individual soldier, and the quantity of radio equipment in a battalion is meager. Partly this is because of the standard peacetime complaint of all armies: no money. But the Germans never did believe in giving out equipment on a lavish scale. Probably as much for that reason as because of their discipline, their equipment is remarkably well cared for. The standards of maintenance of everything from the vehicles through the soldier's clothing are higher than you ever find in our army.

Seen alone with his soft hat on, the BGS private looks like one of the many uniformed civil servants in Germany, where the postmen, railway watchmen, foresters, and dozens of others are more or less militarily garbed. But put that man in his squad, and put the squad out in the field with the rest of the platoon, and you'll rub your eyes in astonishment. The resemblance to the old German Army is most striking. The color and cut of the uniform are different, but the coal-scuttle helmets, the jackboots, the rifles, the camouflaged ponchos, the MG42s, the grey gloves on the officers—they are all there! It is only gradually that you begin to miss the long overcoats and the gas-mask carrier. Even those funny little field telephones and the hinged wooden map boards are back again. It is an odd sensation, seeing them again! Nor is it only their equipment which looks the same, for many methods are also unchanged.

Because of their mission they do not operate just as the Wehrmacht did. A small force, widely dispersed and lightly armed, they are capable of reinforcing other police groups. But they are not capable of establishing strong defense lines or of attacking organized defensive positions. Therefore, their doctrine and training are realistically based upon a constabulary or skirmisher type of combat, where BGS forces locate hostile elements, block their movement by roadblocks and outposts, and seek to disperse or destroy them by local light infantry attacks.

IN the light infantry part of their job, the BGS troops are nothing short of magnificent. Squad leaders have their men well in hand, and they move them over the ground in a most professional way. Riflemen do not

bunch, individual men make excellent use of cover and concealment, and the light machine gun goes in and out of action with remarkable swiftness as it bounds from one well-chosen position to another. In their training exercises these troops play the game to the hilt, taking pride in showing how well they know the rules.

But where mobility is concerned, the BGS is less skillful. Many of the tricks of the trade have apparently been forgotten, although their ranks include many former panzer division and panzergrenadier division officers. True, the nature of their automotive equipment does restrict them to roads, but they could operate perfectly well on unpaved third- and fourth-class roads. Many times proper use of their inherent mobility requires that they do so, but they do not. If the road is a paved highway, they use it; their vehicles never move off paved roads, however. Whether moving or halting, they are usually virtually bumper to bumper.

Control is excellent. Extensive use is made of pyrotechnics, just as during World War II. While the platoon is attacking, the platoon leader controls its fire and its movement with his flare pistol and flares. Tighter and more centralized control is kept over radios. For the battalion command net, the battalion communications platoon sends radio vehicles out to the companies in a supporting role when necessary; they are still battalion's responsibility to maintain and operate. Motorcycle messengers are used a great deal. Most important of all, staffs are kept small. The regimental headquarters works with four or five officers, and the whole battalion headquarters will be the commander and two other officers, plus a very few NCOs. This not only tends to winnow out trivia but also focuses the attention of the commander and his few assistants upon the really significant matters. Their coordination does not seem to suffer, either. It is a simpler system than our own, and it does seem to produce a high degree of responsiveness of the individual rifleman and machine-gunner to the will of the higher commander.

A FINAL and vital point is the attitude of the BGS toward Americans. Happily, it is one of warm friendliness. Although most German civilians like American soldiers, some occasionally do disparage the military effectiveness of the U.S. Army. They do so from a superficial, inexperienced judgment, based more on fit of uniform and absence of heel-clicking than on anything else. The BGS, however, has a professional and discerning eye, and even though we do not train or operate with it, it can see enough to judge. It is clearly evident that its respect for the U.S. Army is high. And even clearer is its general attitude of fondness for the American nation and its army. This attitude, I believe, will probably carry over only slightly diluted into their new army. The more opportunity we give them to see American systems and techniques, the more they will copy us and the stronger will that friendly attitude become.



PLANNING

CAPTAIN BOYD T. BASHORE

IN an unpretentious red-brick office building at 105 Argelanderstrasse in Bonn, a small group of men have undertaken a formidable and highly controversial project. Literally translated, the title of their office is "The Representative of the Federal Chancellor for Matters Connected with the Increase of Allied Troops," but this agency is usually called the Blanksamt, or Blank Office, after Theodor Blank, the hard-working ex-labor leader who runs it. Whatever tongue-twisting euphemism may be used to sugarcoat Herr Blank's official title, he is in reality the defense commissioner for the West German Federal Republic. The success or failure of his important project will affect immeasurably the economic, political, and military planning of the United States during the next critical years of the cold war.

The purpose of Blanksamt is to plan the West Ger-

man defense force, the *Streitkräfte*, the new army, navy and air force that will stand shoulder to shoulder with the other troops of the free world and face resolutely eastward. Approval of this project is being slowly obtained from the rest of western Europe. It now appears that the West German defense forces will be formed under the terms of the Western European Union, which is essentially the 1948 Brussels Treaty Organization, as expanded by more recent London and Paris protocols. Blanksamt is ready for a smooth launching, when and if it is finally approved.

While the Blanksamt blueprint seeks to eliminate the traditional German General Staff, every military organization must have staff functions. So in place of the General Staff there will be a corps of professional officers who will be completely divorced from behind-the-scenes

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL



EX-LT. GEN. ADOLF HEUSINGER
Military planner at Bonn



HERR THEODOR BLANK
West German defense chief

THE NEW ARMY

politics and properly subordinated to the West German democratic government.

One of the greatest deterrents to the revival of the old-style general staff is the fact that much of Germany's strategic planning will be done by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and SHAPE. German officers will work on the NATO and SHAPE staffs with the officers of other Western nations to plan for the common defense of the entire continent.

FORTY-EIGHT-YEAR-OLD Theodor Blank, the Defense Minister, is a civilian by character and philosophy. A battlefield first lieutenant's commission in the reserve of the German Army was the highest military position that he held during World War II. Prior to the 1940s Blank had an excellent reputation as a Catholic labor leader in the Ruhr but was eliminated from union work by the Nazis. Today, in addition to serving as Defense Minister, he is also the Bundestag deputy representing the Ruhr district of Aarhaus-Borken-Bocholt. In short, Blank's background is civilian and political, not military.

It appears that none of Germany's ex-field marshals or really senior generals will serve on active duty as officers in the new German defense forces. A few ex-

high-ranking officers, however, may act as advisors. Hans Speidel, for instance, who was Chief of Staff to Rommel in France, served until the death of EDC, as the German representative on the European Army Interim Committee in Paris. He is presently the military advisor to Hasso von Etzdorf, a career diplomat, who is the German representative on the steering group which is working out the details of the German entry into NATO. Another very influential ex-general working actively with the Blanks in Bonn is Adolf Heusinger, one of Chancellor Adenauer's chief defense experts, and a logistics expert. Both of these ex-generals helped plan the bomb plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler on 20 July 1944.

THE German contingent to the NATO army will be, proportionally, the most armor-heavy fighting force on the western side of the Iron Curtain. Although the final organization of this army of 400,000 men is not yet definite, it will be the same plan, slightly modified and brought up to date, as was scheduled for the now defunct European Defense Community. Germany will furnish twelve divisions: four will be armored divisions, averaging 300 tanks each; two will be mechanized divisions, with approximately the same number of tanks, but having more self-propelled artillery; and six will be motorized infantry divisions, each having about 80 tanks. Backing up the combat units will be the necessary staff, corps, and technical forces to train the army and support it logistically.

The exact organization of these various 13,000-man divisions is classified, but it is obvious that they will contain the infantry, armor, artillery, and technical services essential for independent tactical action. At present there are no plans for German airborne divisions. Contrary to many reports, the *Bundesgrenzschutz*, the 15,000-man federal border police force presently standing guard along the Iron Curtain, will not be used as a nucleus for the *Streitkräfte*, although certain selected units of the U. S. Army's German labor service units may be incorporated, complete with men and equipment, into the Federal Republic's army.

THE West Germans have agreed to certain limitations in the manufacture of army equipment for this rearmament. Chemical, biological, and atomic weapons

will not be developed, nor will magnetic or influence mines, although antitank and antipersonnel mines for defensive use may be made. Restrictions are placed on the manufacture of ammunition, guns and howitzers above 90mm, and tanks or armored fighting vehicles of over ten tons. The armaments agency of the Western European Union will have the power to inspect and control the manufacture, stock level, and importation of all these critical arms.

The new German air force will not be designed for strategic bombing, but instead will stress close tactical support of the ground forces. It will have approximately 1,400 aircraft, including fighter, reconnaissance, transport, and light tactical bomber planes. Each air wing will have from 48 to 75 aircraft and will be backed up by technicians, mechanics, and service troops. This new NATO Luftwaffe will number approximately 20 wings, which will be evenly divided between fighter-bomber and interceptor wings. The total strength will be around 90,000 men, of whom only about 2,000 will be pilots. The British Royal Air Force is expected to be a model for the new Luftwaffe in many things, including uniforms. West Germany has agreed not to build strategic bombers or any military aircraft except training planes, liaison aircraft, transports, and helicopters. Military air frames and jet, turbo-propeller and rocket engines are also prohibited.

Plans have not been completed for the new German navy, but it will probably be confined to vessels necessary for the protection of harbors and the sea lanes of Germany and the other European union countries. It will have an estimated twelve to fifteen thousand men. No German battleships, cruisers, or aircraft carriers will be built, but emphasis will instead be placed on the construction of swift patrol boats, minelayers, minesweepers, amphibious craft, and perhaps a few coastal submarines. Surface warships may not have a displacement of over 3,000 tons and submarines of over 350 tons. It is highly probable that part of the cadre of the new German navy will be the U.S. labor service naval units stationed at Bremerhaven, whose German officers and enlisted men have been trained by the U.S. Navy in the handling of small vessels.

APPPLICATIONS for service in the *Streitkräfte* are flooding into Bonn. The day after the London rearmament pact of 1954 was signed, the daily number of volunteers jumped from 180 to 750. At last count the total number of applicants was about 150,000. The Blanksamt will have more men than it needs to organize the cadre of 100,000 men needed for the 500,000-man West German contingent to NATO forces. The volunteer cadre will consist of approximately 60 generals, 300 colonels, 20,000 other officers, and 80,000 enlisted men, most of whom will be noncommissioned officers. Volunteers will be accepted from the following categories: permanent professional officers, who will receive commissions; noncommissioned officers, who will be given

the option of enlisting under four-, eight-, or twelve-year enlistments; and finally, enlisted men who will be able to volunteer for three- or four-year periods.

A sufficient number of applicants to the new army, however, does not overcome some of the most important obstacles faced by Blanksamt. These volunteers can only say, "if and when you have the *Streitkräfte*, we would like to join it." The West German government recently amended its constitution and expressly authorized the Federal Republic to raise an armed force, but exactly when such an army will be formed is still indefinite.

After the initial cadres have been trained, the Bundestag (German lower house) will be requested to ratify a law authorizing an eighteen-month conscription period. This conscription law will give Blanksamt the civilian soldiers needed to bring the German defense forces up to their authorized strength of 500,000.

Although no one can say exactly when M-day will be, Blanksamt has done much of the detailed groundwork in anticipation of it. Although volunteers are plentiful, the German planners still have the difficult job of enticing back into uniform highly qualified ex-servicemen who were free from close political ties with the Nazis. It is only natural that most competent ex-officers and ex-soldiers have proved equally adept in civilian life. During the ten years since the abrupt end of their military service these people have found secure careers in civilian business.

WHEN the green light flashes, these veterans will suddenly be expected to give up all they have gained in civilian life and accept a rather nebulous future. At first Bonn will only be able to enter into a contract for a three- or four-month weeding-out course, at the end of which the volunteer can be dropped. A successful civilian will have a difficult decision to make, since a four-month absence from his civilian job could easily jeopardize not only his seniority but the job as well. This will pose a serious problem unless the government provides some sort of safeguard.

Picking the right man for the right job out of 150,000 volunteers is a formidable undertaking. Since Blanksamt possesses no old military service records, the government has no accurate means of judging the military suitability of most of the applicants. Blanksamt wants to eliminate those ex-soldiers who were close to the Nazi Party or who would be, for purely military reasons. All it has to go on, however, are the statements of each individual and people who knew him, and civilian records. The recruiting method is haphazard at best and could result in some unfortunate choices.

SOLDIERS of World War II will be taken back into the army in their equivalent wartime rank. Promotions were fast during the war, and Blanksamt believes that many of these men will now be at a more suitable age for their rank in a peacetime regular army. Choosing the high-ranking officers for *Streitkräfte* will not be

a serious problem. Selections for high-level assignments will be based on merit and will depend entirely on the individual, his record, and his health. Most of the high commands will probably be given to men who were senior regimental commanders during the war, since most of the higher commander are now too old. In any event, there will be many competent candidates to choose from.

A critical shortage will exist, however, in the most important ranks of any professional army—the junior officers and noncommissioned officers. The lieutenants of the war are now too old to be platoon leaders, but they do not have the command experience needed to lead battalions or regiments. Many of the combat-trained NCOs will be too old for duty with troops. Building an army without a solid corps of company-grade leaders is a task almost unprecedented in military history. The efficiency of the German army may very well depend upon how this problem is resolved.

The only workable solution would be to accept the most suitable volunteers, subject them to intensive training, and then put them in the job to see if they can do it. There will be unparalleled opportunities to obtain commissions from the ranks. At first, officer candidates without previous military experience will be trained for twenty months, while candidates with previous service may be commissioned after twelve months of training. Officer candidates joining later will be trained for a longer period. Academic background will be an important factor in picking junior officers.

There will be some major changes from the old theory of German military discipline. Much of the Prussian spit-and-polish will be eliminated in an attempt to train a more adaptable citizen soldier. In drill, the goose step will be forbidden. Civilian clothes will be authorized for off-duty hours, and after basic training the soldier will be able to get weekend and overnight passes. During normal training, however, he will have to be in barracks by 2230. The citizen soldier will retain many of his rights, including the right to vote. He will salute officers and noncommissioned officers of his own unit.

A TREMENDOUS amount of administrative planning remains to be accomplished by Blanksamt before M-day, when written directives will be issued and training will actually begin. Since Germany will not manufacture many heavy materials, most of her tanks and artillery will be of foreign design. The United States recently announced that it had stockpiled military matériel for *Streitkräfte* use once mobilization starts. The job of preparing the technical directives and field manuals for these weapons is staggering, and it is complicated by the fact that Blanksamt does not know exactly what arms it will eventually have. Many references must be translated from English, French, or Italian, revised, and then printed in German.

Recently HICOG announced the arrival of the advance contingent of the United States military advisory

group and military and air attachés to the West German capital. The advisory group will instruct the German NATO contingent in the use of the American equipment that will be assigned to it. Blanksamt is interested in the lessons learned by our army in fighting the Communists in Korea, and it is eager to incorporate those lessons into tactical training. At first the Germans probably will participate in Allied maneuvers only as observers, but their role will increase as their forces increase. It will take an estimated two years before Germany will actually field her divisions as trained units.

The allotment of training areas and billets is a knotty unsolved problem which the various higher headquarters are negotiating. The NATO forces already stationed in Germany are fully using the limited training areas. One of the biggest jobs of USAREUR's G3 is the equitable distribution of these areas for the field training of combat units.

A TICKLISH morale problem concerns the wearing of German campaign ribbons and medals from World Wars I and II. Many German veterans feel that if they return to soldiering they should be permitted to wear the decorations they won in combat. Many other Germans and allies do not want these medals worn because they contain the Nazi swastika or because they glorify Nazi political conquests, such as the annexation of Austria, Memel, or the Sudetenland. A German commission has recommended that veterans be allowed to wear their badges for combat infantrymen, parachute troops, and armor troops, and their decorations, provided the Nazi eagle and swastika are removed. The commission also recommended that the campaign ribbons with a purely Nazi political tint be forbidden, while others such as those awarded for the Russian front, the Afrikakorps, Crete, and the Crimea be honored. This recommendation will be presented to Parliament as the basis for a law. Except for those national emblems, the uniforms worn by the German army troops probably will closely resemble the present olive drab American uniform, with battle jackets, combat boots, and tucked-in trousers, and American-style helmets.

THE Bonn government intends to pay its way as much as possible with the new army. At present the West German government has the most stable economy in Europe and has set aside 33 per cent of its new federal budget for defense costs during the year 1954-55. Earmarked for defense is a sum of \$2.2 billion out of a total budget of approximately \$6.5 billion. Actually this amount is about the same as that paid this last year to cover the occupation costs of Allied troops.

This is what the prospective German army will look like. The phoenix is stirring in the ashes. Five hundred thousand ex-soldiers, from privates to generals, who probably know as much about fighting Russians as any other people in the world, are waiting somewhat uncertainly for the bugle to blow.

Here's Why I'm Not an Active Reservist

CORPORAL JACK STANLEY



In my wallet I carry a small red identification card that states I am a corporal in the Army of the United States and will remain one until November 1959. That card is my one and only connection with the Army. I have not worn a uniform for a year and a half, when I was "separated" from active duty after two years of service. I am one of America's millions of "sleeping" reservists—according to figures I have seen.

I cannot speak for anyone but myself, but I believe my reasons for being indifferent to my reserve obligations are shared by many of my fellow ex-draftees. I know I am not unpatriotic. Although I didn't find military life especially fascinating, I am glad I had a chance to be a soldier for a couple of years and I know I am as willing as anyone to do my part when my services become necessary to the defense of my country.

Why, then, am I not fulfilling my legal reserve obligations? The most important reason is that I am unconvinced that such service would enhance the military security of my country. Even if I concede that reserve service would make me a more proficient soldier (and I don't altogether concede that), I still have doubts whether I would ever be called upon to put whatever proficiency I might attain to the test.

I am familiar with the argument that an atomic or nuclear war will require even bigger armies, but to me that means bigger armies in being—ready for quick and decisive action. I don't honestly see how a big force of reservists could do any good in a war that will be over before it is ready to fight.

I could be wrong about this, but the arguments I have heard don't seem very strong. When I am convinced that trained reserve soldiers will really be needed I'll be one of the first to report to the armory every Wednesday night.

When I was separated I was given

several pamphlets about the Army Reserve. They gave a lot of information, but they didn't answer some questions I had on my mind. How much of my freedom would I give up by joining? If I wanted to move to another state, could the Army prevent me or make it difficult for me? If I decided to take a month's trip to Canada, would I have to get permission? I think the Army has these things worked out, but I'm not going to join anything until I'm good and sure. At first glance they may seem unimportant, but I don't think the average American likes to take any chances on losing his freedom to change jobs or just move about.

I cannot accuse the Army of not making an effort to get me to become an active reservist. I have received and read at least a dozen pamphlets on the subject. The only trouble is that this literature is much more likely to appeal to a man of 45 than to one of 25. The opportunities for promotion do not mean much to anyone unless he has already decided to take the plunge. Retirement benefits are comforting to know about, but they aren't the kind of thing that will stir up the blood of a young man, especially if he is unmarried and more interested in opportunity than security.

THE other big argument that the Army uses for persuasion is historical. The reserve is compared to the militia that defended American liberty in the early days. This is an appealing argument—but I think most Americans of my age secretly believe that it is absurd. We know very well that if we are attacked we can't do much good by pulling a rifle off the wall and rushing into the street. We will go to a camp in South Carolina or Kansas or California, where we will most likely receive a six-week refresher course; then we will probably wait around for a few months while some-

one decides where to send us. By then the war will be over, or so most of us think. And anyway, non-reservists will also be training and will be just as prepared as the modern "Minutemen."

I'm not saying that this is what will happen. I have no way of knowing. But it is what many reservists (in name only) believe, and that is why we are not doing what Congress and the Army say is our duty. Let the country give us some idea of how we might be used and why we are essential to national defense; let the men who represent that picture of Uncle Sam pointing his finger at me put some reality into that militia idea (I'm not at all sure it can't be brought up to date), and "reservists" will be flocking to the colors.

I think Reserve units should get more publicity. Maybe even a few colorful parades and demonstrations of their special techniques and equipment for civilians and potential reservists to see. There's a good chance the civilians will begin to take the reservists to their hearts—to feel that they belong to *them* and not to a distant and forbidding Army.

I read in the papers the other day that only four out of every hundred draftees join the Active Reserve after their two years of active service. A lot of people will say, "Why not *make* them join?" The answer is that a reserve of unwilling men wouldn't be as dependable as one composed of eager volunteers. If you want a closely knit and well-trained force composed of men who are civilians for all but a few hours a week, they've got to be men who want to do what they're doing.

Most Americans are patriotic and will do an unpleasant job if they see some meaning in their efforts. So the problem is for the Government to make it clear why reserve service is necessary.

CEREBRATIONS

Training vs Instruction

WE are getting school crazy in the Army these days. There is a tendency to make the entire Army one gigantic school—to the detriment of the units for whose benefit the program was originally intended. Certainly military education is important, but it is only a means for training officers and men in their profession. When entire units assume the form and substance of schools or groups of schools, we are carrying the school idea too far.

The basis of the school program, as it applies to combat training, is the "faculty" or "committee" system. It was a training method admirably suited to its original purpose—turning out replacements in as short a time as possible. Units fighting a war could not take the time to train their own replacements completely, and in this way they were assured of a constant stream of trained men.

The needs of the Army are very different today. This fact has been recognized by the Army's unit rotation plan (see "World Wide Rotation," November 1954), which adapts training procedures to a more stable, peacetime Army. Under this program, there will be no training divisions as such. Recruits will be assigned to a division in the States upon their induction, and they will train with the unit in which they can expect to spend the major part of their Army careers.

We have come a long way from the old military axiom that a company commander is responsible for everything his company does or fails to do. We are also getting a long way from developing good company commanders. Although a company commander may learn all there is to know about administration in the school system, he will not learn much about how to run a company in combat, where he will actually be responsible for everything his company does or fails to do.

When I was a lieutenant I was usually given a training directive somewhat as follows: "Lieutenant Swift, tomorrow you will take your platoon out in Area X and give them squad problems." In this day and age, when every move the trainee (not soldier, you understand,

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but trainee) makes is planned to the last detail by experts in some big headquarters, such a directive would be looked upon with horror. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Swift studied his Field Manual, made his reconnaissance, organized his problem, ran the problem, and gave the critique. In those days lieutenants made mistakes. They made them by the score. Every critique of every maneuver was filled with incidents which illustrated the "deficiencies of small-unit leadership and training." But we learned by those mistakes, and we didn't make them later on the battlefield. Nowadays, about the only mistake an instructor can make is not following the lesson plan or not having his charts in the right order.

Lieutenants these days are excellent instructors. But I wonder if they ever get the professional pride and satisfaction I felt one day when the regimental commander, a great soldier who ran his regiment the way he wanted it run and insisted that his subordinate commanders do the same, observed one of my little problems and told me: "Lieutenant, that was a well organized problem and an excellent critique." To me this was *the* accolade because it was *my* platoon, *my* plan, and *my* problem. If a lieutenant today got the same commendation, he would be sharing it with the nameless individuals who planned the problem in the first place, those who organized it on the ground, those who devised the various training aids and charts, without which no problem can be run these days and—oh yes, the trainees themselves, who were perhaps

a little sharper than the last couple of batches that ran through the problem.

I maintain that the training of small-unit leaders from company commanders down was better in the days just before and in the early phases of World War II than it is today, simply because it made *leaders* responsible for the training of their units. This is not the case in the "faculty" or "committee" system of training. Many reports from Korea indicated that units received well-trained replacements from the ZI, but some reports were not so favorable concerning the caliber of non-combat-experienced small-unit leaders coming from training divisions here. According to the reports, these leaders were hesitant to exercise leadership and did not know how to take care of their men. It is just possible that their training emphasized being efficient instructors more than being efficient leaders. The two are not necessarily synonymous.

I think we have all met officers or NCOs who have been assigned as instructors at service schools or at large training centers for an excessively large portion of their careers. Many of these officers and NCOs are not effective commanders because they do not realize their responsibilities to their men. They do not realize that the commander-soldier relationship is considerably different from the instructor-student relationship. They are inclined to be perfectionists in nonessential details while neglecting more important principles of leadership. They have a tendency to resort to excessive cleverness and sarcasm in dealing with their subordinates, which may go over big before a class, but is not generally the best way to handle day-to-day problems with subordinates who cannot be clever or sarcastic in return. When following a fixed routine thoroughly covered by the book, they are all right, but when confronted by unusual situations or problems, they are not so sure of themselves.

The best way to learn how to be a platoon leader is to lead a platoon, not just to instruct it, and that goes for every other type of unit in the Army. Training is a command responsibility. The sooner we give it back to the commanders, the better the training is going

to be. At any rate, the commanders will be better. The "instruction" may suffer a little bit, but the unit as a whole will be better trained and will have higher morale and *esprit*, which are qualities that cannot be learned in school from an instructor.

LT. COL. EBEN F. SWIFT

First-Day Casualties

"I WONDER why it is," a grizzled old corporal said to me outside a hospital one morning, "that every time I get thrown into combat, somebody shoots me on the first doggone day?"

In examining the unhappy experience of any infantry unit in its first day of a shooting war, many possible explanations for high casualties crop up: the lack of seasoned leadership; the strangeness of an honest-to-goodness battlefield; fear—all of these and many more. But as soon as we find tentative answers to the corporal's question, we find ourselves facing an even more important question: "What can we do to prevent first-day casualties?"

Poor leadership is a prime cause of first-day casualties. It is not enough to say, "There's got to be a first time for everybody," nor is it enough to assume that good pre-combat leadership will necessarily stand up. Perhaps the only conclusion that may be drawn with respect to leadership is this: consider first-combat leadership a thing apart, assume nothing, and have absolutely no illusions about its effectiveness. In time, training will show through and the fittest will survive; but the problem is to keep the blood-cost of this evolution down to a minimum.

Another cause of unnecessary losses has to do with the individual soldiers—including the leaders. During the days and hours before they hit the enemy they aren't busy enough, and yet there is always plenty to do. The leaders must take care of that. Too often they allow themselves the luxury of idleness, and the men take their cues from them.

What ought these men to do during the slack periods? First, they should prepare adequate foxholes. Secondly, they should improve their defenses by setting up observation posts and by checking the man-to-man communication. Thirdly, the leaders should give specific duties to each man; they should make work, if necessary, so that there will be constant checking and reporting all the way up and down the chain of command. Security is the most obvious thing that ought to be checked; but communications and the effectiveness of

night observation are equally important.

We must allow for the confusion of the battlefield. Crack-thump and battle noise training is fine as far as it goes; but something more is needed. Men must know what to do when they think they are under friendly fire. Men must know what to do about casualties. Men must quit laughing at pre-combat three-day problem snafus and begin to realize that those mix-ups are but pale shadows of the authentic.

Units must prearrange as many details as they can in anticipation of being shot at for the first time. If I were a platoon leader again, I would have my platoon spend the last training period before embarkation running through a problem that is especially designed to accustom the platoon to what life in the combat zone may be like for the first two or three days and nights. Such a problem would enable the leaders and men to make their personal adjustments to these once-in-a-lifetime conditions, and would require the combat-loaded platoon to march to an assembly area from a simulated dockside or airstrip, to spend the night in a tactical position behind the line, and to attack a platoon objective the next morning. In all of these requirements, heavy emphasis would be placed on the idea that the problem is really one of learning to survive being green. In the attack problem, for example, the leaders can learn that they can make more realistic estimates of the situation when they allow for the tendency of their men to run for cover upon first being shot at.

Unit leaders can make use of many otherwise useless hours during the movement to the combat zone by talking their men through hypothetical situations, like this one: "Jones, you are a squad leader on the right flank of the platoon. An enemy machine gun cuts loose over your head, but two of your men are hit. What are you going to do?"

The answers may be something less than brilliant, but that won't matter: discussion of the problem will set the men to thinking about the tremendous difference incoming live ammunition is going to make, and the more they think about what they must do to remain combat effective, the less their leaders need worry about their being shocked and surprised into uselessness.

This kind of training is most effective at the lowest level. If a unit commander sees his men sitting on hatches or huddled in corners of troop compartments talking these things over with their leaders, working out things to do

when the outfit gets ashore, he should feel very grateful indeed. His next task is to get his subordinate leaders together to keep the chain reaction going.

This is by no means the answer to the twice-hit corporal's question, but it is what his platoon leader could do to prevent first-day casualties if he had to take another platoon to war. This is a stab at the kind of analysis infantrymen must make of many similar problems if unit rotation is to be a success, if casualties are to be held to a minimum, and if we're going to keep on winning wars.

CAPTAIN EASY

Inseparable Team

THE importance of armor is growing. The ratio of armored divisions to infantry divisions has been increased both in the active Army and the National Guard. There is now a tank battalion in every infantry division and a tank company in every regiment. Infantry and armor work everywhere as an inseparable team. Since armor and infantry operate so closely together, it seems to me, an infantrymen, that they should be combined into one branch. An infantry officer in the course of his career may be assigned to such varied units as an infantry battalion, an armored infantry battalion, a regimental tank company, and a combat-command staff. In an infantry battalion, he will frequently be supported by tanks of the regimental tank company, which may be attached to the unit of which he is commander. All or part of the division tank battalion will often work with the infantry. In an armored infantry unit, the infantry officer will constantly work with tanks. He may command a task force consisting of both armor and infantry, or he may be a member of a task force in which infantry troops are attached to a tank unit.

Should the infantry officer be assigned to a regimental tank company, he has to know as much about the technical side of armored vehicles as any armor officer. Although these "infantry" tanks are employed somewhat differently from the tanks in a tank battalion, the tanks themselves are identical. In a combat-command staff, we find both infantry and armor officers, and they must all have a thorough knowledge of the employment of both kinds of units.

The armor officer is in a similar situation. In the armored division, whether he is assigned to a tank battalion or a combat-command staff, he works with infantry units. He may even be assigned to an armored infantry battalion and

command infantry troops, or he may serve in the tank battalion of an infantry division, where he will also work with infantry. In almost every possible tactical assignment other than an armored cavalry regiment, the armor officer is in close association with infantry units.

Infantry and armor officers must be qualified to work with, and in some cases actually command, units of each other's branch. One proof of this is the fact that some positions may be filled with officers of either branch. The relationship between infantry and armor is much closer than between artillery and either. Infantry and armor do not merely support each other; they actually fight side by side and are so closely intermingled that the duties of officers of each branch cannot be clearly separated. Why not recognize this and combine the two branches into one?

Arguments can be raised against this proposal. The first is that officers would have to become qualified in two branches. But this would not require much more versatility than most successful officers now possess. Another possible argument is that the merger would reduce the effectiveness of both branches. The answer to this is that officers who have in the course of their careers served in both tank and infantry units will be better qualified to perform their duties in task forces and combat commands containing both types of units.

CAPT. LOTHROP MITTENTHAL

Should We Always Assault?

SHOULD we always assault the objective in an attack? The term *assault* is used here in its strict sense—deployment, assault fire, and fixed bayonets.

No one seriously contends that, assigned an attack mission, we will do anything but assault an objective which we suspect is occupied by the enemy. But what if our objective appears to be unoccupied?

There are many who argue that an "unnecessary" assault wastes time, sacrifices secrecy and surprise, expends ammunition, and increases problems of control—all without purpose if the objective proves to be unoccupied.

Although this line of reasoning seems logical at first glance, it will not stand up under close scrutiny. I believe we should *always* assault. Our doctrines do not contain any suggestion that there are other ways of taking objectives in a daylight attack. This omission is not an

accident. Its purpose is to eliminate any doubt that we must assault.

Assault fire was stressed in General George S. Patton's "marching fire" concept, first widely advocated in 1943-44 for the Normandy divisions then training in the United Kingdom. General Patton's idea was simply to be firing from the time of crossing the line of departure until the objective was taken. I recall no doubts about the likelihood of enemy being present. No doubt we were universally confident that we weren't being sent across the beaches for a route march. In any event, emphasis was placed both on the terrifying effect such a volume of advancing fire would have on the German if he were there, and the psychological lift assault fire would give our own troops. Marching fire was widely practiced in the European Theater after 6 June 1944, and at no time was it regarded only as a last resort. It was an accepted part of the attack, almost as automatic as the last hot meal.

The principal difference between marching fire and our present-day assault fire is that the assault position has replaced the LD as the starting point for its delivery. The advantages of this change are obvious. Our intentions are not prematurely disclosed, control is made easier, and less ammunition is expended—all for the same gains. *But the same basic idea is there.* We don't probe an objective in the attack, or patrol it, or sneak up to it. We *assault* it.

And why not assault it?

Because, they say, it isn't necessary if the objective turns out to be unoccupied by the enemy.

Let us examine that argument. The assault is a rifle-platoon operation. The company is, at best, a coordinating echelon. Decisions respecting the assault are not appropriate at echelons higher than the rifle platoon. What medium exists in the procedural hierarchy for the company commander to waive or prohibit the assault by his platoons? What could he plead at his board of inquiry when the Government entered in evidence an extract of his order like this:

3. a. 1st Plt: Atk and seize Hill 1. . . .
s. Don't assault (unless you have to).

So the decision not to assault would have to rest with the platoon leader. Let's set the stage for him and follow him through his estimate.

He's 100 to 150 yards from his objective, at the tentative assault position he selected earlier. The two courses of action open to him are to assault or not to

assault. He sees no indication of the enemy. Haven't they told us for two wars now that you never do? General Patton probably had this very point in mind when he called for marching fire.

Assault, then, if you're not certain. But how can you be certain? You can't be, so we should not for any reason deprive the American soldier of the protection our collective assault fire will give him.

Let us hope that in this situation our platoon leader would decide to assault. What would have been in it for him not to assault? Let's look into his thoughts:

Ammunition? What are a few bullets now, more or less? Need them for reorganization? I'll cross that bridge when I come to it.

Secrecy and surprise? If they wanted me to sneak up to this hill I expect they'd have issued me some knives and blackface paint and maybe some Rangers.

Loss of control? Who said that? I hold my arms out parallel and the squads give me the skirmish line. At least they're up and moving. If we were creeping along in column or had split up, it would be hard to get the show on the road when we have to.

Time lost? I'm under no deadline to get this battle over with. It's not part of my mission, or any platoon leader's, to take the objective by a given time. True, I might report to the Old Man that the hill looks vacant, but that along with his meditation might take as long as an assault. Anyway, I believe I can walk up there shooting in less time than any other way.

Later objectives after this one? That's another one of those bridges. Even as good as I am, I'm not wearing this gold bar to think of campaign strategy. My job is to take this hill.

Authority and responsibility? Given an attack mission, I wonder about my legal right to change it to a patrol. If higher headquarters believed there was nobody on that hill, they would probably have ordered a march objective or a phase line.

So he assaulted. However good the risk that no harm would come to his platoon if he didn't assault, our platoon leader found no good reasons not to assault. That's the advice of our school of thought. Assault 'em all, brother, if you're attacking in the light of day! We won't even concede that it will take longer. And we're positive that you'll be a lot better off legally, spiritually, and physically.

LT. COL. JAMES W. GRAHAM

IRONS IN THE FIRE

Battlefield X-Ray Unit



The Army Medical Research Laboratory has developed a portable x-ray unit for use on the battlefield. Weighing only 48 pounds, the complete unit can be carried on the back of a medical aid man (*above right*). It is powered by a tiny piece of radioactive thulium, and a 3/4-inch lead plate protects the user from accidental radiation exposure. The x-ray can produce a picture without electricity, water, or a darkroom. The thulium is effective for about a year, after which it can be rejuvenated by means of an atomic pile.

Instead of film the x-ray unit uses radiosensitive paper and pads, which are saturated with developer and stabilizer and are held in a cassette that is wrapped in a light-proof, water-proof covering. When the cassette is exposed, the paper records the radiograph. The device does not produce pictures with the fine detail of standard x-ray films, but it is suitable for field and emergency use.

An average man can learn to operate the x-ray unit in a few hours. The complete process of setting up the machine and taking and developing a picture takes from five to ten minutes. It is estimated that the unit will cost approximately \$200 when it is commercially manufactured.

Transport Gets Auxiliary Jets



In tests conducted recently, two small jet engines were used as auxiliary power sources for the C-123B assault transport, in order to increase safety on take-offs. The two Fairchild J44 turbojet units were placed on the plane's wingtips, providing an additional 2,000 pounds of thrust. No special fuel is needed, since the J44 operates on regular aviation gasoline drawn from the plane's main nacelle tanks.

Maintenance Made Easy

The Corps of Engineers' Research and Development Laboratories are getting results from a program to reduce maintenance problems by modifying the parts of heavy equipment that give maintenance crews the most trouble.

One development is the hydrajuster, a device that permits adjustment of a bulldozer's track with a standard grease gun. Another time-saver is the installation of hinges on the two-piece radiator guard. One man can now remove or place the guard in position, a job formerly requiring three men. By rerouting hydraulic lines, the engineers have made it possible to remove a bulldozer's cylinders, tank, hose, and pump without having to remove the complete hydraulic unit and draining the hydraulic system.

Remote-Control Helicopter



A remote-control helicopter has been developed by the Office of Naval Research and the Kaman Aircraft Corp. The control system is similar to that used for fixed-wing aircraft, but the varied flight capabilities of helicopters make the problems far more complex. In these tests a pilot has remained in the aircraft to take over in case of emergency. The helicopter, which is controlled from the ground, is designed for research and development purposes.

Curved Relief Maps

Maps showing the earth's curvature as well as relief have been produced by Panoramic Studios. Measuring 23 inches in diameter, each map represents a continental section taken from a 30-inch globe. They are made of colored plastic and can be hung on walls or TIE boards. Each map weighs 14 ounces.

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

Dockside Crane




An experimental 100-foot cargo-handling portal gantry crane has been developed by the American Hoist and Derrick Company, to specifications prepared by the Transportation Research and Development Command, Fort Eustis, Va. The crane, which is being used at the Army's Hampton Roads Sub-Port of Embarkation, can pick up a ten-ton trailer on a single hook.

Smoke Provides Atomic Shield

The Chemical Corps has devised a method by which it hopes radically to reduce casualties of an atomic or hydrogen attack. Recent tests have shown that heavy smoke, such as industrial plants produce, will absorb much of the heat from an atomic explosion and thus greatly reduce the radius of an atomic bomb's lethal heat effect.

Transportable Atomic Plant



Pictures have been released of the Army Package Power Reactor, which will be the first atom-powered generating plant whose components can be transported by air. The reactor, designed by American Locomotive Co. under contract with the Atomic Energy Commission, is expected to be ready in three years. It will be built at Fort Belvoir, Va.

New Helicopter

The Army has contracted with Bell Aircraft Corp. for a new medium-sized helicopter to be used for evacuation, general utility, and instrument training. Designated by Bell as the Model 212, the helicopter carries 800 pounds of cargo, has a cruising speed of 100 knots, and a ceiling of 6,000 feet. Its rate of climb is 1,500 feet a minute.

The 212 is similar to the Bell H-13 but somewhat larger. It is designed to provide a compromise between small helicopters, whose payloads are severely limited, and the large models, whose costs are excessive. It is not known how many of the 212s will be purchased by the Army. A number have already been ordered for testing and evaluation.

Sub-Machine Gun for NATO

The British Sterling sub-machine gun may soon become standard equipment for all NATO forces. Weighing six pounds and firing 575 rounds of 9mm ammunition a minute, the Sterling has been battle tested in Korea, Malaya, and Kenya. Among its features are accuracy up to 200 yards, a self-cleaning breech block that automatically removes fouling, and a double-feed 34-round magazine.

When its butt is folded away the gun can be fired with one hand like a pistol. The Sterling has been adopted by the British army, replacing the Sten gun. It is expected that it will soon be put into mass production in Canada, since 15 countries have already placed orders.

Mine Exploder



An experimental mine-exploding device consisting of parallel steel discs has been developed by the Corps of Engineers' Research and Development Laboratories. Known as the High Herman, the device weighs 36 tons. It is shown here being pushed by an M46 tank. During World War II, several types of tank-propelled rollers, rotating flails, and plows were used for detonating mines with varying degrees of success.

All-Magnesium Aircraft

The Air Research and Development Command has announced the completion of an experimental all-magnesium aircraft. The plane, an F-80C, was built by East Coast Aeronautics, Inc. and is currently being run through tests at the Wright Air Development Center, Dayton, Ohio, in order to determine the suitability of magnesium in the structures of fighter-type aircraft. Engineers list several advantages of a magnesium airframe: the metal is probably the best substitute known for aluminum; its supply is almost inexhaustible; it is probably the most efficient structural material throughout the usable temperature ranges of light alloys; and its cost is less than that of aluminum.

Detector of Germ Warfare

A device to detect the presence of biological and radiological agents in the air has been developed at the Biological Warfare Center, Camp Detrick, Md. Called the aerosoloscope, this instrument automatically counts germs and radioactive particles, and it can be used to give warning of an enemy germ warfare attack.

THE WORD FROM THE SCHOOLS

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL


Meteorology Training Aids

Field artillery electronic and antiaircraft artillery meteorology sections are currently using the new Rawinsonde system for the measurement of weather elements aloft. This system consists of a radiosonde, a Rawin set, and a radiosonde recorder. The radiosonde is used to measure and report temperature, pressure and humidity in the atmosphere above the ground, and acts as a target for measuring wind direction and speed. The radiosonde is carried aloft by means of a hydrogen-inflated balloon. It is a box containing a transmitter; a modulator; an antenna; and pressure, temperature, and humidity-sensing elements. The transmitter operates in the ultra-high frequency band. The radiosonde's radio wave is modulated at an audio rate determined by the pressure, temperature, and relative humidity in the vicinity of the radiosonde.

The Rawin set is a transportable radio direction-finder which automatically tracks the radiosonde during its flight and processes the radiosonde signal. The Rawin set also indicates and records on a control recorder the azimuth and elevation angles and time in flight of the radiosonde. These azimuth and elevation angles, representing the flight course of the radiosonde, can be plotted with the height (computed from temperature and pressure data) to determine wind direction and wind speed. The radiosonde recorder is an electronic instrument which records on graph paper the weather information transmitted by the radiosonde. The weather soundings are fed to the recorder in the form of audible tones. A preflight calibration establishes the relationship between the audible tones and both temperature and relative humidity. As the data are received, they are converted into actual temperature and relative humidity values. Pressure values are determined from a preflight setting and a pressure calibration chart which is issued with each radiosonde. The Rawinsonde system is capable of measuring weather elements up to altitudes of approximately 100,000 feet over horizontal distances up to 125 miles. These measurements are used in the preparation of ballistic corrections for the effect of the atmosphere on the trajectory of projectiles, missiles, and rockets.

This system has certain disadvantages. The cost of the expendable equipment used for each flight is about \$100, and the radiosonde is a poor instructional aid owing to its complex nature and small size. TAS has adopted two training aids as measures to reduce the considerable expense involved in the instruction in the operation and theory of the Rawinsonde System and to provide an element large enough to facilitate instruction.

The first of these training aids is a commercial-type magnetic tape recorder. The audible tones representing the atmospheric soundings made by the radiosonde during flight are recorded on a tape recorder. The



Radiosonde mock-up

tape is then played back to as many as 20 radiosonde recorders during instruction on the evaluation of radiosonde soundings. The necessary preflight calibration and instructions are also recorded, so that each playback represents a realistic radiosonde flight. The meteorology division of TAS has built up a library of tape-recorded flights taken during various weather conditions. The use of this training aid not only assures uniformity of instruction but also saves approximately \$8,000 a year.

The second of these training aids is an operational mock-up of a radiosonde (see cut) which is large enough to instruct a class of forty students. Its unique construction permits uniform and simplified instruction in the following subjects: Operation and theory of the radiosonde; preflight calibration of temperature and humidity tones; and preflight setting of the barometric switch.

The mock-up was designed and constructed at TAS at an estimated cost of \$300. Plans and schematics are available to interested agencies by writing to the Secretary of The Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Regular Officers at TIS

All new Regular Army officers are now required to take the Ranger and airborne courses at TIS. The purpose of this ruling is to encourage the aggressive spirit vital to successful combat leaders, to increase self-confidence through the completion of difficult training, and to develop a higher standard of physical fitness. The first of the new officers, most of them 1954 graduates of the Military Academy, completed the training in February.

ROTC Summer Camp

Approximately 1,500 ROTC cadets will attend the 1955 summer camp at Fort Benning from 25 June through 5 August. Most of the training will be in the field and will include technical service unit demonstrations and exercises staged by TIS.

New Films

The Concept of the Attack and the Triangular Infantry Organization, TF 7-1902, 21 minutes. This film shows how the triangular concept of organization in the attack can be applied at all levels of command and on all types of terrain. It is receiving Army-wide distribution.

Shooting began in March at TIS on a new training film, *The Airborne Soldier*, and eight supplementary film bulletins. The bulletins will cover the following subjects: assembly problems after the novice jump; personnel parachute malfunctions; personnel parachute entanglements; parachute landing falls; parachute training in the 34-foot tower; conduct of a parachutist in the aircraft; the swing landing trainer; and parachute recovery during novice training. The release date for the films will be announced.

TIS Instructional Material

The following new instructional material suitable for non-resident as well as resident instruction may be ordered from the Book Department, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., at the prices shown. On orders of less than one dollar, add 25¢ for postage and handling.

Battalion in the Attack, 2211-USAR. Practical work in planning a battalion attack, with emphasis on the plan of maneuver and plan of supporting fire. Principles

applicable to interior units in offensive combat (e.g. a reinforced interior battalion), emphasizing the employment of the reserve during an attack. Four hours. 30¢.

Command and Leadership—Problems in Training and Combat, 6182-R-USAR. Conference and practical exercises designed to develop leadership problems at the battalion and regimental level. Two hours. 15¢.

Map and Aerial Photograph Reading, 6763-USAR. Application of photomaps to the ground. Includes orienting the photo-

map, plotting and locating points on the ground from the point-designation grid, comparing ground forms to the photomap, locating points by polar coordinates, applying intersection and resection, locating positions by photomap-ground inspection and a daylight cross-country march. Four hours. \$1.

First Aid, 7731B-7747. A discussion of the principles of first aid and the employment of these principles in treating wounds. Two hours. 35¢.

Tank Recognition and Identification

Pamphlet. An aid for the uniform training of personnel in the recognition and identification of tanks, methods used in training and vehicles that (at present) are considered operational. 10¢.

Mechanical Training, AR M1918A2, VF-1108. Mechanical training on the AR, methods of instruction and the use of training aids and assistant instructors. Four hours. 10¢.

Rocket Launcher, 3.5-Inch, VF-1221. Characteristics of 3.5-inch rocket launchers and rockets, methods of instruction and marksmanship firing. Four hours. 10¢.

Considerations of Offensive Combat, the Infantry Battalion, 2200-USAR. General considerations of the infantry battalion in offensive combat. Two hours. 35¢.

Battalion Coordinated Antitank Defense Plan, 2413-USAR. Development of the antitank defense plan. Consideration of the characteristics and tactical employment of antitank weapons organic to the battalion and those weapons normally attached to or in support of the battalion. One hour. 20¢.

General Considerations of Defensive Combat, 2500-A2. Fundamentals and types of defense. Includes mobile defense and the influence of atomic weapons. One hour. 50¢.

Command and Leadership—Problems of Command, 6108-R-USAR. Discussion of command and leadership problems which may confront a company officer. Includes an analysis of techniques employed in the solution of such problems. One hour. 15¢.

New Vehicle-Bridge Classification Signs

THE Engineer School has developed a system by which drivers can quickly tell whether or not their vehicles can safely cross any given bridge. Numbers are fixed on vehicles and bridges, and the driver can cross if his vehicle's number is lower than that of the bridge. This system has been adopted by all NATO countries.

Bridges that are used for both two-way and one-way traffic will have two numbers on their signs. If the bridge is being used for two-way traffic, the driver will compare his own number with the number on the right of the bridge's sign, while if it is being used for one-way traffic, he will read the left-hand number.

Other bridges will have different numbers for tracked and wheeled vehicles. The number for the former will be at the bottom of the sign and for the latter at the top. Combination (trailer-trucks) and towed vehicles will carry their own numbers on their sides and a temporary combination number on the front. The combination number will not necessarily be as high as the sum of the two numbers.

This new doctrine will be contained in FM 5-36, *Route Reconnaissance and Classification*, which has been rewritten by TES. It will be released soon through AG publications depots.



Figure 1. A sign for a two-lane bridge. The right-hand number is used when the bridge is being used for two-way traffic, the left-hand number for one-way traffic.



Figure 2. A sign for a dual-class bridge. The top number is for wheeled vehicles, the bottom one for tracked vehicles.



Figure 3. Two signs are needed for a dual-class, two-way bridge. The sign at the left shows the numbers that the driver of a wheeled vehicle must refer to when the bridge is being used for one-way traffic (number on left of sign) and two-way traffic (number on right of sign). The right-hand sign shows the same thing for tracked vehicles.




Figure 4. A combination vehicle such as this trailer-truck will carry a sign for each component and another temporary sign for the combination. Note that the combination number carried on the front of the vehicle is smaller than the sum of the other two numbers.

THE ENGINEER SCHOOL Course in Refrigeration

The Refrigeration Section, Dept. of Mechanical and Technical Equipment of TES offers a complete course in refrigeration and air-conditioning. The intensive 12-week training program teaches the theory, installation, maintenance, and replacement of refrigeration equipment and other equipment that directly supports it.

Each year approximately 600 men are graduated from the course, which provides the personnel needed for the installation and sustained maintenance of all Army and Air Force refrigeration equipment.

Air Compressor Manual

A technical manual on the air compressor used on Nike sites throughout the U.S. is being prepared by Design Service, a private engineer consultant firm, with the assistance of the Dept. of Mechanical and Technical Equipment of TES. The manual will cover the assembly, disassembly, operation, and maintenance of the 3500-pounds-per-square-inch compressor.

COMBAT ACTIONS IN KOREA

Infantry—Artillery—Armor

By

Major Russell A. Gugeler

Here is the war in Korea—at the fighting level. The true accounts of outstanding small-unit actions written by a trained soldier-observer and historian from on-the-spot observations and interviews with the men who actually did the fighting. Working as a member of the observer team from the Office of the Chief of Military History, Major Gugeler has made the most of his unique opportunity and material to bring out the drama and boredom, the gallantry and fear, the flashes of brilliance and stupidity which add up to a splendid digest of combat lessons that every soldier should read.

Reviewers say:

"... For anybody who has ever served in war, for anybody who will ever have to serve in war." George Barrett, in *New York Times Sunday Book Review*.

"... Of considerable professional interest to any military student and of particular interest to those who were there." Maj. J. R. Stevens, in *Marine Corps Gazette*.

"The ground forces would do well to set this book up as required reading." *Army Times' The American Daily*.

"... The most effective literary indoctrination available in our language to those who seek a vicarious introduction to war at the fighting level." Charles B. MacDonald, in *Armor*.

\$5.00

260 Pages

THE MONTH'S AUTHORS

(continued from page 8)

called back to the States, however, where he served in the Office of the Chief of Staff and later as executive officer of the Department of Tactics at West Point.

General Fritzsche returned to Europe in 1945 as intelligence staff officer of the 12th Army Group, and later in the year he became deputy assistant chief of staff for intelligence of U.S. forces in Europe. He attended the National War College from 1948 to 1949, and then assumed command of the 23d Infantry at Fort Lewis, Wash. After serving as an instructor at the Army War College, General Fritzsche went to the Far East in 1952 and became assistant Commander of the 25th Infantry Division in Korea. He assumed his present duties at Fort Benning in May 1953.

LIEUTENANT BENSON L. GRAYSON, MI-USAR ("What About Zhukov?" page 25) is a reservist and a student at the Russian Institute of Columbia University, where he is completing the requirements for a Ph.D. in Soviet military operations.

CAPTAIN RICHARD P. TAFTE, Infantry ("Homburgs and Helmets" page 30) has recently completed a tour of duty in the Office of the Chief of Information and Education. He is currently attending the Advanced Officers' Course at The Infantry School.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RAYMOND W. MILLICAN, Artillery ("Divide and Conquer" page 28) is a 1940 graduate of the Military Academy. He is assigned to the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.

CAPTAIN FRANK M. TATUM, Infantry ("... Toward a More Flexible Patrol ..." page 36), is an instructor in infantry tactics at The Artillery School. He served in Korea as a company commander with the 7th Infantry.

MAJOR REGINALD HARGREAVES ("The German as an Ally" page 38) is a retired British Army officer whose articles about some of the lesser-known byways of military history have appeared in several publications, including previous issues of *THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*. Being a combat veteran of the First World War, Major Hargreaves has a perhaps too intimate knowledge of the capabilities of the German soldier. He writes: "I am punched as full of holes as a colander and still walk with a bit of a limp owing to his professional attentions."

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DeWITT C.

ARMSTRONG, III, Armor ("Cadre for the West German Army?" page 40), commands the 1st Battalion, 2d Armored Cavalry, in Bavaria, where he has had an opportunity to observe the German border police force in garrison, on border patrol, and in field training.

CAPTAIN BOYD T. BASHORE, Infantry ("Planning the New Army" page 44), was on duty with the 42d Armored Infantry Battalion in Germany until last fall, when he was assigned to the 714th Tank Battalion at Fort Benning.

CORPORAL JACK STANLEY ("Here's Why I'm Not an Active Reservist" page 48) is the pseudonym of a journalist who was separated from active duty in 1953.

THIS month's celebrators (pages 49-51) discuss training, tactics, and organization. LIEUTENANT COLONEL EBEN F. SWIFT, Infantry, is assigned to the Range Control Section at Fort Benning. He enlisted in the Army in 1933, and later went to West Point where he was graduated in 1940. CAPTAIN EASY is the *nom de plume* of a Regular Army Infantry officer who has had wide experience in military writing and education. CAPTAIN LOTHROP MITTENTHAL is S3 of a California National Guard armored infantry battalion. While on active duty he served with infantry units. LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES W. GRAHAM, Infantry, is on duty with the Tactical Department of The Infantry School.

Our book reviewers this month include Dr. STEFAN T. POSSONY, who is a professor of political science at Georgetown University in the evenings and a civilian working for the Air Force during the day. He is the author of *Strategic Air Power*, and other books on military and foreign policy. COLONEL FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, JAGC-USAR, is a Washington attorney who has been a regular contributor to this magazine for several years. MAJOR GENERAL H. W. BLAKELEY (retired) was commander of the 4th Infantry Division in Europe during World War II. He has written many articles on military subjects. BURTON D. MUNHALL is an ordnance engineer who has collaborated in the writing of two books on center-fire pistol and revolver cartridges. LIEUTENANT COLONEL E. G. PIPER, AGC-USAR, is on duty with the Correction Division of the Office of The Provost Marshal General in Washington.

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

Strategic Alternatives

AMERICAN STRATEGY IN THE ATOMIC AGE
By Colonel George C. Reinhardt
University of Oklahoma Press, 1955
236 Pages; Index; \$3.75

Reviewed by
STEFAN T. POSSONY

Most readers of THE JOURNAL undoubtedly know Colonel Reinhardt as a highly competent professional soldier-engineer and co-author with Colonel William R. Kintner of the well-known book, *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat*. In the present work, the author has attempted a highly ambitious undertaking: he has tried, within some 220 pages, to discuss all world strategic issues presently confronting the United States and to do so in simple language. The result is a highly readable book packed full of correct and inaccurate information, challenging argument, and attractive, though not always persuasive, solutions.

This book should satisfy the general reader and the strategic thinker, but probably will arouse the ire of any specialist whose area of interest has been slighted; and presumably this will include most specialists. There is a great need for short and comprehensible books on strategy. If the critical faculties of the various specialist groups must be satisfied (if that were a practical objective), a 2,000- rather than a 220-page volume would be required which, I am afraid, no one would read, let alone buy. This is the rare book, then, whose faults are identical with its virtues: brevity and simplicity had to be paid for by the neglect of full documentation and extensive reasoning. The author just does not say all he knows. It is a great tribute to Colonel Reinhardt that he succeeded so well in setting forth the main alternatives and possibilities of American strategy.

He is highly objective. The military atom is neither a cure-all nor a phantasmagoria. It does not stand alone but is accompanied by the peaceful atom. Military strength is required and war remains a distinct possibility, but a really effective foreign policy with a convincing ideology behind it is no less necessary. There is a worldwide threat posed by Communism but there are also many regional and local situations within whose framework Com-

munist does its damaging work. Anti-Communism is indispensable but not enough; there also must be a positive program. American interests must be defended more effectively than in the past but the interests of our allies must be satisfied too. The free and democratic nations must unite their efforts but alliances without leadership, common purpose, and a modicum of courage do not work.

As I understand it, the author proposes the following broad strategy: American foreign policy must be made effective by basing itself on firm operational "guide lines"; the author presents such "guide lines" in forceful language. It must use the various strengths at its disposal, including economic resources such as the peaceful atom and spiritual resources such as our political values. It must aim to effect the necessary "conversions"—surely this term has never before appeared in a strategic treatise. American policy also should aim at ending the current two-power duality and bringing about a global multipower balance, with Europe again being self-reliant and secure, and U.S. overseas forces largely redeployed to the Middle East. The economic strength of the free world must be stimulated into further growth, the alliance of free nations be revitalized in an organization called CONATS (for truly cooperating nations), and the Soviet leaders be persuaded to see that they cannot achieve world domination, nor even maintain the *status quo* as unwelcome conquerors of many non-Russian lands. Once the free world finds itself in a position of true strength, once "dormant discontent" within the Soviet orbit begins to "burgeon," we might attempt to negotiate "the withdrawal of the Red Army to new borders." It will take at least a decade to reach a point where such a negotiation can be undertaken with some hope of success.

Can we not get there faster through force?

"Historical situations involving a two-sided power struggle have usually resulted in a military showdown disastrous to both contestants, the victor too weakened to enjoy his triumph. This reason, plus the shadow of the hydrogen bomb, favors a strategy which will eventually roll back

communism, not destroy Russian power even were that within our means to accomplish. . . . We cannot, if we are to succeed, demand or instigate a complete abdication of Soviet power or a complete recasting of the Soviet people in our image. We can encourage Soviet leaders who are willing to consider a retraction, not the abolition, of Soviet power in return for tangible benefits. . . . History indicates that men can be found who will themselves believe that some accommodation with the free world is a necessary step in a progressive alteration of the Soviet system. Any basic alteration in Soviet society will have to be conceived and carried through by the varied peoples comprising it. External manipulation cannot achieve what the people themselves do not want. We need only do what has been done so often in history—help those leaders, even from the top level of the Party, who will risk working with us to better their own people. If the German General Staff could open Lenin's path to power, is it beyond our capabilities to find the man, or men, to lead a more liberal Russia to cooperate with, rather than undercut, the United States?"

This is a novel approach which may be startling to many readers. Yet Colonel Reinhardt's case deserves an attentive hearing. The careful study of *American Strategy in the Atomic Age* is strongly recommended.

How Not to Do It

HAWAII UNDER ARMY RULE
By J. Garner Anthony
Stanford University Press, 1955
204 pages; \$5.00

Reviewed by
COLONEL FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER

As VJ-day recedes into the background of the past, the story of martial law in Hawaii appears at first blush to be just another chronicle of

Old, forgotten, far-off things,
And battles long ago.

But as the brooding threat of nuclear warfare is more and more impressed on our thinking, as the civic dislocation which

would inevitably follow the dropping of even a single bomb—A or H—becomes increasingly a subject for study and concern, it is appropriate, not to say necessary, to review the only recent example from our history of virtually complete military control over domestic territory.

Martial law was initiated in Hawaii by proclamation of the Governor on the afternoon of Pearl Harbor Day. But instead of calling on the land and naval forces for assistance, instead of calling on the local commanders for military aid to the civil power, the Governor asked the commanding general to become the civil power—as Military Governor. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this step was not warranted by law. None the less, from December 1941 until July 1944, the senior Army officer in Hawaii bore the title of Military Governor of Hawaii, and until February 1943, exercised virtually complete governmental powers.

Unfortunately, he and his advisers lost sight of the principle that as necessity creates the occasion for martial rule, so it limits the extent and duration of such rule, with the result that convenience rather than necessity became the governing yardstick in Hawaii. Most questionable of all was the military order that closed the courts, and of course it is well known that, in 1946, the Supreme Court held illegal all military trials of civilians.

Some of the intervening incidents had all the earmarks of *opera bouffe*. When the Federal judge issued a writ of habeas corpus, the commanding general countered with a military order, the notorious GO 31, prohibiting this judge (by name) from entertaining any such proceeding, under pain of trial by military commission and punishment up to imprisonment for life. The judge thereupon cited the general for contempt, the general played hide-and-seek with the marshal who attempted to serve him, and, in the end, had to be rescued by a Presidential pardon from the consequences of his own militant precipitancy.

The validity of military trials of civilians had been upheld by the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit late in 1944. Before the cases could be heard in the Supreme Court, the war was over; but the prisoners were not released. "We've got to back up the theater commander!" Well, he was backed right up into the buzz-saw of an adverse decision that will be a substantial stumbling-block in any future dislocating emergency. And a good many questions, vital to future commanders, remain unanswered. For instance, if the writ of habeas corpus should be validly suspended in a future invasion because, in the language of the Constitution, "the public safety may require it," may a court inquire as to the necessity for such action? And if a commander, during such suspension, detains suspected individuals, is he thereafter subject to damage suits after the privilege of the writ is restored?

The volume under review is written by an acknowledged leader of the Hawaiian bar, who was Attorney General of the Territory during part of the war, and who was winning counsel in the Supreme Court cases to which reference has already been made. The picture he paints is, needless to say, a critical one, and his book reflects as well some personal animosities that could profitably have been deleted in the editing process. None the less, it is an account that the Army should ponder, for in large measure it is a how-not-to-do-it book. Certainly this is a subject worthy of the attention of the most senior of our service schools.

One basic criticism, however, must be noted: The thrust of Mr. Anthony's argument is that martial law was allowed to go on for years without correction from the War Department because of the precept that the judgment of the military commander in the field should not be disturbed. He repeats the statement, cherished in Hawaii, that President Roosevelt never saw the Governor's original proclamation of martial law. And so the picture presented is that of stubborn military adherence to error, without action by superior civil authority.

But is it conceivable that FDR never knew what went on? Even if it could be supposed that Mr. Stimson did not properly keep the President advised, can it be imagined for a moment that Secretary Ickes, who was fighting martial law from at least the summer of 1942, or Attorney General Biddle, who was on Ickes's side in the controversy, never got to the White House to protest? In order that the matter might not rest in conjecture or on the probabilities, this reviewer made inquiry of the Honorable John J. McCloy, who was Assistant Secretary of War during all of the period in question. Mr. McCloy replied:

... I do not have all my papers at hand and so can not cite you chapter and verse. However, the situation in Hawaii was gone over with President. Secretary Stimson was in constant touch with the President both by visits and telephone; drafts were discussed with the Attorney General, and I know there was a conference with the President about them.

This book, then, merits careful study. But the definitive history of Hawaiian martial law has yet to be written.

Provocative View

THE INFLUENCE OF FORCE IN FOREIGN RELATIONS

By Captain W. D. Puleston, USN, Retired
D. Van Nostrand Company, 1955
261 Pages; Index; \$4.50

Reviewed by

MAJOR GENERAL H. W. BLAKELEY

Captain Puleston's current book is controversial. Among those who will not like it are believers in the United Nations, friends and admirers of Admiral Stark and

General Marshall, many Air Force officers, and all those who believe that an inherent element in the American philosophy is that our armed forces must not strike the first blows in any future war. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that each of these diverse groups will not like part of *The Influence of Force in Foreign Relations*.

In a chapter called "Is the World Ready for the United Nations?" Captain Puleston's answer runs along the line that the objective of the UN organization is a just and permanent peace, and that everything is to be subordinated to that end, even, temporarily, peace itself, because the Security Council is directed to prepare armed forces to be used to avert or suppress war. This, he argues, would, if successfully carried out, result in a static world politically, and "such a world might well be a stagnant world." Elsewhere he says, "If Great Britain, Russia, and the United States agree, the super State is superfluous; if they disagree it is helpless."

Fleet Admiral King is by far the author's favorite character. The book is dedicated to him, and among the compliments paid him is an interesting one in connection with a discussion of whether or not King should have been given command of the fleet in the Pacific: "There is no question that King was needed in Washington, but he was badly needed in the Pacific to restrain MacArthur. It would have been well for the nation if the Navy had had at its disposal two Admiral Kings."

Also in the field of personal appraisal is the author's comment that Churchill's frequent notes to his land, sea, and air force commanders (many of these notes are included in the appendices of his *World War II* volumes) indicate "a complete lack of confidence . . . in his professional assistants." The true picture seems rather to be that of a leader on top of his job, riding it every minute, and using the spurs judiciously and, admittedly, vigorously.

Captain Puleston's discussion of the characteristics and limitations of air, sea, and land forces is of professional interest. Air and Army officers will inevitably think that it has a Navy slant, but there are many indications that officers of all the armed forces are becoming more receptive to the consideration without resentment of the points of view of members of other services.

At times, Captain Puleston seems to be arguing against unity of command. He calls General Marshall's proposal just after Pearl Harbor to establish unity of command over all the forces of America, Britain, Holland, and Australia, in the so-called ABDA area, "catastrophic." He also disagrees, as did the British Government, with the idea of the American Chief of Staff that a Supreme Commander should be appointed to command all the Allied operations against Germany from both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. It may be that Captain Puleston is actually con-

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A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 64 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

AIR COMMANDO. By Serge Vaculik. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1955. 320 Pages; \$4.00. A factual story of a young Czech who escaped from the Germans to join De Gaulle, was captured by the Spaniards and was recaptured by the Germans while working with the Free French. Some of the adventures are close to incredible; very good reading but it out-fictions fiction.

THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM. By Lewis Mayers. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 589 Pages; Index; \$7.50. An examination of our legal institutions as distinguished from our laws, written for the layman. It has a rather extensive section on military courts and tribunals in which the author mentions the problem of separating the commander's wishes from the actual outcome of the trial.

AMERICAN STRATEGY IN THE ATOMIC AGE. By Colonel George C. Reinhardt. University of Oklahoma Press, 1955. 236 Pages; Index; \$3.75. A geopolitical approach to America's foreign policy with positive recommendations that do not include the necessity for a shooting war.

FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS. By Charles Abrams. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 404 Pages; Index; \$5.00. An examination of the problem of minority groups and race prejudices in American housing. A rather complete study and one that may become a rather important tool for sociologists.

FROM HERE TO SHIMBASHI. By John Sack. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 214 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.75. Another slightly strained attempt at Army humor but this one, strangely enough, brings forth a few chuckles from those whose service has lasted more than a couple of years.

AN INTRODUCTION TO JAPAN. By Herschel Webb. Columbia University Press, 1955. 130 Pages; \$2.75. A short once-over-lightly which offers in a very few pages helpful information on the land and the people, history, government, economic life, social and cultural life, fine arts, literature, religion and philosophy. A masterpiece of compression.

MAN ON EARTH. By Jacquetta Hawkes. Random House, 1955. 242 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.75. A book on man's early beginnings and following man's evolution to the present, with a slight projection to the future. Written in inspirational vein.

MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE. By William B. Aycock and Seymour W. Wurfel. University of North Carolina Press, 1955. 430 Pages; Index; Appendix; \$7.50. A textbook based on the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals rendered during the first three years of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

THE NAVY WIFE. By Anne Briscoe Pye and Nancy Shea. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 336 Pages; Index; \$3.50. The third revised edition of what has long been a standard military book.

NO FACILITIES FOR WOMEN. By Charlotte Ebener. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955. 291 Pages; Index; \$3.75. A feminine war correspondent writes of her adventures in odd corners of the world, beginning with China in 1944 and going on to Korea, Indochina, Yugoslavia, the Middle East and the Himalayas. Not an important book, but it does give a slightly different view of late events in some of the odd corners of the world.

NO. 13, BOB. By Jean Overton Fuller. Little, Brown & Co., 1955. 240 Pages; \$3.50. A book about a failure of British intelligence in World War II which may cause quite a stir. It is a story of the success of German counter-espionage and, according to the publishers, an attempt was made to suppress the author's investigation of this particular case.

THE PASSIONATE STATE OF MIND. By Eric Hoffer. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 151 Pages; \$2.50. 280 aphorisms by the author of *The True Believer*, for the same audience. Biting and provocative.

THE POOR MAN'S GUIDE TO EUROPE. 1955. By David Dodge. Random House, 1955. 307 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.50. How to do your European traveling on a slim budget. Chatterly written and on the whole should prove a useful guide book, especially for military personnel overseas.

SCOTLAND YARD. By Sir Harold Scott. Random House, 1955. 256 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00. Another in a long series of descriptive books of probably the most glamorous of police agencies. This one was written by a man who was the Commissioner of Police during 1945-1953 and covers a wide area of information from recruiting to planning for state visits by foreign royalty.

SMALL ARMS OF THE WORLD. By W. H. B. Smith. Military Service Publishing Co., 1955. 768 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$10.00. A revised and enlarged volume of a standard text; contains information on the F.N. rifles and other new matériel. A useful book for weapons experts and just plain gun bugs.

SPIES AT WORK: A History of Espionage. By Ronald Seth. Philosophical Library, Inc., 1955. 234 Pages; Index; \$4.75. A history of espionage in 228 pages cannot be very profound; in portions it is quite interesting.

STILL THE RICE GROWS GREEN. By John C. Caldwell. Henry Regnery Company, 1955. 312 Pages; \$3.75. Mr. Caldwell finds very little good in our handling of the Far East question by the State Department and USIA and much to criticize in the Army's role in our relations with the Orient. The underlying theme is one of hope that the people of Asia are not lost to the forces of evil.

TWO STUDIES IN SOVIET CONTROLS: COMMUNISM AND THE RUSSIAN PEASANT AND MOSCOW IN CRISIS. By Herbert S. Dinerstein and Leon Goure. The Free Press, 1955. 254 Pages; Notes; Bibliography; \$4.50. A particularly timely report on Russia showing the difficulties of effective control of the Russian peasant under the collective farm system and the reactions of the people of Soviet Russia to the seemingly imminent capture of Moscow by Hitler's armies in October, 1941.

U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: THE WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS. By Mattie E. Treadwell. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955. 841 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.25. A thicker-than-usual volume of the official history that will explain to the World War II soldier many points in connection with the Women's Army Corps that seemed inexplicable at the time.

WHY JOHNNY CAN'T READ AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. By Rudolf Fleisch. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 222 Pages; \$3.00. The famed author of *The Art of Plain Talk* advocates what is basically a return to the fundamentals that we 40-year-old-and-over people were drilled in before educational concepts changed. Phonics is the answer although it is not quite that simple.

cerned with what is permissible in the geographic size of a command rather than disagreeing with the principle itself. He does have an interesting point in discussing the fact that the Japanese General Homma refused to accept the surrender of Cor-

regidor unless Wainwright included all the United States troops in the Philippines. "Wainwright, thanks to the Army system of extending commands over vast areas, felt obliged," says Puleston, "to comply with Homma's demands. . . ." Nevertheless, at

some level, unity of command is generally regarded as necessary. The question may well be: "What level?" And suppose General Bradley had been surprised and forced to surrender in Luxembourg City during the Battle of the Bulge. Would he have

had to surrender the entire 12th Army Group? An absurdity, of course, but it is sometimes possible to argue from the extremes of a problem back to a sound solution.

Captain Puleston is strongly opposed to the theory that in any future war the enemy must be allowed to strike the first blow. His alternative is essentially dependence on an ultimatum when a dangerous situation is thought to exist. He believes that if we persist in a policy of attempted retaliation on an enemy privileged to deliver the first blow, some future historian will record how citizens of the United States "committed national suicide."

The Code is Here to Stay

MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

By William B. Aycock and Seymour W. Wurfel
The University of North Carolina Press, 1955
430 Pages; \$7.50

Reviewed by
COLONEL FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER

The Uniform Code of Military Justice, with its capstone, a civilian Court of Military Appeals, has now been in operation for nearly four years, and, notwithstanding some current rumbling from the services, both will be with us in essentially their present form for a long time to come. It may be galling to the high JAG brass that the hitherto inviolate system of military courts is now subject to review by outsiders, but so long as the members of Congress can reply to anguished communications from constituents with the reassuring news that the misconduct of poor misunderstood and maltreated Johnny may be appealed to a civilian tribunal, there is no danger—or, depending on the point of view, no hope—that the Court of Military Appeals will soon be abolished. The 531 statemen on the Hill are now out of the court-martial business, and few if any cherish the slightest desire of reentering it.

The Court then, and most of the Code, are here to stay—but until very recently there was no workable key to the mass of decisions, not always too consistent, that have been handed down.

Professor Aycock and Colonel Wurfel have filled the previously existing gap, and have written a first-rate and eminently useful textbook on present-day military law. They cover jurisdiction of courts-martial, the law officer, all of the incidents of the trial, appellate review, the problem of the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law, punishments, the rules of evidence, the punitive articles, military habeas corpus, and the vexed problems of "military due process" and "general prejudice." The several chapters are logically subdivided, making it easy to turn to the precise point on which guidance is sought. All CMA opinions through 13 August 1954 have been considered.

Any criticisms of the work under review

shade into personal preferences as to emphasis and interpretation. On occasion there is too much reference to military antiquity, in other places the historical development of jurisdictional concepts and of the machinery of military appellate review, both of which are still illuminating today, seems not to be sufficiently emphasized. Parts of the discussion on military habeas corpus appear more hopeful than the most recent decisions on critical analysis would seem to justify. But then, as is well known, any time three lawyers gather together, they express four opinions, and a reading of recent CMA decisions (with often two and three separate opinions per case) will assuredly dispel any notion that military law is either an exact or a predictable science.

To repeat: This is a first-rate text, which every military lawyer will want—and need.

For the Gun Bug

SMALL ARMS OF THE WORLD

by W. H. B. Smith
Military Service Publishing Co., 1955
768 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$10.00

Reviewed by
BURTON D. MUNHALL

In December of 1943 Walter H. B. Smith published *A Basic Manual of Military Small Arms*. This 213-page paperback volume, selling at two dollars, enjoyed immediate favor with service men and civilians who at that time were particularly thirsty for knowledge of military small arms. Since 1943 this volume has been issued in five revised and enlarged editions in eleven printings. This 1955 volume is the fifth revised and enlarged edition with 250 additional pages and resembles its forebears only in the fact that it remains a treatise on military infantry weapons of many nationalities.

The first 230 pages are devoted to a historical discussion of all types of military small arms explaining, in brief, the development of each type. While no one volume could possibly give the full history of arms, Smith presents an interesting story which covers the more important achievements in this field.

The most valuable portion of the book to the arms student is Part II entitled "Current Weapons." This 526-page section is subdivided alphabetically by nationality and covers twenty-nine countries. It apparently was the author's intention to discuss the present pistols and revolvers, rifles, submachine guns and machine guns of each nation, and it is regrettable that in many instances his material on a particular country is extremely meager. As a case in point, under "Argentina" only the Argentine Mauser rifle is listed with a note stating that other Argentine arms are pictured in Part I. This reviewer would prefer to have some of the historical material in Part I omitted in favor of showing more arms of a nation under that country's sec-

PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY BOOKS

□ **DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUIDED MISSILE** by Kenneth W. Galtland. This edition has been completely revised and greatly enlarged, a number of useful features having been added. New chapters deal with problems of propulsion, research into rocket techniques and requirements, and post-war work on guided bombs. Of particular importance is the detailed survey of Russian potentialities for long-range rocket development. An appendix reveals some details of the telemetering equipment used in British missiles, and another appendix shows photographs, to scale, of over forty notable rockets from various countries. The table of characteristics which was an important feature of the first edition has also been enlarged, and now provides data on 140 powered rockets from eight countries. Illustrated. \$4.75

□ **THE NEW WARFARE** by C. N. Barclay. Brigadier Barclay, known to many as Editor of "The Army Quarterly," discusses and develops the theme that the existing conditions in world affairs amount to war, the new warfare, not a full-scale shooting contest, but the modern substitute of propaganda, underground activities, armed threats and limited war by proxy. \$2.75

□ **THE SCOURGE OF THE SWASTIKA** by Lord Russell. THE BOOK THEY TRIED TO BAN. A Short History of Nazi War Crimes. Twenty-eight hitherto unpublished documentary photographs. \$4.50

□ **ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ATOMIC ENERGY** by Frank Gaynor. More than 2,000 entries defining and explaining concepts and terms in nuclear physics and atomic energy make this volume a vital handbook for all those concerned with atomic science. Illustrations, charts, tables. \$7.50

□ **THE ORIGIN OF RUSSIA** by Henryk Paszkiewicz. Professor Paszkiewicz sheds new light on the part of the Eastern Slavs and the Finns on the Volga by linking it with the history of the Norsemen, of Great Moravia, Poland, Lithuania, Byzantium, and the Tartar Golden Horde. The author is intimately conversant with the abundant literature of the period and refers to sources hitherto disregarded. \$10.00

□ **JET** by Sir Frank Whittle. This book is primarily the historic story behind the world's first successful jet airplane. The author, who in 1930 had applied for his patent for a turbo-jet engine, here sets on record with characteristic modesty his own courageous pioneer work. \$6.00

□ **THE NEW MILITARY AND NAVAL DICTIONARY** edited by Frank Gaynor. This is the first comprehensive and up-to-date definitive glossary which covers all branches of the armed forces—Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Civil Defense. Charts and tables. \$6.00

□ **SPIES AT WORK** by Ronald Seth. Here are all the great names of espionage, and a host of lesser ones. Mr. Seth illustrates the development of the "art" with story after story of cunning, daring, resource and personal courage—and often abject failure—which makes the most exciting and complete account of espionage ever written. The author of *A SPY HAS NO FRIENDS*, and a Secret Service agent during the last war, Mr. Seth brings to this work authentic knowledge of his subject. \$4.75

□ **TWO YEARS IN THE ANTARCTIC** by Kevin Walton. This is the first personal account of two years spent in British Antarctica since the war. Kevin Walton went to the Antarctic as a member of the newly formed Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey and during his first year he trained himself and his dogs to live and travel in difficult country. The next year, an American expedition arrived and later both parties combined to complete an extensive survey of the East Coast of the Graham Land Peninsula. \$4.75

□ **EUROPEAN FIREARMS**. A richly illustrated history covering arms of the 16th and 17th centuries. Compiled by J. F. Hayward of Victoria & Albert Museum. \$7.50

□ **FLIGHT HANDBOOK**. The fundamental theory of aerodynamics is simply explained, and the design principles of each class of aircraft, from balloons to missiles, are lucidly described. Engineering principles in piston engines, gas turbines, ramjets, pulse-jets and rockets are discussed, and the theory of aerial navigation is also covered.

On the practical side, there is a vast amount of information on modern aircraft and engine construction, on auxiliaries, controls and instruments, furnishings and fittings, armament, landing gear and similar matters. Types of aircraft dealt with in detail include balloons, airships, gliders, mail-planes, piston-engined and jet fixed-wing machines, helicopters and other rotorcraft, and even guided missiles. More than 200 photographs and drawings. \$6.00

□ **SPACE TRAVEL** by Kenneth W. Galtland and Anthony M. Kunesch. An illustrated survey of its problems and prospects. \$4.75

□ **A TREASURY OF PHILOSOPHY** edited by Dagobert D. Runes. Here is one of the most comprehensive collections of philosophical writings ever to be gathered between the two covers of one book. In a text of over 1,500 pages, under more than 375 separate entries, are to be found, not only the great philosophers of the West, but the important, and less familiar, thinkers of the Orient. \$15.00


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tion in Part II. It is always an annoyance to be referred elsewhere in arms research, although it is conceded that many times this is unavoidable. It is a matter of public record that all modern armies use handguns, rifles, submachine guns and machine guns. Information on the makes of these weapons is available and we believe it should have been included under each nationality, if only a single line entry giving the name of the weapon type. Under some nationalities the author does not give the data on later model rifles which are a matter of common knowledge. Under Turkey no mention is made of the Turkish Model 1924 Mauser chambered for the 7.92 x 57mm cartridge, although a mention is made that certain German and Belgian Mausers have been used by that country. Similar references appear under Belgium and Germany but the idea is conveyed in the Turkish listing that the earlier Model 1903-1905 is the standard infantry rifle.

In the data on Swiss rifles the Model 1911 Swiss Schmidt-Rubin is discussed at some length with a brief reference to the 1936 models. In the evaluation, the Swiss rifles are discounted to some extent due to the locking lugs being to the rear of the bolt, a weak design. No mention is made of the important difference in the 1936 models where the locking lugs were placed forward, a marked improvement. Such omissions create a false picture and are to be avoided in an arms reference book wherever possible. It is believed that further research would have corrected these errors.

The general pattern for the treatment of each weapon type is the listing of the specifications, an explanation of the basic operation and a step-by-step procedure for dismounting the arm. Many unique illustrations are included to show the salient points. Such information is not available on all arms, but, in fairness to Mr. Smith, such a treatise would run to many volumes. The data that are presented are in an orderly fashion and with the aid of the seven-page, closely printed index are readily accessible for quick reference.

The print style makes for easy reading and the many fine sectioned gun drawings are extremely valuable. As in many books, there are some illustrations which are too contrasty, thus not showing some details of interest. A few illustrations are misplaced, which is regrettable, but happens in spite of the best efforts of author and proofreader.

It is a very easy task to find fault with the work of others, but any book which discusses and illustrates several hundred weapons is worth this asking price in spite of the faults pointed out in this review. Having taken an active part in the preparation of a few books, we can fully appreciate what a monumental effort this represents. Those interested in modern infantry weapons will find it most informative and worthy of a place in their library.

Record of Disaster

ASSIGNMENT TO CATASTROPHE

Volume II: The Fall of France, June 1940

By Maj. Gen. Sir Edward Spears

A. A. Wyn, Inc., 1955

349 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; \$5.00

Reviewed by

MAJOR GENERAL H. W. BLAKELEY

This is the story of the French Government during the final seventeen days before it capitulated to the Germans in June 1940. It carries on the very frank and personal account begun by General Spears in his *Prelude to Dunkirk*. He pulls no punches, particularly in regard to the French commander in chief, General Weygand, and Camille Chautemps, Vice President of the Council. The troubles of a historian in writing an accurate record of a period could hardly be better illustrated than by comparing this book with Weygand's *Recalled to Service*. It is difficult to believe that the two authors are writing about the same events.

Spears, as his readers know, has, to a marked degree, the rare asset of achieving what the fiction writers call "reader identification" with himself as the main character in his chronicle. This is true even when he is engaged in a rather routine series of conferences and visits. And he slips in his little touches of humor in a masterly fashion. For example, he tells of the rather cloak-and-dagger affair of getting DeGaulle out of France. General DeGaulle, posing as a friend who had merely come to see Spears off, was by prearrangement hauled on board after the plane had actually started to move. They are soon in England: "I asked de Gaulle if he wanted anything, and he said he would like a cup of coffee. I handed it to him, whereupon, taking a sip, he said, in a voice which indicated that without implying criticism he must nevertheless tell the truth, that this was tea and he had asked for coffee. It was his first introduction to the tepid liquid which, in England, passes for either one or the other. His martyrdom had begun."

As has been indicated, however, he does not qualify with humor or anything else his opinions of men who he thought failed to measure up. Of Weygand, for example: "His own hostility to me, and, I felt certain, to the British point of view, was as perceptible as is sulphuric acid, and, I, on my side, was as loth to be near him as to someone suffering from a virulent disease. I need not have worried; a thirst to surrender is not a contagious complaint."

On the other hand, Spears seems never to have forgotten that a liaison officer's main job is to put oil on the machinery, not on the fire. In London, he tried to present the French arguments and explain their troubles, but the hard fact was that the French Army, so often proclaimed the best in the world with the usual apologetic comment that of course they didn't go in much for smartness and the outward forms of discipline, was lacking in firm command

control not only in terms of the qualifications of senior commanders, but in lack of communications, and in discipline. And, almost from the first and still inexplicably, it lacked mobile, properly located reserves, controlled by aggressive commanders and linked to them by multiple communications.

Unfortunately descriptive of American methods of personnel management, now being improved it is hoped by unit rotation and similar steps, is Spears's comment to Weygand: "Surely no one knows better than the Commander-in-Chief that you cannot throw packets of men at divisions as you slap plaster on a wall. A military formation is something more than a flock or herd made up of so many bodies."

Another point which Spears emphasizes and which has not been given very much attention, in this reviewer's experience at least, is the question of the authenticity of orders, both written and oral, not only to military commanders, but to mayors, postmasters, police chiefs, and managers of communications installations. The Germans in 1940 apparently used false orders given in writing, by messengers, and by telephone and telegraph to all these key persons with resultant major confusion. With America now within easy reach of surprise attack from the air, the point might well be a vital one, particularly in civilian defense procedures.

Useful for the Layman

INDEX-DIGEST AND ANNOTATIONS TO THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

By Colonel Lee S. Tillotson
Military Service Publishing Company, 1954
Third edition; 505 Pages; \$4.00


Reviewed by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL E. G. PIPER

Although Book One of this third edition reflects little change from the corresponding section of the 1952 edition, Book Two presents more than 1,800 annotations, 950 of which are new. There are 448 new annotations to the punitive articles. Consequently, anyone who has found either the 1951 or 1952 edition valuable will want to retire his old book and buy this latest revision.

Service lawyers, who usually have access to excellent libraries, are not likely to find an annotated code of much use except as a handy point of departure. They will probably criticize the third edition because it makes no provision for a supplement or "pocket port" and will therefore have to be again revised in a year or two to include the large volume of decisions that will be published during that period.

The layman, however, required to investigate charges, practice before and sit as a member of courts-martial, with nothing more than the Manual and certain pamphlets and local poop sheets, however excellent these may be, to guide him, will find the annotations interesting, informative, easy to understand, and something of a bargain at four dollars.



Pass In Review

This promises to be an interesting spring for the many Civil War fans among our readers. We lead off this month with four new titles that deserve particular mention.

Those who read Earl Schenck Miers's fine story of General Sherman, *The General Who Marched to Hell*, should welcome his new work on Grant at Vicksburg, *The Web of Victory* (\$5.00). This book follows somewhat the same pattern of the Sherman book, in that you get a portrait of the principal subject as well as a detailed account of the battle in question.

Although we have not yet seen a review copy, we are most intrigued by what we have learned about the forthcoming *Decisive Battles of the Civil War* (\$4.00), by Colonel Joseph B. Mitchell. This book should be valuable. First Manassas, Shiloh, The Seven Days, Second Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Murfreesboro, Chancellorsville, Vicksburg, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and Petersburg are the decisive battles described. Perhaps the outstanding feature of this book is the effort to show the war in maps. There will be 26 two-color and 9 black-and-white maps. The campaign maps will show the roads of the Civil War period with the roads of today superimposed, so that the book can be used as a guide book for visits to the battlefields. Nine maps are designed to show the progress of the war and to integrate the battles into the overall picture.

A reissue of a memoir that has long been out of print is *Destruction and Reconstruction* (\$7.50). The original was written by Richard Taylor, son of President Zachary Taylor and brother-in-law of Jefferson Davis. This is a view of the war years and the reconstruction period through the eyes of an ardent Confederate with an acid pen. He discusses Confederate strategy in three theaters and has some interesting sketches of his associates and some pointed comments on his "damyankee" opponents.

The last title of our quartette is not in the strict sense a "Civil War" title, but it belongs in this grouping. Jim Bishop's *The Day Lincoln Was Shot* (\$3.75) is certainly one of the most talked about books of the day. Of course, the fact that it was a February Book-of-the-Month Club selection has brought it to the attention of a wide audience, but we have been surprised at the number of people who have gone out of their way to say how much they enjoyed it. The reader gets an hour-by-hour close-up of the activities of not only the two principals—Lincoln and Booth—but many of the supporting characters such as Grant, Stanton, Seward, and Johnson as well as Booth's band of conspirators. It's a fascinating account uniquely told.

As you may have noted on the back cover of the March issue, the new edition of *Psychological Warfare* (\$6.00) by Paul M. A. Linebarger is coming off the press now. This is a most important book in a vital field and one that is useful at all levels. Our Combat Forces Press is also producing another volume of unusual interest at this time and that is the companion volume to our popular *Combat Actions in Korea* (\$5.00). The new book is *Combat Support in Korea* (\$5.00) and was written by Captain John G. Westover. Westover has written an excellent record of the unusual and outstanding accomplishments of the technical and administrative services in their support of the battles in Korea. Certainly we have fought in few places where the initiative and ingenuity of the support elements were more sorely taxed than in Korea. The terrain, the elements, and the enemy conspired to make things as difficult as possible and it is encouraging and heart-warming to see how these American soldiers met and overcame the challenge.

For the record: The latest volume of *The U.S. Army in World War II* series just out is *The Women's Army Corps* (\$6.25), by Mattie Treadwell. C. S. Forester has introduced the modern counterpart of Horatio Hornblower in *The Good Shepherd* (\$3.75). This topnotch sea yarn concerns itself with the suspenseful action of the destroyer escort *Keeling* during the Atlantic convoy days of World War II. Captain Krause, the *Keeling's* skipper, is the main character. Three other recommendations: *Crusade in Asia* (\$4.00), by Carlos Romulo; *From Lexington to Liberty* (\$6.00), by Bruce Lancaster; and *Duel of Wits* (\$4.00), by Peter Churchill. The last is a Resistance thriller set in France during the early years of World War II.

R.F.C.

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